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FOREWARD
In no war where Americans have been engaged in battle against 
foreign foes, except the American Revolution, has desertion been 
classified as a major issue, although it has always been a concern of 
military commanders. It is ironic that it should have been so serious 
a factor during the period when Americans were fighting to establish 
a new nation based on lofty principles. Since 1783, generations of 
Americans have pointed with pride to the gallant little army that 
persevered and finally won independence for the United States.
However, Americans have closed their eyes too long to the hardships 
that some men were unable to endure, as if desertion were un­
thinkable for patriots and too unpleasant to concern us now.
This study will explore the problem of desertion in the 
American army during the War of the Revolution as fully as possible.
A look at the laws passed by the states and the central government 
that pertain to desertion, both in the Continental army and the 
militia forces, will show the efforts of Congress and the states 
to deal with shirkers. The causes of desertion will be dealt with in 
three chapters followed by a chapter on the extent of desertion, which 
makes an attempt to establish how many men left illegally from the 
American service. The chapter on apprehension will show the various 
means used by the army to retrieve their runaways. Two chapters
iv
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V
are concerned with the prevention of the crime: they deal with the
army's attempts to correct grievances and to improve the recruiting 
system and describe the types of punishments to which deserters were 
subject. The concluding chapter considers the effect of desertion 
on military operations.
Many questions have been raised about the problem of 
desertion in the army during the American Revolutionary War. Some 
of these questions will be answered in this study, but no doubt more 
will be raised than answered. It is conceded that much additional 
work needs to be done in this area, especially since this investigation 
is principally devoted to the American field army under Washington's 
immediate command.
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ABSTRACT
This is a study of desertion, in the American army during the 
Revolutionary War. Emphasis is placed on the following facets of the 
subject: laws, regulations, and policies enacted by governing bodies
to combat desertion; reasons men deserted; extent of illegal departures; 
capture of deserters; action by authorities to prevent desertion; 
punishment of deserters; and effect of desertion on the operation 
of the army.
The states passed numerous laws to regulate the activities of 
militia forces and state lines serving with the Continental army.
These laws provided punishment for men who refused to report when 
ordered and for those who left the service prior to the termination 
of their legal tour of duty without proper authorization. Additional 
state laws prohibited civilians from assisting known army runaways.
The Continental Congress enacted the Articles of War (1775- 
1776) to govern the army. Several provisions in the Articles of War 
gave the army authority to apprehend deserters, bring them to trial, and, 
if convicted, impose punishment ranging from reprimands and whippings 
(not to exceed one hundred lashes) to the death penalty.
Soldiers deserted the service for a variety of reasons. Physical 
hardship was a principal qause, as were inadequate food, clothing, 
and shelter. Sickness and the lack of medical attention prompted 
others to seek solace away from the army. Delays or the failure to be 
paid angered some soldiers to the point that some gave up serving.
Rigid discipline, poor officers, disgust with recruiting methods,
ix
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and long periods of Idleness soured minds against the army and Induced 
many to flee. Homesickness and personal business concerns lured 
others away. A considerable number of men deserted to receive 
additional bounties offered to recruits. Fear of death or wounding 
in combat or capture spurred a few to abandon their army duty.
The exact number of men who deserted the American army is 
difficult to ascertain, in no small part, because of incomplete and 
often inaccurate records. This study indicates that from 20 to 25 per 
cent of the men who served in the army during the Revolutionary period 
deserted. Recruiting officers played an important role in capturing 
deserters. Civilians occasionally recovered shirkers.
To prevent desertion the army punished some of the guilty, 
sometimes severely, while at the same time it tried to correct glaring 
abuses. No amount of punishment dissuaded men from leaving the army. 
Even the death penalty —  awarded to hundreds of convicted deserters 
and actually carried out in a few dozen cases —  was no deterrent 
to men determined to run away. As disagreeable as harsh punishment 
was, commanders were reluctant to abandon its use, even though they 
knew from experience that it brought little good in stopping defections.
Desertion in combat occurred frequently, especially during 
marches and retreats, or at other times when men found themselves 
separated from the main body of troops. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that desertion materially altered the outcome of 
any engagement. The most damaging results of desertion came in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
form of discouraging recruiting, harming morale, frustrating 
commanders planning battles, and reducing the army's effectiveness.
Even so, it is doubtful that desertion prolonged the war. It is quite 
possible that the Commander in Chief at times exaggerated the magnitude 
of the problem.
Various sources of information were highly important in this 
study. George Washington's writings edited by John C. Fitzpatrick 
was the primary reference used, supplemented by the Washington Papers 
in the Library of Congress. The Papers of the Continental Congress 
and the Revolutionary War Records in the National Archives were 
invaluable sources. Published papers of general officers were 
used extensively, along with numerous diaries and journals of 
individual soldiers.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF DESERTION
The problem of desertion is not a popular subject for 
tradition-minded Americans who look with great pride on the heroic 
soldiers of General George Washington in the Revolutionary War. 
There are many books describing the acts of American heroes, but 
few that deal with desertion and punishment in the patriot camp.*" 
Nevertheless, desertion was a troublesome sore that caused 
Washington much pain.
Eighteenth-century Americans were not totally unaware of 
the military's struggle with soldiers who abandoned the service. 
European armies also faced the problem of desertion; and although 
they dealt with quitters by imposing severe punishment, they 
experienced relatively little success in preventing it on a large 
scale. According to Fred Wilson, in his digest of laws governing 
desertion, no satisfactory remedy "has ever been advanced whereby 
the evils attendant upon and growing out of the matter may be
*"A few books that deal with the problem to some extent are: 
Carl Van Doren, Mutiny in January (New York: Viking Press, 1943),
John E. Bakeless, Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes (New York:
J. B. Lippincott, 1959); Lynn Montross, Rag, Tag, and Bobtail: 
Story of the Continental Army (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1952); Benjamin Allen Bowman, Morale of the American Revolutionary 
Army (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1943).
1
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opracticably met or removed." Military service, whether voluntary 
or compulsory, was ordinarily attended with hardships and restraints 
exceeding the expectations of most men, however honest and praise­
worthy their motive for embracing it. During wartime the severity 
of discipline and the presence of the enemy usually operated to 
lessen the frequency of the crime, and capital punishment often 
deterred others from disgracing themselves and their flag. But a 
few always managed to slip away.
The problem of desertion had existed in the English colonies 
prior to the Revolution, and George Washington had had to deal with 
it while commanding his Virginia regiment on the frontier during the 
Seven Years’ War. Whippings and imprisonment, used frequently, 
proved to be no real deterrent to desertion, and Washington had
even resorted to hanging a few of the worst offenders to set an 
3example. Washington, in fact, maintained that he could not keep
2Fred T. Wilson, Digest of Laws, Rulings, and Decisions 
Governing the Military Crime of Desertion (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1882). Hereinafter cited as Wilson, Digest of 
Laws.
3John C. Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself: A Common
Sense Biography Written from His Manuscripts (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1933), 66; Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, 
May 3, 1756, George Washington Papers (124 Rolls [Microfilm], Manu­
scripts Division, Library of Congress), Roll 3. Hereinafter cited as 
Washington Papers; Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, August 3, 1757, 
ibid.
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an army together without literally "whipping it into line" in the 
4European fashion.
Furthermore, the British army in American colonies had to 
deal continually with, desertion, especially during the French and 
Indian War. Large provincial bounties often increased desertion 
of the British regulars.'’ Pontiac's Indian uprising, 1763-1764, 
forced the ret .oats to fight an elusive enemy on his own ground and 
under miserable conditions. Some British soldiers in that campaign 
occupied isolated Mississippi posts, where they lived in Indian 
huts, suffered sickness, fevers, fright and despair; consequently, 
many fled the service. An expedition to Illinois in 1764, 
commanded by Major Arthur Loftus, failed primarily because of
g
desertion. Loftus' trouble began at New Orleans while recruiting 
his men. In spite of the threat of severe punishment, twenty men 
deserted before the detachment left the city. Ten men disappeared 
during the first night's encampment; sixteen more escaped during 
the next five nights in spite of posted guards. Even one of the 
guards fled his post, but he was captured, court-martialed,
^Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, October 8, 1775; September 
23, 1756, ibid.
■’John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army
in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), 99.
£
Robert R. Rea, "Military Deserters from British West Florida," 
Louisiana History, IX (Spring, 1968), 124.--
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sentenced to death, and executed at the head of the regiment.7 Two 
more deserters caught aboard a ship in New Orleans were court- 
martialed and shot. Numerous British soldiers, along with American 
recruits and volunteers continued to "show their heels" during the 
1764 campaigns in West Florida, notwithstanding threats of death 
if captured.
Soon after the fighting broke out at Lexington in 1775, the 
throng of militiamen that eventually emerged as the American 
Continental army began defecting. Patriotic fervor, for a few 
individuals, quickly subsided and they decided to forsake the 
service. On August 24, 1775, Samuel Bixby recorded in his diary
Qthat a rifleman deserted. Accounts of known desertions, such as
this one, are profuse, and they continued daily with little let-up
throughout the war years.
For some of those who did not desert the traumatic experience
of being away from home and facing hardship produced the most
tragic consequences. Bixby noted on June 1, 1775, that a soldier
from Cambridge, "deeply in love and wishing to go home to see his
dear," was refused a leave of absence and consequently went into a
9b a m  and hanged himself. A few days later he noted another
7Ibid., 125.
^Samuel Bixby, "Diary of Samuel Bixby, May 4, 1775-January 
3, 1776," Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, XV 
(1875-1876), 292.
9Ibid.. 286.
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instance of suicide when a prisoner killed himself by jumping 
from a window of the guard h o u s e a n d  later in the war, William 
Moody wrote in his diary on July 20, 1779, that a soldier died of a 
self-inflicted wound, having blown his hand off with a gun."^ While 
a few took this way out, the more frequently used method of relief 
from the distresses of army life was simply to turn tail and run.
The countless references to desertion during the Revolution,
such as those found in letters and papers of most every general
officer and especially in Washington's official communications,
indicate that the problem ranked as one of the greatest concerns
of the entire military command. The Commander in Chief complained
often to the president of Congress about it; in 1777 he said that
the army was shamefully reduced by desertions, and that unless the
people helped in returning the runaways he would "be obliged to
12detach one half of the Army to bring back the other." In March, 
1777, writing to John McKinley, president of Delaware, Washington
10Ibid., 288.
^William Moody, "Diary of William Moody," Maine Historical 
Society, Collections and Proceedings, X (April, 1899), 144.
•^Washington to President of Congress, January 31, 1777.
John Clements Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of George Washington 
from the Original Manuscript Source (39 vois., Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1931-1944), VII, 81. Hereinafter cited as 
Writings of Washington.
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referred to the "scandelous practice of desertion" so prevalent 
13in the army. To William Buchanan, commissary general of the
Continental army, Washington confided in 1778, "the spirit of
desertion among the Soldiery never before rose to such threatening
heights, as at the present time."^ In a letter to Major General
Marquis de Lafayette in 1781, the General expressed his extreme
concern over the mood of his command, where desertions were
occurring at an alarming rate.1'*
Desertion is often mentioned in the correspondence of other
major American military commanders. In 1780 Brigadier General
William Irvine complained to Washington "that the Spirit of
16desertion still prevails." Major General William Heath voiced 
the same sentiment in a letter to the Commander in Chief in 1782:
13Washington to President John McKinley (Delaware), March 4, 
1777, ibid., VII, 243.
14Washington to William Buchanan, February 7, 1778, ibid.,
X, 427.
■^Washington to Lafayette, April 22, 1781, ibid., XXI,
493-94.
16Brigadier General William Irvine to Washington, January 4, 
1780, Pennsylvania Archives: Selected and arrang.ed from Original
Documents in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Nine 
Series, 138 vols., Philadelphia: Joseph Sevems and Company and
others, 1853-1935), 1st ser., VIII, 74. Hereinafter cited as 
Pennsylvania Archives.
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. . . desertions are too frequent in our army. I assure 
you it is become a serious affair. They are every day 
increasing. I have this moment a report of a very 
steady sergeant, corporal and three men going off from 
the 5th Massachusetts regiment. Desertions are as 
frequent in the Connecticut line; ten or a dozen are 
almost entirely of the old soldiers who are for the 
war, and unless some means are speedily devised to 
relieve them I fear the desertion will increase among 
that class. ^
Numerous British records verify that desertion was a serious
American problem. General von Knyphausen reported to Lord George
Germain in 1780 that Washington's army, located at Morristown, had
suffered from "a great desertion," and that "a general discontent
18prevades the whole army." As the war continued desertion rose 
to an alarming height not only embarrassing Washington and his 
general staff, but also interfering seriously with the conduct of 
military operation. Soldiers left singly and in whole units. The 
losses in the New York campaign in 1776 in particular worried 
Washington and the Continental Congress. Washington wrote to the 
president of Congress that the militia, thoroughly dispirited, were
•^Major General William Heath to Washington, July 23, 1782, 
"William Heath Papers," Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 
5th ser., IV (1878), 379-80. Papers found in 5th ser., IV (1878), 
1-285; 7th ser., IV, V (1904-1905), with a few in other volumes. 
Hereinafter cited as "Heath Papers."
18General von Knyphausen to Lord George Germain, March 27,
1780, extract from a letter printed in the New York Gazette, July 3, 
1780, William S. Stryker (ed.), Archives of the State of New Jersey: 
Extracts from American Newspapers (2nd ser., 5 vols., Trenton,
New Jersey: John L. Murphy Publishing Company, 1901-1917), IV,
468.
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19leaving in some instances almost by whole regiments. Frederick
Mackenzie of the Royal Welch Fusiliers stated that on a single
20day close to eighty Americans fled to the British lines.
While continentals, militia, and state troops all departed
illegally, Washington seemed to be especially conscious of the
instability of the militia forces, which disappeared in such large
numbers that the Commander in Chief doubted that he could get
sufficient service from them to justify their pay, meager as it
was.^l Within a two-week period, he reported that a Connecticut
militia regiment was reduced to fourteen fit men, all the others
22having slipped away; another regiment was down to less than
23thirty, and several others were reduced to half strength. The 
day after Fort Washington fell the Massachusetts militia began to
^Washington to the President of Congress, September 2, 1776, 
Writings of Washington, VI, 5.
20Frederick Mackenzie, Diary of Frederick Mackenzie as an 
officer of the Regiment of Royal Welch Fusiliers during the years 
1775-1781 (2 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1930), I, 64.
^Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography
(7 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948-1957, Vol. 7
by John A. Carroll and Mary W. Ashworth), IV, 205. Hereinafter cited 
as Freeman, Washington.
^Washington to Lund Washington, September 30, 1776,
Writings of Washington, VI, 137-38.
23Ibid., VI, 138.
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march homeward without being properly relieved; ^  and when 
Washington went to Hackensack to resume preparations for a 
withdrawal southward, he was appalled to find scarcely any of the
OCNew Jersey militia. He assumed that they either were frightened 
by the British victories or did not have American sympathies at 
heart. He lamented the use of militia because of their instability 
and bad influence on his regular troops:
To place any dependance upon Militia, is, 
assuredly, resting upon a broken staff. Men just 
dragged from the tender scenes of domestick life; 
unaccustomed to the din of Arms . . . when opposed 
to Troops regularly train'd, disciplined . . . makes 
them timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows. 
Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, 
(particularly in the lodging) brings on sickness in 
many; impatience in all, and such an unconquerable 
desire of returning to their respective homes that 
it not only produces shameful, and scandalous Deser­
tions amon 
in others.
Desertion certainly was not confined to the irregular units. 
During the terrible winter at Valley Forge, where most of the men 
were organized into Continental regiments, Joseph Galloway estimated 
that 1,134 soldiers and 354 sailors went over to the enemy, taking
24Freeman, Washington, IV, 254.
25Washington to John Augustine Washington, November 6, 
1776, Writings of Washington, VI, 245-46.
26Washington to President of Congress, September 24, 
1776, ibid., VI, 110-11.
» themselves, but infuses the like spirit 
16
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the oath of allegiance to Great Britain. He added that the bulk of
these runaways were foreign-born, most of them "natives of Ireland,
27England, or Scotland." The British claimed that 3,000 Americans
deserted to their camp during the first five months of 1777, a
number possibly exaggerated but still indicating that defection to
28the enemy had reached near ruinous proportions.
At times mass exits were prevented by the quick action of
the commanders. On January 1, 1780, a hundred Massachusetts men
stationed at West Point, declaring their enlistment had expired,
29marched off in a body. They were forcibly brought back, and
while some were punished, most of them were pardoned. In June of
that year thirty-one men of the First New York Regiment stationed
at Fort Schuyler left with their arms for want of pay and
30necessary clothing. In an exchange of gunfire, thirteen of the 
deserters were killed, and the remainder were returned to the fort.
Desertion remained a major problem until the very end of the 
war. In a letter to the Superintendent of Finance in 1782, 
Washington underscored the troubled disposition of the troops:
27Joseph Galloway, "An Account of the Number of Deserted 
Soldiers . . .," B. F. Stevens (comp.), Facsimiles of Manuscripts 
in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783, (25 vols., 
London: Malby and Sons, 1889-189?.), XXIV, 2094. Hereinafter cited 
as Facsimiles.
OQTheodore R. Thayer, Nathanael Greene: Strategist of the
American Revolution (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), 154-55.
29Van Doren, Mutiny in January, 20.
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"Minds soured by distresses are easily rankled; as a specimen of 
it, the privates of the Connecticut Line were the other day upon 
the eve of a general Mutiny." Washington continued: "Besides this,
desertions are more prevalent than ever; by the last Returns a
31greater number went off than ever did in the same space before."
It is almost impossible to determine how many American
soldiers fled from duty during the eight years of the war.
Benjamin A. Bowman, in his study of morale in the American army,
estimated conservatively that at least every other militiaman and
32every third Continental fled the service. Historical Statistics 
states merely that no official figures of troop strengths are 
available for the Revolutionary War.^ Volume twelve of The 
American State Papers provides a table that gives the number of 
men from each state that entered the Army, but nothing is included 
to indicate the percentage of desertions. The Army Almanac does
not bother to even discuss the topic, as is true of most army
'^Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, May 17,
1782, Writings of Washington, XXIV, 289.
32Benjamin Allen Bowman, "The Morale of Continental and 
Militia Troops in the War of the Revolution." (Ph.D. dissertation,
U. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1941), 70, 72.
33Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial
Times to 1957 (Washington: Bureau of Census, 1960), 731.
34American State Papers, Documents, Legislative and Executive. 
(38 vols., Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1861), XII, 14-19.
Hereinafter cited as American State Papers.
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35histories. Although Washington himself wrote hundreds of letters
that mentioned desertion, he gave no hint as to the total number
of soldiers that left. Troop musters and returns prepared for the
adjutant general's office during the war give the approximate
strength of the army, including the location of various units.
These reports, of course, do provide information about desertion,
but these records are both incomplete and often inaccurate. (A
careful study of data secured from these muster rolls will be
presented in chapter eight.)
Washington was especially annoyed by inaccuracies found in
many muster returns, since the aggregate of the army was altered
and usually more men were reported than were actually present. On
other occasions verbal reports of commanders differed greatly with
actual returns. Regiments, which Washington expected were nearly
completed according to reports from colonels, were found to "have
36only from fifty to one hundred men" by actual return. If these 
totals were faulty, it is not unreasonable to assume the other 
reports might also be defective.
35The Army Almanac: A Book of Facts Concerning the United
States Army (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1959);
William A. Ganoe, History of the United States Army (New York: 
Appleton-Century, 1936); Russell F. Weigley, History of the United 
States Army (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967); Francis V. Greene,
The Revolutionary War and the Military Policy of the United States 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911).
36Washington to Brigadier General John Armstrong, March 5, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, VII, 251.
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The overall number of deserters from all types of units 
during the Revolution has been estimated at from 184,000 to 
250,000. From an army reputed to have numbered only about a 
quarter of a million different enlistments during the war, this 
estimate would provide a range from 75 to 100 per cent!
Bowman's lower suggestion of from 33 to 50 per cent is probably 
more accurate. If these figures are true, then the American army 
experienced far more desertions than the usual 10 to 12 per cent 
which was characteristic of European armies.
A closer study will show that not all the men listed as 
deserters were actually guilty of that crime in a meaningful 
sense. In fact, terminology accounts for a considerable amount 
of confusion in trying to determine who should be classified as a 
deserter. Many duplications in records add to the total number of 
desertions listed.
The question must be asked: What is desertion? Fred Wilson
defined the crime as "the willful abandonment of the military service
by a soldier or officer duly enlisted or commissioned, or in the
pay of the government, without leave and without an intention to 
37return." In order to establish the nature of the specific 
offense, both these elements —  fact of the unauthorized voluntary 
withdrawal and the intent permanently to abandon the service —  must 
be proved. Using this definition, an unauthorized absence of a
37Wilson, Digest of Laws, 15.
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few hours, or even longer, without intent to leave permanently 
should not have been labled desertion. Yet this is in fact what 
happened during the recording of musters in the Revolutionary 
army. For lack of a different terminology men were often listed as 
deserters who had merely missed the muster formation. Recruits 
who did not report when ordered were also counted among the 
deserters. Militia troops were listed as deserters if they failed 
to show up for their training. Obviously then, the number of 
deserters in the American army during the Revolution was not as 
high as the records indicate. A conservative estimate of from 
20 to 25 per cent might be more correct than the higher figures 
given by Bowman and others.
Before considering statistics, a look at state and 
congressional laws governing men on active duty will provide the 
legal setting under which individuals who deserted were legally 
charged and brought to trial.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
MILITIA LAWS
During the eight years of the Revolutionary War, the state 
councils of safety, conventions, and assemblies passed a variety of 
laws dealing with desertion from military service. These laws 
may be grouped into three categories: (1) those dealing with rules
and regulations for each state's militia force; (2) those providing 
rewards for the apprehension of runaways and punishment for anyone 
harboring or enticing soldiers to desert; and (3) those dealing 
with treason, To some extent all these laws had an effect on the 
Continental army's problem of desertion.
All the states passed laws establishing militia forces.
Most of these laws provided for the organization of the state's 
military force, specifying duties, muster days, obligations, as 
well as prescribing punishment for non-compliance with the various 
articles in the military codes. The penalties for violation of
A
the state codes were usually minor compared with those provided for 
in the Articles of War which governed soldiers on active duty with 
the Continental army. While the intent of the laws in most cases 
was to discourage desertion, some of the laws actually worked in 
the opposite direction —  creating attitudes and practices that 
made desertion more widespread by allowing legal means to avoid
15
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military service. Also, some state laws enumerated penalties for 
desertion so minor that often the payment of the fine was far 
less of an inconvenience than fulfilling the designated tour of 
duty with the army. Many militiamen did not always feel bound to 
a definite committment to remain in service under all conditions 
and, therefore, some left without permission.
When the war began in April, 1775, the laws of only three 
of the former colonies —  New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Pennsylvania —  provided the death penalty for desertion, and they 
were either repealed soon after the colonies became states or were 
not enforced. Two states, Virginia and New Hampshire, used confine­
ment as the chief punishment for desertion, but the confinement 
period in both was lifted to two months. New Hampshire law 
prescribed corporal punishment for captured runaways, and that of 
Virginia called for the death penalty beginning in 1781. Most 
state militia laws provided fines only for non-attendance at drills.
In Article Eleven of the New Hampshire militia law, enacted 
September 19, 1776, desertion was to be punished at the discretion 
of a general court-martial, but Article Fifty-four of this code 
set limits to punishment specifying that a court-martial could 
inflict only "degrading, Cashiering, drumming out of the caiup, 
whipping not exceeding thirty-nine, fines or imprisonment, not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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exceeding one month.. However, Article Twenty-eight of the same
code allowed the death penalty for "abandoning post and inducing
others to leave." A court-martial sentence of death was to be
immediately put into effect by order of the commanding officer,
according to the New Hampshire code. The law further declared
that no confinement of more than eight days was allowed, until a
3court-martial could convene. On January 18, 1777, the New 
Hampshire Assembly enacted an additional law providing a fine of 
ten pounds for non-attendance at muster, which could be removed if 
the soldier furnished a convincing excuse for his absence. On 
June 26, 1779, another act was passed increasing the fine from ten
4to sixty pounds.
The Rhode Island General Assembly"* on December 11, 1776, 
voted to accept the Congressional Articles of War in their entirety
^Acts and Laws of the Colony of New Hampshire (Portsmouth: 
Daniel Fowle, 1780), 42.
2Ibid.. 40. 3Ibid., 42. 4Ibid., 159.
^Prior to June, 1775, Rhode Island had passed the "Rules of 
Army of Observation," which allowed the death penalty for betraying 
or changing the watchword and for compelling a commander to 
abandon his post. Flogging was limited to thirty-nine lashes.
John R. Bartlett (ed.) Records of the Colony of Rhode Island; 
and Providence Plantation in New England (10 vols., Providence; 1856- 
1865), VII, 340 ff. Rhode Island passed additional codes in 1777,
1779, 1792, 1794, and 1798. The code of 1792 specified that the 
death penalty would be by hanging only. The Public Laws of the State 
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (Providence Plantations:
Carter and Wilkinson, 1798), 442.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
g
and apply them to its militia on duty. The code was published and 
a copy furnished to each unit. This code announced the death 
penalty for desertion.
The Pennsylvania Council of Safety in 1775 enacted the death 
penalty for mutiny and desertion to the enemy, but the main 
militia law that was in force throughout the war, passed on May 
17, 1777, removed the death penalty for all offenses and allowed 
only a fine for a sentinel's sleeping on duty or for deserting 
his post.^ The law of 1777 was extremely lax and possibly accounted 
for the widespread desertion of the Pennsylvania militia troops 
during the war. Section Eleven of this code called for a forfeit of 
only ten shillings for any commissioned officer who refused to 
attend any of the days appointed for exercise; for non-commissioned 
officers and privates the fine was only five shillings for the same
g
offense. The penalty was increased to five pounds for field 
officers, fifteen shillings for commanding officers, and seven 
shillings for all enlisted men if the exercise was for a field day
Resolves of the General Committee Acting in Recess of the 
General Assembly (Providence: John Carter, 1777).
^Acts of the General Assembly of the Common-Wealth of 
Pennsylvania, enacted into laws, since the Declaration of Independence 
on the Fourth of July, A.D., 1776 (Philadelphia: John Dunlop,
1779), 22-30.
8Ibid., 24.
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rather than just a muster. For leaving his company and joining 
another company, an offense carrying the death penalty under the 
Continental code, the Pennsylvania law allowed a man to get off 
with a fine of only three pounds! Section Twenty-five of 
Pennsylvania's code stated that if "any militia man when called 
into actual service shall absent himself or desert from the 
company, battalion, or troop to which he belongs, the person or 
persons so offending shall forfeit and pay a sum equal to two 
months' pay, and if an officer, shall be cashiered."^ Under such 
a lenient code, it is no wonder that many men preferred to pay 
the two months' fine rather than endure the rigors of active duty. 
Even for such a serious crime as mutiny the penalty was moderate: 
"Any officer or private man, who shall begin, excite, cause, join 
in, or promote any mutiny or disturbance in the battalion, troop 
or company to which he belongs, or in any other battalion, troop 
or company, shall be fined or censured according to the nature of 
the offense, by a General or Regimental court-martial."^ Section 
Twenty of the Pennsylvania code limited the punishment any court- 
martial may prescribe: "No penalty shall be inflicted at the
discretion of a court-martial other than degrading, cashiering, 
or fining; the fines for officers not to exceed Ten pounds, fines
9Ibid., 27.
10Ibid., 281.
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for non-commissioned officers and privates, not to exceed five 
pounds for one fault.
On June 19, 1777, a supplement to the act to regulate the 
militia of Pennsylvania was passed which in effect greatly weakened 
Washington’s control over the militia forces while on active duty 
with the Continental army. It stated:
The militia of this state, while in actual continental 
service, shall be subject to the same Rules and Regulations 
as the Continental Troops are . . . provided, that upon 
any break, transgression or offense of a militia man, 
whether officer or private, against the Rules and Regu­
lations of the Continental Troops, the cause shall be 
tried and determined by a Court-Martial of the 
Militia of this state, except for a charge of High 
Treason.
It also provided that the sentence could be mitigated, suspended,
or pardoned by the president of the Executive Council or the
12commanding officer of the militia.
Pennsylvania passed a new militia law on March 20, 1780, 
authorizing a mulct of one day's pay for every day a militiaman
11Ibid., 30.
^ Ibld., 47. Most states reserved the right to mitigate 
sentences pronounced on militiamen under the Continental code.
Peter Force (ed.), American Archives . . . A Documentary History of 
the English colonies in North America (4th ser., 6 vols.,
Washington, 1837-1846; 5th ser., 3 vols., Washington, 1848-1853), 4th 
ser., IV, 62. Hereinafter cited as Force (ed.), American Archives.
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13neglected to perform a tour of duty, and a penalty of twenty 
days1 labor if the soldier left his company.^ A most 
extraordinary provision of the 1780 code was section Sixty-three:
That in case any militia man shall desert when he is 
out on a tour of duty, the commanding officer of the 
battalion or detachment from which he deserts, shall 
as soon as possible give notice thereof to the 
lieutenant of the city or county or sublieutenant 
of the district from which he came, who, if he does 
not see proper to send him back, shall subject him 
to the payment of such fine as he would have paid
if he had not gone out on such tour.-^
In short, if a soldier decided he wanted to go home, and he
did go, then the only penalty he had to face was the payment of
a fine equal to the days' pay that he missed, provided he could 
talk the county lieutenant into allowing him to remain at home.
No doubt many did just that. This same code restated the limitations 
upon courts-martial, that no penalty more than degrading, 
cashiering, or fining was allowed."^
The New Jersey assembly enacted militia laws that were in 
force for only one year, requiring renewal of the old laws or
^ Acts of the General Assembly . . .  of Pennsylvania (1780), 
356, Section 34.
^Ibid., 361, Section 41.
15Ibid., 369.
16Ibid., 367, Section 60, Item 9.
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annual passage of new ones. The New Jersey code, passed March 17,
1777, was the basic law that was used until 1781 when the militia
regulations were completely overhauled. None of the codes provided
the death penalty for offenses enumerated. The 1777 code allowed
a fine of ten shillings for the first offense and twenty shillings
for all other offenses of non-attendance at exercises, if no
reasonable excuse was provided for the absence.^ The 1780 code
increased the fine for all offenses to three times the original 
18amount. The fine of thirty shillings for refusal to muster, no 
doubt seemed like an enormous penalty to pay, and was, therefore, 
considered by the assembly to be inducement enough to make every 
militiaman obey orders. A supplement to a law passed June 5,
1777, stated that for the crime of desertion, the offender could
suffer whatever punishment a court-martial directed but was not to
19suffer loss of life. A supplement to the code passed September 23,
1777, provided a three pound fine for the crime of leaving one
20company and joining another.
17Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey at 
a_ Session begun at Princeton, on 27th day of August, 1776 
(Burlington: Isaac Collins, 1777), 29( Section 16. Hereinafter
cited as Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey.
1 ftIbid. (1780), 69, Article 11.
^ Ibid., 66, Article 2.
^ Ibid., 100, Article 2.
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If a soldier chose not to serve, he was allowed to enlist a
substitute to take his place. If he could not find a substitute
and still refused to serve, he was obligated to pay a fine to cover
the commanding officer's expenses incurred in finding the substitute 
21for him. The New Jersey regulations gave militiamen great 
latitude in choosing whether or not to obey orders summoning them 
to military service, and also protected militia forces when under 
the Continental code by specifying that the death penalty would 
apply only for treason, desertion to the enemy, and cowardice in
99action —  a highly questionable procedure.
Virginia, like most of the other states, had passed numerous
militia acts during its colonial period, and the provisions of
these colonial acts were retained to some extent during the first
few years of the Revolutionary War. The primary militia act passed
by the assembly in 1777 provided a forfeiture of two months' pay
23or a one month's confinement for desertion. The death penalty
for desertion was not allowed in Virginia until the assembly passed
24a supplementary act in 1781.
^ I b i d ., Article 7.
22Ibid., 52.
23Collection of all such Public Acts of the General Assembly 
and Ordinance of the Convention of Virginia Passed since the year 1768, 
as are now in force (Richmond: Thomas Nicholson and William Prentis,
1785), 52, Article 8. Hereinafter cited as Collection of all such 
Public Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia.
24William W. Hening (ed.), Statutes at Large: Being a
Collection of all the Laws of Virginia . . . 1619-1792 (13 vols.,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
Massachusetts militia laws provided a fine of from five to 
twenty shillings for neglect to appear as ordered on training or
muster days. The law specified that if a soldier who had missed
the muster or drill should
within fifteen Days next after such training or muster, 
make his application to the officer of said company, 
or the major part of them, and pay such fines as they 
order . . .  or shall obtain their Excuse, and 
present a certificate of the same under Hands of 
the clerk it shall be a Bar to any further action or
Complaint against him for such offense.^
The law was written so that the best interests of the soldier would
always be considered and none of his rights violated. This militia
code had a highly humanitarian and extremely democratic flavor,
which certainly did not enhance the effectiveness of the militia
forces. It was much too lenient especially with regard to
desertion. Washington and Congress continued to ask the states to
pass stricter militia laws dealing with the problem of
desertion. Massachusetts responded on March 3, 1781, by passing a
new law which provided an increased fine of from twenty to forty
26shillings for failure to appear as ordered.
Philadelphia, 1923), IX, 40; X, 418. Hereinafter cited as 
Hening (ed.), Statutes at Large.
2^Acts and Laws Passed by the Great and General Court or 
Assembly of the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 
(Boston: Benjamin Edes and Sons, 1780), 19.
26Ibid., (1781), 32-43.
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The Connecticut assemblymen passed both a militia act and 
a minuteman act in December, 1775. The minuteman legislation 
called for a force of men to be raised for the better defense of
27the colony and for the "defense of the rest of the united Colonies."
The members of the minuteman organization, who already belonged
to a military unit, were not allowed to be militiamen. The
minuteman law made the penalty for non-attendance of drill the
same as that prescribed for the militia. In May, 1776, the
General Assembly of Connecticut passed a militia law to supersede
the older laws, but the new law did not include a penalty for those
who refused to muster or march. A separate act, passed during the
same session, corrected this oversight by levying a fine of "ten
pounds Lawful Money" against soldiers who were guilty of these 
28offenses. On December 18, 1776, a completely new and unlarged
militia law was passed, but the penalty for non-attendance did
29not change; fines alone were allowed. An officer guilty of non- 
attendance could be fined forty shillings if no excuse were 
presented within twelve days.
27Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut in America 
(New London: Timothy Green, 1784), 1.
28Ibid., 423-24.
29Ibid., 441.
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The New York militia law, passed April 3, 1778, required that
twenty shillings should be paid by any foot soldier who failed to
appear on drill day, and a forfeit of forty shillings for any
30horse soldiers who did not attend scheduled drills. Officer
punishment was limited to demotion and disqualification from any
31military office within the state. The law further stated that
"fines may be fixed, for which any Persons adjudged to receive
32corporal punishment may commute such punishment." Such fines had 
to be paid within a specified time. An act passed on October 9, 
1777, lengthened the time that the state's militia forces might be 
used by the Continental army outside the state from forty days to 
three months. During such duty, all militiamen would be subject 
to the "Pains and Penalties, prescribed by the said Law [Militia] 
for any Refusal or neglect of Duty, Desertion and other offences
33respectively which shall be committed during such space of time."
It was not uncommon for New York militia troops to refuse to march.
30Laws of the State of New York Commencing with the First 
Session of the Senate and Assembly, after the Declaration of 
Independance, and the Organization of the New Government of the 
State (5 vols., Albany, 1886-1887), I, 32, Article 16. Hereinafter 
cited as Laws of the State of New York.
31Ibid., 33, Article 23.
32Ibid., 225-33. A new militia law was passed April 4, 1782.
33Ibid., 80.
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They felt that they did well to turn out for drill in the first 
place. Many did not wish to serve outside their state. For 
refusal to do so the only penalty was the payment of a fine, and 
often the fine seemed worth the price to avoid serving with the 
Continental forces even for a few days. Many left the service
*5 /the very day they arrived. Fearing no penalty, they were apt to
plead that they must sow their grain first.
The lower house of the Delaware General Assembly discussed
a militia hill in detail for two months before finally passing it
in 1777; the rules and regulations finally adopted were effective
35for only a short time. Additional laws were passed in 1778,
1779, 1781, 1782, and 1783, all providing fines only for violation 
of the code.^
The laws passed by the Maryland general assembly were 
similar to those of other states, except that control over militia 
troops on active duty would be retained by the State of Maryland.
34Hugh Hastings and J. A. Holden (eds.), Public Papers of 
George Clinton (10 vols., New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford 
Company, 1899-1914), I, 266; II, 247, 261, 529. Hereinafter cited 
as Hastings and Holden (eds.), Clinton Papers.
35Vote of the House of Assembly of the Delaware State . . . 
(Wilmington: James Adams, 1778), 55-82.
36Laws of the State of Delaware, 1700-1796 (2 vols., New 
Castle: Samuel and John Adams, 1797), 619, 627, 681, 751, 1134,
1225.
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An interesting law passed during the October-December, 1777, session 
declared that if a person refused or neglected to serve and refused 
or neglected to find a substitute to serve in his place and "a 
substitute shall have been found by any field officer, [the soldier] 
shall be charged with and liable to pay such sum of money together 
with reasonable expenses of procuring such substitute as any field 
officer shall have actually paid, or contracted to pay."^ Both 
officers and enlisted men had this privilege, making the avoidance 
of active duty rather easy.
The laws of the State of North Carolina required a forfeit
38of ten pounds for desertion, mutiny, or quitting post. The 
Digest of Laws of the State of Georgia indicate that only fines 
were authorized for the violations of the articles in the militia 
codes.^
37Laws of Maryland made since 1763 Consisting of Acts of 
Assembly under the Proprietary Government, Resolves of Convention, 
the Declaration of Rights, the Constitution and form of government, 
The Articles of Confederation, and Acts of Assembly since the 
revolution (Annapolis: Frederick-Green, 1787), 17, Articles 7 and
8. Hereinafter cited as Laws of Maryland.
38James Iredell (ed.), Laws of the State of North Carolina 
(Edenton: Hodge and Willis, 1791), 594.
39Robert and George Watkins (eds.), Digest of the Laws of the 
State of Georgia from its First Establishment as a_British Province 
Down to the year 1798 . . . All Laws in Force . . . With the titles 
of all the Obsolete and Other Acts (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1800).
Hereinafter cited as Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia.
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As might be expected from the brief survey of the laws 
discussed, regulation of the militia during the Revolution, especially 
in the early years, was lax in the extreme. James Wilson, a 
captain in the Virginia militia, wrote to Governor Patrick Henry 
complaining that the men preferred the trifling fine of five shillings 
to appearance at muster.^ Wilson said they were such a disaffected 
and cowardly set that he could do nothing to prevent the Tories 
from ravaging the state. He further complained that only ten had 
appeared out of 200 summoned; he compelled twenty more to serve, but 
a fourth of the little force deserted the first night of their march, 
and the expedition was forced to return home because the men insisted 
that they must tend their crops!
In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, a Virginia commander 
complained that out of 104 men ordered from the county of New Kent 
only 28 appeared, and it was certain that about half of them would 
desert before they reached the rendezvous; he said that many others 
had fled with impunity.^ Brigadier General George Weedon told the
40John Wilson to Patrick Henry, May 20, 1778, W. W. Henry 
(ed.), Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches (3 vols.,
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), III, 169. Hereinafter
cited as Henry (ed.), Henry.
^Hfalker to Jefferson, March 8, 1780, Nathaniel Greene,
Papers, William L. Clements, Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, quoted 
in Bowman, "Morale of the Continental and Militia Troops in the 
War of the Revolution," 162.
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governor of Virginia that calling the militia to active duty was as
little regarded as though it came from a man on the street and that
the few who did respond remained in service only as long as they
pleased. They would return home at will, sometimes led by their
42officers, without consulting the commanding officer. Even though 
elaborate methods of collection were provided by law, when forfeitures 
were assessed for violating militia codes, commanders complained
/  Othat they were almost impossible to collect. George Clinton 
noted the danger of using corporal punishment against violators 
because it usually stirred the men to mutiny.44 Penalties were 
at times suspended for months on the assumption that the governor 
would issue pardons.4^ Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia told 
the legislature in 1778 that militia discipline was practically non­
existent and called for stronger measures, which he finally got in 
1781.46
In units where the men had the right to elect their officers, 
those who attempted to enforce the rules and regulations of the
4^Weedon to Jefferson, March 28, 1781, W. P. Palmer, and 
others (eds.), Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts . . . 
Preserved in the Capitol at Richmond, 1652-1869 (11 vols., Richmond:
Printed under direction of H. W. Flournoy, 1875-1893), I, 603.
Hereinafter cited as Palmer and others (ed.), Calendar of Virginia 
State Papers.
^Hastings and Holden (eds.), Clinton Papers, III, 702.
44Ibid., IV, 270. 45Ibid., III, 715; IV, 272.
4^Henry to Harrison, May 21, 1778, Henry (ed.), Henry, III, 168.
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militia laws not uncommonly found themselves disowned by their own
men. Uncooperative militia officers caused additional distress.
The Governors could not get accurate returns from their officers,
even when the regulations specifically stated that such returns
must be made and that a penalty would be assessed for failure to
do so. The few returns actually made were often incorrect because
47officers tried to shield their disobedient men. The delinquent
officers were threatened with punishment, but few were ever court-
martialed. Occasionally an officer was fined or cashiered in the 
48militia. On one occasion, the Massachusetts Council attempted 
to stop the wages of certain artillerymen who had presented their 
colonel with a mutinous writing and refused to march. The men had 
balked at an order to leave the state to participate in the Rhode 
Island expedition. Eight sergeants were tried and sentenced 
to be flogged and reduced to the ranks for leading the mutiny. This 
was entirely too much for their commander; he interceded for the
49men and secured their pardon and restoration of their pay and rank. 
Another interesting case is that of one Gregory, sentenced to receive 
twenty lashes for damaging the guardhouse, and thirty-nine each
^Hastings and Holden (eds.), Clinton Papers, III, 190, 709; 
IV, 154, 824.
A8Ibid., I, 596, 598, 613; III, 719-21.
49 ..Bowman, "Morale of the Continental and Militia Troops,
147.
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for striking a sergeant, boarding a privateer, seeking to desert, 
and threatening to kill, with his pen knife, anyone who tried to 
apprehend him. The court completely overlooked two other offenses, 
intoxication and raising a disturbance in town. The severity of 
the cumulative punishment for Gregory was almost too much for the 
compassionate colonel. Half apologetically, he explained after 
the flogging that he hoped additional corporal punishment would 
not be necessary, but he felt it was needed at this time to impress 
the men with the fact that whipping was for the good of the entire 
regiment.^
Any unusual claims on the militiamen, such as the need of
getting in the harvest, made their services extremely uncertain.
It, for example, was almost useless to summon them in July even
when enthusiasm was high, stated Washington in 1775.^ The New
Jersey Provincial Congress once asked permission to dismiss the
troops they had sent to the army in order that they might save
their grain crops. Some of these men had already returned home
52before permission was obtained. Brigadier General Hugh Mercer 
had to discharge all those occupying positions from South Amboy to
50Ibid.
"^Washington to the President of Congress, July 14, 1775, 
Writings of Washington, III, 337.
52Force (ed.), American Archives, 5th ser., I, 172.
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Paulus Hook in 1776 because, as he said, their "clamour was so 
53insistent." In 1777 Washington dismissed all but one hundred of the 
New Jersey militia and most of those from Pennsylvania because of the 
harvest.^ Brigadier General Arthur St. Clair in 1777 dismissed 
half of his unit at harvest time, only to have most of the other 
half desert.^ According to Jared Sparks, it probably would have 
been better if the Northern Department had dismissed all the 
militia troops to attend to their harvest, for the men eventually 
took things into their own hands and deserted by whole companies.^
In the South, Brigadier General Thomas Sumter adopted the 
plan of leaving selected persons at home in the busy season to assist 
their neighbors in the harvest, but even so he had great difficulty 
gathering a force, and found it impossible to prevent hourly 
desertions.^ Brigadier General Frances Marion’s force diminished 
so fast at harvest time that by July 17, 1781, he complained of
53Mercer to Washington, July 16, 1776, and to Congress July 
20, 1776, ibid., 5th ser., I, 370, 470.
54Washington to Mercer, July 4, 1777, Writings of Washington, 
VIII, 342; Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., VII, 401, 679-80.
55St. Clair to Governor Bowdoin, July 28, 1777, William Henry 
Smith (ed.), The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of
General Arthur St. Clair (2 vols., Cincinnati: Robert Clark and
Company, 1882), I, 437. Hereinafter cited as Smith (ed.). St.
Clair Papers.
*56Jared Sparks (ed.), Correspondence of the Revolutionary: 
Being Letters of Eminent Men to George Washington (4 vols., Boston: 
Little,Brown and Company, 1853), II, 515,
■^Bowman, "Moral of the Continental and Militia Troops," 166.
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having scarcely one hundred men left; four days later practically
COthe entire command had disappeared.
Evidence is overwhelming that the extent of desertion among
militia forces was far greater than with Continental troops (a
subject to be discussed in later chapters). Militiamen usually
rallied with great reluctance, and it is not surprising to find
that, once they actually left home, they quickly became impatient
to return. Many pleas were made to them by their commanders,
the governors, and Washington to stay in service a little longer
when their terms of active duty were up —  but with little response.
Washington said that from former experience he found it "equally
practicable to stop a torrent, as these people, when their time is 
59up." The New York militia marched home from the scene of 
Burgoyne's invasion despite an offer of twenty dollars' bounty 
for four month's further service.^®
Of course, going home when their terms of active duty ended 
could not be considered desertion, but it does reveal a significant 
lack of enthusiasm for fighting and helps one to understand the fact 
that large numbers failed to wait until their terms expired.
58Ibid., 167.
■^Washington to Reed, March 25, 1776, Writings of Washington, 
IV, 431.
^Hastings and Holden (eds.), Clinton Papers, II, 212.
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If examples of faults of the militia are almost unlimited, 
one should not conclude that the militia forces were useless. Time 
and time again the militia came to the rescue of the Continental 
army when it was hard pressed. All cases considered, the militia 
performed in magnificent fashion. While the state troops did not 
usually fight well in sustained offensive or defensive operations, 
they behaved admirally for short periods in a crisis. As many 
British commanders knew, the militia was always there, swarming 
around like bees whenever their homes were approached; when the 
British left one place, a particular group of militia might 
disappear, but another would spring into being to face the enemy 
somewhere else, so that in effect the total population was always 
on the offensive.*^ The militia therefore proved very valuable to 
Washington in winning the war.
While some of the militia codes were rather strict, allowing 
the death penalty and corporal punishment, others were so mild 
that they were violated, with impunity. New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, Pennsylvania, and Virginia laws allowed the death penalty for 
some periods, but they were not always enforced. The statutes of 
other states, like New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, gave 
more consideration to the rights of the soldiers than to the need 
for enforcing strict discipline, and therefore weakened the overall
61Bowman, Morale of the American Revolutionary Army, 43.
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effect of the laws. The New Jersey law protected militia forces 
while they were under the Continental code by limiting the use 
of the death penalty to three offenses: desertion, treason and
cowardice. The Massachusetts code, with its many loopholes, 
allowed militiamen to refuse to march with penalties of little 
more than the payment of a fine. The Connecticut and Delaware 
laws were likewise very mild.
Lenient laws no doubt contributed to the poor discipline of 
the state militia forces. Two questions might be asked: Why
were the state laws so lenient? And were they in fact lenient?
No state assembly sought to impose more severe penalties on their 
militia forces than they felt were absolutely necessary. Since 
these forces were primarily civilian in nature, the state govern­
mental bodies were extremely reluctant to place these civilians 
under a strict military code that could impose corporal punishment 
on them. Since most militiamen were likely to be voters, they had 
considerable political power. Thus, they could influence legislation. 
Unlike European armies, the American military was not divorced 
from the population at large. The fact that state legislatures 
often passed laws governing militiamen who deserted indicates, 
not a tendency toward leniency, but rather a step forward in 
trying to alleviate the problem. Even the imposition of a fine for 
non-attendance was by no means to be taken as lightly as it might 
first seem. A fine of forty shillings, or in some cases ten
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pounds, was a considerable amount to be paid by many of the troops 
in the militia units; it represented a real punishment for them to 
endure. But the degree of the punishment doubtless had little 
actual effect on the thinking of most of the militiamen. They 
were civilians at heart, not soldiers. When they felt they were 
being asked to go beyond what seemed to them to be a reasonable 
assignment as civilians, they simply declined to obey, punishment 
notwithstanding.
Possibly the greatest effect the militia had on the problem
of desertion was their influence when in contact with regular 
%
Continental troops. While the militia left the service freely 
when they decided it was time to go, not fearing the consequences, 
the Continental troops could not follow that example, for they were 
subject to severe penalties under a stricter code. Under the 
Articles of War, passed by Congress, a soldier could be required 
to suffer bodily punishment or pay for the breach of an article 
with his life.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I I I
STATE DESERTION LAWS
Neither Congress nor the various state legislatures was 
unaware of the seriousness of the problem of desertion from the 
American forces. In an effort to assist the army most states 
passed acts, apart from the various militia codes already 
discussed, providing punishment for deserters and offering rewards 
for their capture and delivery to the proper authorities. Most of 
the states added provisions or passed separate laws imposing fines 
or corporal punishment on civilians who harbored or abetted 
deserters in any way. Unlike the militia laws, the penalties for 
violating these laws were often very harsh, indicating a strong 
desire on the part of the state governments to assist Washington 
in the prevention of desertion.
Soon after the Revolutionary War began, Washington complained 
to both Congress and the states that laws were needed to deal with 
civilians who interfered with soldiers of the American army. In 
a circular letter to the states on January 3, 1777, Washington 
wrote:
I know of no remedy, so effectual, as the different
States immediately to pass Laws, laying a severe
38
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penalty upon those who harbour or fall to give 
information against deserters . . . Desertion must 
cease of course, when the Offenders find that they 
have no Shelter.
On the same day, he urged the president of Congress to write
to the state assemblies, insisting that they pass laws to inflict
osevere and heavy penalties upon those who harbored runaways.
As late as 178Q Washington was still seeking the passage 
of laws to prevent civilians from assisting deserters. To 
President Joseph Reed or Pennsylvania he wrote:
I am . . . persuaded that there is too much countenance 
given to Deserters, and if proper Laws could be devised 
and effectually executed against those that do it, then 
our force would be much more respectable than it is 
at present. There have been many instances where 
Deserters which have been apprehended by Officers, have 
been rescued by the People, but very few where the 
Officers have received their aid and support.
Most of the states complied by passing laws as requested. 
The Massachusetts lawmakers had long been accustomed to enacting 
legislation that required a stiff penalty for desertion. Prior
1Washington to the States, January 31, 1777, Writings of 
Washington, VII, 82-83. Circular letter sent to all states except 
South Carolina and Georgia.
2Washington to President of Congress (John Hancock), January 
31, 1777, ibid., VII, 81. See Chapter Four for Congressional 
discussion on this topic.
^Washington to Joseph Reed, April 28, 1780, ibid., XVIII,
311.
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to 1742, the Bay Colony produced a law declaring that any soldier 
who deserted would be "proceeded against as a felon; and shall
4suffer the pains of death, or some other grievous Punishment."
The law also declared that "every justice of the peace within his 
precinct is hereby authorized and required to cause all such 
deserters . . .  to be apprehended."^ This view prevailed during 
the Revolutionary War as evidenced by the numerous laws enacted 
by Massachusetts to deal with illegal departures from the army.
The Massachusetts House of Representatives on September 29, 
1779, directed county superintendents to advertise for quitters 
from their districts in one of the Boston newspapers and to offer a 
reward of one hundred dollars and expenses for each deserter taken
g
to jail. The bill passed gaining the concurrence of fifteen 
members of the Council.
Within two weeks Massachusetts passed another act that 
directed militia officers to apprehend persons who had fled 
from any corps in the service of the United States and to deliver 
them to their units where they were to serve their time and
4Acts and Laws, of His Majesty’s Province of the Massachusetts- 
Bay in New England (Boston: Samuel Kneeland and Timothy Green, 1742),
117.
~*Ibid., 118. The same law was again enacted in 1757.
gJournals, Minutes and Proceedings: State of Massachusetts
Bay, 1775-1780 (Boston: Benjamin Edes and Sons, 1780), 5-6.
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receive any punishment that the regulations of the army provided.^
The act further stipulated that if any person deserted one unit then 
enlisted in another unit, he was to be sentenced to serve from 
three to six months on board a vessel in the service of the United 
States. While serving in this capacity he was not to be eligible 
to receive prize money, and expenses for keeping him on board were 
to be deducted from his pay. On November 23, 1779, the Massachusetts 
lower house passed a resolution that prevented sentencing to the 
navy; the deserters were to be immediately returned to their army
Qunits.
An act of October, 1779, provided a penalty for any town 
that harbored a deserter or refused to obey the law:
Resolved, that if there shall be found in any Town, 
any Person who shall desert from the detachment 
ordered by this Resolve, or who has deserted from 
any former detachment and the Militia Officers, 
Selectmen & Committee in the same Town being 
knowing thereto shall neglect to perform the Duty 
by this Resolve prescribed them for bringing such 
Offender to punishment the Inhabitants of such 
Town shall incur as a Penalty for every Offender 
respecting whom they shall be thus delinquent the 
sum of five hundred Pounds which sum shall be added 
to the next State Tax of such Town or Plantation.
^Ibid., 79; Act passed October 9, 1779. 
8Ibid., 114-15.
9Ibid., 80.
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The law also stated that no credit would be given a town for enlisting 
prisoners and known deserters in fulfilling its draft quotas.
The law further stated that if any brigadier general, commanding 
officer, or company commander should refuse or neglect to observe 
the provisions of this law, the offender would be fined one hundred 
pounds for each such delinquent.̂
The next year, the Massachusetts General Court passed a law 
entitled, "An Act to prevent and punish Desertion, and for 
apprehending and securing Deserters from the Continental Army."^
This very detailed and complete law attempted to provide a remedy 
for the embarrassing problem of the Massachusetts soldiers' fleeing 
from the Continental army and to discourage civilians from trying 
to help the deserters escape their pursurers. The General Court 
noted that many soldiers of the Continental army had fled from the 
several battalions belonging to the state of Massachusetts and 
that the laws already passed were found to be insufficient to deter
Acts and Laws . . . of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
306-309. Act passed May 5, 1780; on June 23, 1780, another bill 
was passed, after having two readings and receiving the consent 
of 15 members of the Council, entitled "An Act for the punishment 
of such persons as shall encourage desertions from the fleets and 
armies of any foreign power who shall prosecute the war in America 
in conjunction with the United States of America for recovering 
such deserters as shall conceal themselves among the inhabitants." 
Journals, Minutes and Proceedings: State of Massachusetts Bay,
1775-1780, 537.
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desertion or to guarantee the effectual apprehension and return of 
the deserters to their companies. This law gave the officers of 
every militia company and the committees of all the towns and 
plantations the authority to
apprehend all Deserters from the Continental Army 
that may reside or come within the limits of their 
respective Companies and Plantation, and to command 
the Assistance of the Militia if necessary, for 
the Purpose, and deliver him or them so apprehended, 
to some Continental Officer within the County . . . 
or commit him or them to the common Gaol of the 
County.^
The jailers were instructed to receive the captured truants, with 
any expenses incurred to be paid out of the treasury of the state; 
if there was further expense in getting a deserter to his rightful 
company, that expense would also be paid out of the state treasury, 
but would be recovered from the pay of the deserters. A fine was 
imposed on any official who refused to obey this law, amounting to 
from five to fifteen hundred pounds for each offense.
The Massachusetts law, which was quite severe in providing 
stiff penalties for these offenses, did not overlook many details. 
A provision was added to cover those men who attempted to desert 
by way of the navy. The lawmakers noted that countless deserters 
escaped "on board the armed Ships and other Vessels sailing from 
this State as Seamen, or otherwise, to the great Injury of the
12Acts and Laws . . .  of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
306.
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13Land Service." To prevent this practice Massachusetts authorized
that every commander of an armed vessel sailing from any harbor of
the state, who conveyed away on board his ship any person known
to be a fugitive from the Continental army, "shall pay for every
Deserter a fine not exceeding Fifteen Hundred Pounds, nor less
than Five Hundred P o u n d s . I t  was further declared that all
prizes, or shares of prizes that otherwise might accrue to such
deserters, should be paid by the agent of such deserter into the
State Treasury. A descriptive list of all officers, sailors, and
marines belonging to each vessel and all the shares they were
entitled to was required to be prepared and submitted to the
Secretary of State; an additional penalty of from five to fifteen
15hundred pounds was provided for non-compliance. The colonels of 
Continental army regiments were also ordered to prepare descriptive 
lists of their runaways for the Secretary of the State.
The Massachusetts bill allowed a pardon for all deserters 
who gave themselves up within a three-month period, or for those 
at sea, who, did so within the first month after their returning 
to the state. The pardon was, however, dependent upon the terms 
of proclamations issued by General Washington. The preamble to this 
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their folly and wickedness in violating their Faith and Oath, in
16dishonorably abandoning the Cause of their Country by Desertion,"
and expressed the conviction that they would return to their
companies for the remainder of their three years or for the
duration of the war, and might even serve an extra few months to
show their remorse. The authors of the bill felt that the only
thing preventing many from taking advantage of the pardon was fear
17of "an ignominious Punishment." To quiet the minds of persons,
and to deny any appearance of excuse to any who might reject the
pardon, a further inducement was added, provided the Commander in
Chief approved: those accepting the pardon would be entitled "to
receive all Bounties, Gratuities and Allowances for Depreciation
offered or granted, or that may be due to the Soldiers of the
Continental Army, belonging to this State, for the time that he or
18they may have served, as though he or they had never deserted." 
While this was a fair, and even very liberal offer, it might well 
have displeased faithful soldiers who would be entitled to not one 
cent more for their active duty service than deserters who spent 
that time at home! If the offer of pardon was shunned by the 
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their right to the Liberties and Privileges of a Free Citizen, and
may be apprehended by Virtue of this Act, any time hereafter,
19within the Term of Twenty Years."
Thus, a rather severe penalty was prescribed by Massachusetts
law for captured deserters. If caught during the war, they, of
course, would be subject to the Articles of War, which meant they
could receive the death penalty. If caught after the conclusion
of the war and before the expiration of twenty years they were to
be confined on board a ship of the state or sent to a fort of
the state to serve a ten-year sentence!
By the terms of the same statute, Massachusetts authorized
ordinary citizens to capture deserters. After the termination of
the time limit set for delinquents to return without penalty, any
male inhabitant could capture deserters and, upon handing them
over to proper authorities, was to "receive out of the Public
20Treasury . . . the sum of thirty pounds." At the same time, 
civilians who employed runaways for more than forty-eight hours, or 
who concealed known deserters, were subject to a fine, upon 
conviction, of from five to fifteen hundred pounds.
To insure wide distribution of the provisions of this act, 
the Secretary of State sent copies to commanders of brigades, corps,
19Ibid.
20Ibid., 309.
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regiments, and companies to be read to all their men. Massachusetts, 
therefore, took seriously the advice of Washington and the Continental 
Congress by passing stem laws to help prevent desertion from 
the army.
A new act was passed on November 2, 1781, by Massachusetts
for apprehending and securing deserters from the Continental Army
and from the fleets and armies of the allies, a measure that
21repealed all previous acts. It authorized all militia commanding 
officers, selectmen, committees, and other persons to catch deserters 
and take them to jail. Whatever expenses incurred would be paid out 
of the state's treasury but would be ultimately charged to the 
account of the deserter. The important difference in the new law 
was in the amount of the fines imposed on those convicted of 
violating the various provisions. For instance, under the new 
law of 1781, any militia officer, selectmen, or committee who 
neglected to apprehend deserters would be fined from ten to one 
hundred pounds rather than five to fifteen hundred pounds for each 
offense. The penalty for commanders of vessels who conveyed known 
deserters away from the state was reduced to fifty to three hundred 
pounds. The reward for successfully apprehending and securing a 
deserter was also reduced from thirty to six pounds. For concealing, 
harboring, encouraging to desert, or employing a quitter for more
21"An Act for Apprehending and Securing Deserters for the 
Continental Army;and from the Fleets and Annies of our allies; and 
for repealing all Acts heretofore made and passed for that purpose," 
ibid., 104-107.
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than forty-eight hours, the fine was reduced to fifty to three
hundred pounds for each offense proven.
The net effect of the law of 1781 was to reduce penalties
of the law of the previous year. The need of a stiff law, enacted
during the time of heavy desertion and several mutinies, no doubt
was thought to have ended with the surrender of Cornwallis at
22Yorktown in October, 1781.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted its first major
bill dealing with desertion on February 20, 1777: "An Act to
discourage desertion, and to punish all such persons as shall
23harbor or conceal deserters." This law, differing on several 
points from those of Massachusetts, placed the burden of 
apprehending deserters on the constables in every town, ward, and 
borough. The law authorized and required those officials to arrest 
any person whom they suspected of being a deserter and to turn him 
over to the justice of the peace for examination of the charge. If
22 In 1782 the Massachusetts General Court passed two additional 
acts dealing with the same topic with little change. "An Act more 
effectually to Prevent the Desertion of French Sailors," Massachusetts 
General Court, March 6, 1782. A bill entitled "An Act in addition 
to an Act for apprehending and securing deserters from the Continental 
Army and from the Fleets and Armies of our Allies: and for repealing
all other acts made and passed for that purpose," passed April 30,
1782, Journals. Minutes and Proceedings: State of Massachusetts Bay.
23The Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, enacted into Laws, since the Declaration of Independence 
. . . (Philadelphia: Frances Bailey, 1782), 32-36.
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found to be a deserter, he was to be conveyed to the jail of the
county where apprehended; the sheriff was then to be responsible
for his return to the army where he would be prosecuted under
military law. The keeper of the jail was to receive the "full
subsistence of such deserter or deserters," but was not entitled
24to any fee or reward. The Pennsylvania lawmakers apparently felt
it the duty of public servants to perform this service without
extra pay. The law specified, however, that the army officer to
whom the deserter was delivered should "pay into the hands of the
gaoler or sheriff the sum of three dollars, over and besides the
25reward ordered to be paid by congress for each deserter." None
of this reward money was to come from the Pennsylvania treasury.
A fine of five pounds was to be assessed against any
civilian who sheltered a deserter "for the space of six hours by
26day, or twelve hours by night," without giving notice to the 
justice of the peace. An additional penalty of five pounds was to 
be paid by any "civilian who shall knowingly detain, buy, or 
exchange, or receive any arms, caps, clothes, or other furniture, 
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from any soldier or deserter . . .  or who cause the color of the
27clothes to be changed."
The disposition of the fines collected was unique, for part
went to the overseer of the poor of the town and the remainder to
the informers who helped seize quitters. Convicted violators who
did not have money to pay in cash or could not promise to pay
within sixty days were "committed to the common gaol, there to
remain without bail or mainprise for the space of six weeks," or
were "publically whipped on his or her back with any number of
28lashes not exceeding twenty-one." The corporal punishment
prescribed for Pennsylvania civilians who maintained deserters
was, therefore, a more severe penalty than the fines levied in
some of the other states.
The Pennsylvanians were very careful that in carrying out
one law they did not violate another. Section Five of the "Desertion
and Harboring Act" forbade the breaking open of any houses by
a commissioned officer or any other person to search for runaways
without first obtaining a warrant from the justice of the peace
for that purpose. Violators of this provision were subject to
fines of thirty pounds, payable to the owners of the house, plus
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Since the Pennsylvania law made apprehension of deserters 
compulsory for certain officials, lawmen were obliged to make 
frequent visits to areas where fugitives were suspected of hiding.
To make passing through the state more difficult for turncoats, 
the law required that all suspicious persons coming into the state 
without passes from some justice of the peace or from some command­
ing officer be immediately arrested by the constable and put in 
jail until it could be determined whether or not they were 
deserters. In case the officer requested help in making the arrest, 
the law stipulated that the men of the neighborhood were required 
to give it; and if any person commanded to assist the constable
refused such assistance, he was subject to a fine of twenty
30shillings upon conviction. Again the money went to the poor and
to the constable.
Further to encourage the capturing of deserters, the law
stated that "every person, not a constable, who shall apprehend
any deserter, and deliver him to some constable, shall be entitled
to receive for each such deserter, the sum of twenty shillings," to
31be paid out of the state treasury. If he conveyed the deserted 
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The Pennsylvania assemblymen on March 12, 1778, passed a
supplement to the "Desertion and Harboring Act" that offered an
extra incentive to persons of draft ages for nabbing truants: any
person who captured a deserter would not only receive the monetary
rewards, but was exempted from active duty in the militia for a two-
month period or excused from paying the fine if he refused to join
32when called to service. Two years later another supplement was
passed which extended the coverage of the act to include aiding
deserters from the fleets and armies of any country assisting the 
33United States. In September, 1780, Pennsylvania again strengthened 
the apprehension code by adopting a measure to cover soldiers who 
fled from the service, boarded armed vessels, and then deserted 
the ship when in a foreign port. A severe penalty was imposed on 
those who aided runaways in this manner. The law provided that every 
captain or other officer belonging to a vessel that received or 
entertained any known deserters, "shall forfeit and pay to this
32A Supplement to the Act, entitled, "An Act to discourage 
desertion and to punish all such persons as shall harbor or conceal 
deserters," ibid., 110-11. On September 29, 1781, this law was 
amended to allow exemption from two tours of militia duty for 
apprehending a deserter, ibid., 515.
oqSection 15 and 16 of "An Act for funding and redeeming 
the bills of Credit of the United States of America, and for 
providing means to bring the present war to a happy conclusion," 
passed June 1, 1780, ibid., 389-97.
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commonwealth the sum of ten thousand pounds . . .  or suffer one
A  I
year’s imprisonment without bail or mainprize." Section Seven
of this statute declared that all shares of prize money and wages
to which deserters originally would be entitled were to be
"confiscated and forfeited to the use of the commonwealth" and
applied to recruiting troops for the state line in the Continental 
35army.
These laws indicate that the state government of Pennsylvania 
was keenly aware of the problem of desertion and knew how injurious 
its continuation was to the state and to the Continental army. 
Pennsylvania made definite efforts to halt illegal departures, but 
with little success.
Most states passed similar laws dealing with deserters 
and provided penalties for those who offered them assistance. The 
New Hampshire legislature, on March 12, 1777, authorized any person 
to apprehend any other person suspected of being a deserter from 
the American army, and provided a penalty of forty shillings for
o6
any one refusing to assist in the capture of a known deserter.
A supplement to the act entitled, "An Act for regulating 
and establishing Admiralty jurisdiction," passed September 22,
1780, ibid., 399-405. This act also provided the death penalty for 
any captain who betrayed his trust and turned pirate.
35Ibid., 401.
36"An Act to prevent the Desertion of Soldiers, during the 
present War with Great Britain, the concealment of Deserters, and 
also the embezzlement of Clothes, Arms, etc., belonging to the
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A fine of from nine to fifteen pounds was levied against any
37person knowingly concealing a fugitive. For capturing a deserter, 
the New York assembly provided an exemption from "being classed, 
drafted, or detached from or in the Militia, or performing any 
Duty in the Militia, for the space of one year."33 It further 
offered a reward of ten pounds per capture to be paid out of 
unappropriated money of the treasury of the state. For harboring, 
aiding, or comforting, any deserters, or for encouraging or 
persuading any person to desert from the American armies, or 
allied armies of the United States, the New York code provided
OQ
that "any person so offending, would be prosecuted as a misdemeanor."
The Maryland assembly meeting February 5 through April 20, 
1777, passed a desertion law containing rewards for seizing deserters 
and penalties for harboring runaways. If the reward was undeclared, 
the penalty was severe. For the first offense violators either 
paid fines or went to jail for three months, whereas a second 
conviction brought either a heavier fine or a whipping up to thirty- 
nine lashes. The Maryland lawmakers also allowed magistrates to
United States of America," Acts and Laws of the Colony of New 
Hampshire, 59-61.
37Ibid., 60.
38"An Act to encourage the apprehending of Deserters, from 
the Troops of this state, serving in the Army of the United States," 
passed July 1, 1781, Laws of the State of New York, I, 203.
39Ibid., Section 4.
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issue warrants and legally search houses they suspected of
concealing deserters— even to break down doors if not opened on
demand. However, a penalty of twenty dollars was set for any
person who broke down a door without a warrant which was to be
40paid to the injured party. Maryland, therefore, provided
fines, imprisonment, and whippings for persons assisting fugitives,
making this law one of the harsher passed by the various states.
The New Jersey General Assembly passed a fairly mild
apprehension law on February 26, 1777. The statute required
citizens to help capture alleged renegades who passed through the
state without proper identification. After delivery to the justices
of the peace, the pursuer received a reward of five dollars, plus
expenses. Persons harboring, concealing, or encouraging desertion
were subject to forfeits of ten pounds for the first offense and
fifteen for the second and all other offenses of a like nature.
A further penalty of five pounds struck any ferryman or boatman
41who conveyed a deserter across any river.
Responding to a letter on the problem of desertion from 
Washington read before the General Assembly on February 7, 1777,
^"An Act to prevent desertion," Laws of Maryland,
Chapter II.
^"An Act to prevent Desertion from the Army of the United 
States of America, and for other purposes therein mentioned,"
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, 15-16.
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Delaware prepared and passed within fifteen days a law to prosecute
42deserters and their cohorts. Connecticut enacted a law on the
same subject prior to receiving Washington's request. The
Connecticut measure pointed out that it was the duty of every
citizen, especially constables and grand-juries, to assist in the
return of deserters. A fifteen pound fine or two months imprison-
43ment was set for anyone convicted of concealing deserters. Unlike 
that of many of the other states, the Connecticut law was unchanged 
throughout the war. The Virginia Assembly, meeting at Williamsburg, 
on May 5, 1777, passed a similar act designed to discourage 
desertion and to punish persons in league with the backsliders.^
Most state passed treason laws usually contained provisions 
which were similar in phraseology, dealing with desertion. The 
primary purpose of the treason laws was to punish civilians who 
used their influence to assist the enemy. Some states felt that 
civilians who aided deserters and the deserters themselves could be
/ o"An Act against desertion, and harbouring deserters, and 
dealing with them in certain cases," passed February 22, 1777, Laws 
of the State of Delaware, II, 598; for discussion in the assembly, 
see Vote of the House of Assembly of the Delaware State, 50-83.
^"An Act for taking up and securing Deserters, and for 
punishing those who shall conceal them," passed after December 14, 
1775, and before January 1, 1776. Acts and Laws of the State of 
Connecticut in America, 41.
44A Collection of all such Public Acts of the General 
Assembly of Virginia, 52.
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punished under these state statutes. North Carolina enacted a
measure in 1777 that made it a violation of the treason act
punishable by death and forfeiture of estate to join the army of
the enemy; to furnish arms, ammunition or provisions, to plot,
conspire, or betray the state; or to give intelligence to the enemy.4"*
The same law allowed punishment of imprisonment for the duration of
the war and forfeiture to the state of half of all lands, tenaments,
goods, and chattels, for discouraging enlistment or stirring up
46turmoils, disorders, and insurrections. A Connecticut treason law 
provided the death penalty for aiding or joining the enemy's 
army, "by inlisting or procuring or persuading others to inlist for 
that purpose."47 Unsuccessful attempts to join or aid the enemy 
were, upon conviction, punishable by fine and imprisonment "in 
any of the Gaols [of Connecticut], not exceeding ten years."4® A 
New Hampshire treason act required the death penalty upon conviction, 
but special care was taken to insure that offenders were legally
45"An Act for declaring what Crimes and Practices against 
the state shall be treason, and what shall be Misprison of Treason, 
and providing Punishment adequate to Crimes of Both Classes, and 
for preventing the Dangers which may arise from Persons disaffected 
to the State," Iredell (ed.), Laws of the State of North Carolina, 
321-26, Section 2.
46Ibid., 332, Section 3.
4 7 "An Act for the Punishment of High Treason, and other 
Atrocious Crimes against the State," passed October, 1776, Acts 
and Laws of the State of Connecticut in America, 25.
48Ibid.
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hanged. No one was to be executed until the New Hampshire clerk 
certified the record and the House of Representatives reviewed it
and sent official orders to the sheriff for execution of the
49sentence. An earlier act was repealed by the New York lawmakers 
in 1778, to make more humane the method of execution of criminals 
guilty of treason. Tl.e old method of putting a prisoner to death 
by mutilating his body was abolished, and the law prescribed that 
execution was to be by hanging by the neck until dead."*^
The New Jersey treason law was more lenient than that of 
the other states mentioned. The punishment for treason or other crimes 
listed in the act was to be set by the court, and was to be fines 
and imprisonment, "Saving the corruption of b l o o d . F o r  assisting 
the enemy a fine of three hundred pounds and one year's imprison­
ment was provided; a person could also be set in pillory and imprisoned 
for less than a year for violations of various other provisions of 
the act.
49"An Act Against Treason and Misprison of Treason . . . 1777," 
Acts and Laws of the Colony of New Hampshire, 51-54.
^®"An Act for altering the Judgement heretofore by Law pre­
scribed against Persons found guilty of High Treason and Petty 
Treason and those who on being arraigned for Treason or Felony, stand 
mute or refuse to plead," passed March 30, 1778, Laws of the State 
of New York, I, 22.
^*"Act to punish Traitors and disaffected Persons," passed 
October 4, 1776, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New 
Jersey, 41; "Supplement to the Act," passed June 7, 1777, ibid.,
77-78.
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Virginia amended an earlier treason act in 1778 to allow
a maximum imprisonment of six months for any officer or soldier
found guilty of "mutiny, desertion, disobedience of command, absence
from duty or quarters, neglect of guard, or cowardice," stating
that the earlier penalty was not severe enough to deter the
52defaulter from committing all these offences. The revised law 
was still far more lenient than most other state laws dealing with 
insurrection.
A number of states passed laws providing penalties for 
civilians who went over to the enemy. A New Hampshire law 
declared that all persons who "have traiterously deserted, or may 
hereafter desert the common cause of America, and have gone over to 
or in any way or manner joined our enemy, or of those who belong to 
or reside in Great Britain," were to be punished by the seizure 
of all their property and the voiding of all other legal trans­
actions, which prevented them from engaging in normal business 
53contracts. Georgia had a similar law, passed in 1778, that allowed 
the attaining of persons guilty of high treason and their execution
52"An Act to amend an Act for providing against invasion 
and Insurrection," passed May 4, 1778, A Collection of all such 
Public Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, 78.
53"An Act to prevent the transfer or conveyances of the 
Estates and Property of all such Persons who have been, or shall be 
apprehended upon suspicion of being guilty of Treason . . .," 
passed June 25, 1777, Acts and Laws of the Colony of New Hampshire, 
83-85.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
if apprehended and c o n v i c t e d . A  Maryland statute imposed the
death penalty for any one who should bear arms against the state.
The Maryland law also prohibited any person who had deserted the
defense of the state from "holding any office of trust or profit 
56with the state." A New York measure, passed in 1780, subjected any
person who came out from the enemy to be tried by a court-martial
as a spy, under the Articles of War. If convicted, he was
to suffer death.^ According to the New York law, any person so
apprehended and sentenced would be executed by the sheriff for the
government of the state. At least one person was given a pardon
by the New York Assembly after being convicted of treason prior to
58the passage of the above act. Massachusetts passed an act
5 4 An Act for Attaining such persons as are therein mentioned
of high treason, and for Confiscating their estate . . .," passed
March 1, 1778, Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia, 208-19.
■’■’"An Act to punish certain crimes and misdeameanors, and to 
prevent the growth of Toryism," passed 5 Feb - 20 April, 1777, Laws 
of Maryland, Chapter XX.
~^Ibid., Chapter XX, Section 17.
■^"An Act subjecting all Persons who shall come out from the 
Enemy and secretly lurk in any Park of this State, to Trials by 
Court-Martial as Spies," passed June 30, 1780, Laws of the State of 
New York, I, 143.
58"An Act to Pardon Thomas Cummings, convicted of Treason," 
passed October 8, 1779, ibid., I, 77. Cummings, a farmer of Ultser 
County, was convicted of adhereing to the enemy, and sentenced to
be executed October 29, 1779. The New York Assembly records show
two other pardons; Jonah Wood, pardoned September, 1780, and Richard 
Everitt, pardoned July 1, 1781.
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directed at the capture of one individual, John Robinson, who "left
59and went to the enemy."
The terms of the desertion and harboring laws passed by 
the various state legislatures clearly show the willingness of 
local officials to render every aid possible to prevent illegal 
departures from the army. Some of the laws were particularly well 
written and comprehensive in coverage. Massachusetts, which witnessed 
considerable combat during the first few years of the war, was 
sensitive to the army's problem in regard to desertion. Passing 
laws not only to discourage runaways and require civilians to make 
captures, the Massachusetts assembly also punished individuals and 
whole towns for abetting deserters.
The threat of being pursued for twenty years after the war's 
termination made fugitives of deserters for a long time and should 
have dissuaded most men from any temptation to steal away illegally. 
Unfortunately, too few soldiers considered the consequences after 
their minds were set on parting company with the service. The 
Pennsylvania lawmakers also passed laws adequate to cover the crime, 
allowing corporal punishment to be inflicted on civilians who 
schemed with deserters and, in some cases, their imprisonment for a
Journals, Minutes and Proceedings, State of Massachusetts 
Bay, 434. Robinson, a former inhabitant of the state, had been 
taken and exchanged as a British prisoner, and was then at large in 
Boston. The Commissioner of Prisons was directed to capture him 
in order that he could be exchanged for a subject of that state of 
equal rank.
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year. Maryland went further, making it legal to break down doors 
to seize fugitives and providing imprisonment and fines for 
civilians who did not help in capturing runaways. While all the 
states enacted measures designed to prevent desertion and deter 
citizens from helping shirkers, some of the laws were very mild. 
Specifically, the laws passed by New Hampshire, New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, aud Virginia were comparatively 
lenient. In some cases, the harsher treason laws of these states 
added the needed sting against deserters and those who concealed 
them.
In most cases, the state statutes were designed primarily 
to promote the capture of deserters (leaving the actual punishment 
of the renegades to the army) and to prevent civilians from 
encouraging men to leave the service. No doubt, state desertion 
laws were effective in influencing some soldiers to remain on 
active duty. Yet it is unreasonable to assume that mere passage of 
laws could have solved such an enormous problem. Nevertheless, 
realizing the necessity for unified cooperation, Washington never 
stopped asking the states to revise or pass new laws against 
desertion, just as at the same time he made similar requests to 
the Continental Congress.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS' DESERTION LAWS
Although state assemblies passed numerous laws in an effort 
to curtain the evil of desertion, they were limited to state 
boundaries, with no jurisdiction elsewhere. Had each state enacted 
the same laws, theoretically, the entire country would have been 
blanketed with laws adequate to punish the guilty; where one 
state's law ended, another's would begin. Problems involving 
militia or state forces could possibly have been settled among 
the states. While this arrangement would have pleased many state 
lawmakers, it would have been clumsy for commanders to regulate 
forces designated to operate in all of the states under the direct 
control of a central government. Congress, therefore, in answer to 
a clearly recognizable need, passed a number of laws to regulate 
the armed forces under its jurisdiction. Some of these dealt with 
the problem of desertion.
The first important congressional resolution pertaining to 
the regulation of the army was the agreement made in 1775 to use 
the Massachusetts Articles of War as a model for the Continental
63
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army."*" The Articles of War in effect at Cambridge when Washington 
took command had been enacted by the Provisional Congress of 
Massachusetts two weeks prior to the first engagement between the 
minutemen and British regulars at Lexington. Most of these articles 
were copied from the British rules and regulations of 1765; the 
Massachusetts government had modified them to make the punishments
Oless severe than those permitted by the British code. As Richard
Henry Lee predicted to Washington, the Continental Congress adopted
the "mutiny and military regulations" of Massachusetts with few 
3exceptions. A week later, Roger Sherman wrote to Joseph Trumbull 
that "Congress had agreed on articles for regulating the army not 
much differing from those established by the New England Colonies 
except the addition of a few, and a more particular limitation of 
the discretionary powers given to Court Martial."^ The military
■^Worthington Chauncey Ford and others (eds.), Journals of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (34 vols., Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1906-1937). June 30, 1775, II, 111-23. The 
rules and regulations were not entered in the Manuscript Journal, 
but were included in Ford's Journals; he followed the text printed 
in the Pennsylvania Packet, 17 July, 1775.
2Maurer Maurer, "Military Justice Under General Washington," 
Military Affairs. XXVIII (Spring, 1964), 9.
3Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, June 29, 1775,
Edmund C. Burnett (ed.), Letters of the Members of the Continental 
Congress (8 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington,
1921-1936), I, 147.
^Roger Sherman to Joseph Trumbull, July 6, 1775, ibid., I, 154.
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code adopted by Congress on August 10, 1775, was derived more from 
the Massachusetts articles than from the British. Amendments made 
on November 7, 1775, followed by a complete revision on September 20, 
1776, brought the American code more in line with British law."*
The first Congressional code began by justifying the 
existence of an American army. The regulations were to give order 
to the army authorized "for the express purpose of securing and
g
defending the lives, liberties and immunities of the Colonists," 
and were intended to have jurisdiction over all military units raised 
by Congress.
Several articles of this code dealt with desertion and its
punishment. Article Five provided that any officer or soldier who
started, excited, caused, or joined in a mutiny in any part of the
Continental forces, would suffer punishment ordered by a general 
7court-martial. No specific punishment was mentioned. Nor did 
Articles Eight and Nine, which dealt with desertion, prescribe 
any definite punishment. Article Eight stated that any officer or
\ h e  British Articles of 1765, the Massachusetts Articles of 
April 5, 1775, and the American Articles of June 30, 1775, Nov. 7,
1775, and Sept. 20, 1776, are printed in William Winthrop's Military 
Law and Precedents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920),
931-71. The American Articles are found in Journals of the Continental 
Congress, II, 111-13; III, 331-34; V, 788-807; VII, 265-66.
g
Journals of the Continental Congress, II, 111-12.
7Ibid., II, 113.
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soldier who deserted would be punished by a court-martial; Article
8Nine included punishment for those who induced others to desert.
The sentence of a regimental court-martial was to be
inflicted on any non-commissioned officer or soldier who was found
one mile from camp without written orders from his commanding
officer, as well as for any officer or soldier who slept out of 
9camp. Moreover, any officer who failed to show up for any parade
or exercise would be punished by a regimental court-martial.^^
The commanding officer could order punishment without court-
martial for any officer or soldier who retired to his quarters without
permission,^ according to Articles Sixteen and Seventeen.
For sleeping on guard, or for leaving his post without
being properly relieved, a sentinel was subject to punishment by
12a general court-martial. For leaving the platoon or division, 
any officer or soldier would be punished by a regimental court- 
martial.^^
g
Ibid., Article 8. "Any non-commissioned officer, or soldier, 
who shall desert, or without leave of his commanding officer, absent 
himself from the troop or company to which he belongs, or from any 
detachment of the same, shall upon conviction thereof, be punished 
according to the nature of his offense at the discretion of a 
general court-martial."
^Ibid., 115, Articles 16 and 17.
10Ibid., Article 19.
^ I bid., Article 18.
^ Ibid., Article 21.
13Ibid., 115-16, Article 23.
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According to Article Fifty, the court-martial could inflict 
punishments at its discretion, although Article Fifty-one put 
limitations on the severity of the sentences. No person was to be 
sentenced to death except in the three cases expressly mentioned 
in the articles: for abandoning a post, or inducing others to
quit a charge; for making known the watch-word to any person not 
entitled to receive it; and for compelling a commander of a post 
to give up to the e n e m y — all serious offenses that endangered the 
lives of many soldiers. The courts were further limited in the 
punishment that could be ordered by the same articles. No 
punishment was to be inflicted at "the discretion of the court- 
martial, other than degrading, cashiering, drumming out of the army, 
whipping not exceeding thirty-nine lashes, fine not exceeding two
15months pay of the offender, imprisonment not exceeding one month."
An additional safeguard was Article Forty-two; no person could be 
put in arrest, imprisoned, or confined for more than eight days 
prior to his court-martial.
While the 1775 rules and regulations of the army did provide 
a basis for the orderly control of the troops, they did not 
completely satisfy Washington and the other commanders. They 
desired stricter codes, and Congress eventually acceded to their
^ I b i d ., 116, Articles 25, 26 and 31.
15Ibid., 119, Article 51.
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wishes. In a letter to Congress, Washington urged an addition to
the Articles of War that would provide the death penalty for several 
1 6other offenses. On November 7, 1775, Congress complied with the
request, amending sixteen articles of the code to permit a wider use
of the death sentence.^ For instance, under the revised code the
death penalty was allowed, upon conviction, for any person who
18gave intelligence to the enemy. Formerly the sentence for this 
offense had been at the discretion of the court, which meant that 
no penalty above thirty-nine lashes could be inflicted. For 
beginning, exciting, causing, or joining a mutiny or sedition, the
I Qdeath penalty was authorized. Any officer or soldier who
deserted to the enemy and was afterward captured, would be subject 
20to death, u as he would be if he misbehaved before the enemy, or 
did "shamefully abandon any post committed to his charge," or spoke
^Washington to President of Congress, November 2, 1775, Writings 
of Washington. IV, 58-59; the original is in the Papers of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (204 Rolls, Record Group 360,
Microcopy No. 247, National Archives) and varies in a few details.
See Worthington Chauncey Ford (ed.), Writing of George Washington (14 
vols., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1889-1893), III, 190. Hereinafter
cited as Ford (ed.), Writing of Washington.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, III, 330-34.
^ Ibid., III, 331, Amendment One.
19Ibid., Amendment Five.
20Ibid., III, 332, Amendment Six.
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words inducing others to do the same. ^  For sleeping on guard or
for leaving a guard post without permission the sentence was
changed to cashiering for officers, and whippings of from twenty to
22thirty-nine lashes for soldiers. For signing a false certificate
or giving a false return of troops, officers convicted were to be
23cashiered. Congress ordered the amendments published in the 
24newspapers.
Even the revised articles did not produce the desired
discipline in the army that both Congress and the generals had
hoped for. Although conditions improved after Washington took
over the disorganized and undisciplined crowd at Cambridge, he
learned that a well-trained, orderly, fighting force could not be
developed in a day, or month, or even a year. The American soldiers
were accustomed to unbounded freedom, and could not, as he said,
"brook the Restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good
25order the Government of an Army," without a stricter code.
21Ibid., Amendment Ten.
^ I bid., Amendment Eight.
^I bid., III, 334, Amendment Fifteen, 
o /
Journals of the Continental Congress, III, 352. Printed in 
the Pennsylvania Packet, November 20, 1775.
25Washington to President of Congress, September 24, 1776, 
Writings of Washington, VI, 111.
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Washington regarded subordination and discipline as the "life and
soul of an Army;11 these qualities must be established and maintained
to "make us formidable to our enemies, honorable to ourselves, and
26respected in the world." Earlier Washington had informed the
troops that "an Army without Order, Regularity and Discipline, is
27no better than a Commission'd Mob." He promised to punish every
kind of neglect or misbehavior and warned that no connections,
interests, or intercessions would avail to prevent strict
28execution of justice. In June, 1776, in letters to the president
of Congress, Washington again pleaded for further revision of the 
29Articles of War.
John Hancock, president of Congress, wrote Washington on 
June 14, 1776, that additional regulations were deemed necessary 
and would be passed. Congress had only laid a foundation at the 
present time and, "it still remains, in a great measure, to erect a 
System of Rules and Laws, that will enable us to carry on our
26Ibid.
2^General Orders, January 1, 1776, ibid., IV, 202.
28Similar warnings appeared frequently in General Orders, 
July 4, 1775, July 7, 1775, January 1, 1776, October 1, 1776.
29Washington to President of Congress, June 13, 1776,
June 20, 1776, Writings of Washington, V, 128, 159; see also Force 
(ed.), American Archives, 4th ser., VI, 837, 991; Journals of 
Continental Congress, January 24, March 20, April 18, June 12,
13, 14.
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30military operations with more Knowledge, Certainty, and Dispatch."
The duty of preparing the new army regulations fell to a 
committee consisting of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Edward 
Rutledge, James Wilson, and Robert R. Livingston. The committee 
brought in a report on August 7, which was debated August 13, 19 
and September 19, and adopted on September 20, 1776. John Adams in 
his autobiography said that he and Thomas Jefferson presented the 
proposal "In consequence of a letter from General George Washington 
. . . representing the insufficiency of the Articles of War, and 
requestioning a revision of them." Adams acknowledged that 
revision of the Articles of War "was very difficult and unpopular"; 
he suggested to Jefferson that since the opposition to a small 
change would be as great as a more complete alteration, "we might 
as well therefore report a compleat System at once and let it meet 
its fate." Observing that the British Articles of War were, in 
fact, a copy almost of the Roman code, and since these regulations 
had carried both Rome and England to the head of mankind, Adams 
felt they deserved serious consideration. "It would be in vain,"
he wrote, "for Us to seek, in our own Inventions or the Records of 
Warlike nations for a more compleat System of military discipline."
30John Hancock to Washington, June 14, 1776, Burnett (ed.), 
Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, I, 488. Included in 
this letter was the suggestion of the establishment of War Office 
which Hancock said, "is a new and great event in the History of 
America, and will doubtless be attended with essential advantages 
when properly conducted and inspected." ----
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Moreover, noting that the "prosperity of Nations had been in
proportion to the discipline of their forces by Sea and Land,"
he therefore favored reporting verbatim the code that had worked
31so successfully for the British. Jefferson cordially concurred 
in this plan. Using the British regulations as a model, the new 
articles were accordingly reported to Congress, defended principally 
by Adams, and eventually adopted on September 20, 1776. Commenting 
years later, Adams said the new code "laid the foundation of a 
discipline, which in time brought our Troops to a Capacity of 
contending with British Veterans, and a rivalry with the best
qoTroops of France."
The debate over the articles was heated and prolonged.
According to Adams, Jefferson never spoke a word in their defense,
and all the labor of the debate on the articles, which were discussed
33paragraph by paragraph, fell upon him. Some members of Congress 
saw great danger in a strong military code. The fact that military 
law was a very powerful instrument to place in the hands of 
Washington or any other military commander worried many congressmen, 
since it extended over both enlisted men and officers, as well as
31Lyman H. Butterfield and others (eds.), The Adams Papers:
Diary and Autobiography of John Adams (4 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1961), III, 409-10. Herein­
after cited as Butterfield and others (eds.), Diary and Autobiography 
of John Adams.
32Ibid., III, 410. 33Ibid., Ill, 434.
I
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civilians who accompanied the army in the field. Americans had 
always cherished the privileges of a common law and naturally 
objected to a legal system in which indictment by grand jury and 
other fundamental rights and safeguards were omitted.
The members of Congress were familiar with the long struggle 
of the English people against military law, and the war they were
rt/
fighting was itself a protest against arbitrary government. 
Jefferson, and no doubt other members of Congress, were familiar 
with Sim Matthew Hale's History of the Common Law of England, in 
which the Chief Justice had asserted that military law was "some­
thing indulged, rather than allowed as law."-33 Hale explained that 
order and discipline was necessary in the army and was the only 
thing that could give the law respectability. Military necessity, 
then, was viewed as justification for a strong military law to 
govern the Continental army. Washington's judge advocate, William 
Tudor, said, "when a man assumes the soldier he lays aside the
■^Maurer, "Military Justice," 9.
35Sim Matthew Hale, History and Analysis of the Common Law 
of England (1713), as quoted by Justice Hugo Black in Reid v.
Covert, 1 L ed 2d, 1169, n.48.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
citizen, and must be content to a temporary relinquishment of some
07of his civil rights." Adams remarked in his Works that "so
indigested were the notions of Liberty prevalent among the Majority
of the Members most zealously attached to the public Cause, that
to this day I scarcely know how it was possible that these
38Articles could be carried." In August, 1776, Edward Rutledge,
Congressman from South Carolina, wrote Robert R. Livingston:
"We are doing everything in our power to reform the vices of the
army and put the forces under better regulations than they have 
39yet been." Rutledge felt that if the articles carried they would 
have a happy effect on the army.
Apart from the debate on the articles, Adams had been instru­
mental in bringing about a resolution prepared by the Board of W a r ^
37Memoral of Judge Advocate, October, 1775, Force (ed.), 
American Archives, 4th ser., Ill, 1164.
38Butterfield and others (eds.), Diary and Autobiography 
of John Adams, III, 434.
39Edward Rutledge to Robert R. Livingston, August 19, 1776, 
Burnett (ed.), Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, II, 55.
40The Board of War and Ordnance, established in July,
1776, was made up of five members of the Continental Congress, a 
paid secretary, and clerks. It soon became apparent the Board 
was not able to carry out its assigned duties, and a new Board of 
War was set up October, 1777, composed of three persons not members 
of Congress, a secretary, and clerks. In November, 1777, the 
number was expanded to five, all military men. In October, 1778, 
the Board was changed again to allow two of the five members to 
be congressmen. It remained essentially the same until it was 
superseded by the War Office in 1781. James A. Huston, The Sinews 
of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953, Vol. 2 of the Army Historical
Series (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), 6-7.
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(an executive arm of Congress) in behalf of discipline that was 
passed September 19. This resolution came as a result of his 
journey through New Jersey to Staten Island, where he had observed 
much dissipation, idleness, confusion, and distraction among the 
officers and men. He was "astonished, grieved, and alarmed" 
by it:
Discipline had become by constant topick of discourse 
and even declamation in and out of Congress and 
especially in the Board of War. I saw very clearly 
that the Ruin of our Cause and Country must be the 
Consequence if a thoughrough Reformation and strict 
Discipline could not be introduced. My Zeal on this 
Occasion was no doubt represented, by my faithfull 
Ennemies in great Secrecy however, to their friends 
in the Army, and although it might recommend me to 
the Esteen of a very few, yet, it will be easily 
believed that it contributed nothing to my 
Popularity, among the many. ^
Adams was very happy to be able to report to James Warren on
September 24, 1776, that the articles had been accepted, and he
12
hoped real discipline would be introduced at last.
The new Articles of War, enacted in 1776, contained a 
number of changes from the code put in effect the year before. 
Punishment for violations under the revised code was more severe. 
The death penalty was prescribed upon conviction in fifteen cases,
41Butterfield and others (ed.), Diary and Autobiography of 
John Adams, III, 433.
^John Adams to James Warren, September 25, 1776, Burnett 
(ed.), Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, II, 102.
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and the maximum number of lashes allowable was changed from thirty-
43nine to one hundred. Section VI, Article One, covering desertion, 
specified that "all officers and soldiers, who having received pay 
or having been duly inlisted in the service of the United States, 
shall be convicted of having deserted, shall suffer death, or
44such other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflicted."
In this instance the punishment was the same as the amendment of 
the previous November. Article Three dealt with soldiers who 
enlisted in two or more units without receiving a discharge from 
the company in which they last served. The offender would be guilty 
of desertion from the first unit and would suffer accordingly.
While this article did not specifically state that the death penalty 
would be inflicted upon conviction, it was understood that it was 
to be so interpreted. A provision was added to punish officers who
Besides desertion, the death penalty was provided for the 
following offenses: Excite or join a mutiny (Sec. II, Art. 3);
officer or non-commissioned officer who did not stop a mutiny (Sec. II, 
Art. 4); leave guard post (Sec. XIII, Art. 8); do violence at 
civilian provisioner (Sec. XIII, Art. 11); misbehave before the 
enemy or abandon post (Sec. XIII, Art. 12); misbehave before the 
enemy, run away, abandon post, speak words inducing others to do 
the like, quit post to plunder . . . to be regarded as a "disobeyer 
of military orders" (Sec. XIII, Art. 13); cast away arms or ammunition 
(Sec. XIII, Art. 14); make known the watch word (Sec. XIII, Art. 15.); 
force a safeguard (Sec. XIII, Art. 19); relieve the enemy with money, 
victuals, or ammunition (Sec. XIII, Art. 18); leave post to go in 
search of plunder (Sec. XIII, Art. 21); compel the commander to 
give up or go to the enemy, or abandon a post (Sec. XIII, Art. 22); 
Journals of the Continental Congress, V, 788-807.
44Ibid., V, 792.
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knowingly enlisted men who had deserted from other military units. 
Upon conviction an officer would be cashiered. For persuading 
any officer or soldier to desert, the offender would be subject to 
punishment as inflicted by a court-martial.
Articles dealing with those absent without proper authority
(A. W. 0. L.) were listed tinder Section Thirteen.4^ Soldiers found
one mile from camp without permission were subject to a sentence of
the court-martial; officers who "sleep away from camp without
permission" were also subject to punishment at the discretion of a
court-martial. For sleeping on guard or leaving a guard post without
proper authority, the sentence of thirty-nine lashes maximum was
46changed to the death penalty.
While the new Articles of War added teeth to the commander's 
attempt to instill discipline in the officers and soldiers in the 
Continental army, it was not the complete answer. Additional laws 
were required from time to time to cover specific instances not 
adequately explained in the code.
Resolutions and laws for the apprehension of deserters, 
deemed essential for the good discipline of the army, touched off 
a heated debate in Congress. To some congressmen the problem of
45Ibid., V, 797.
46Ibid., V, 797, Section XIII, Article 6.
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desertion was less important than the fact that state's rights were
being violated for the purpose of capturing and punishing deserters.
Thomas Burke of North Carolina recorded in his "Abstract of Debates"
an interesting discussion that took place on February 15, 1777,
over amendments proposed to a report of a committee "appointed to
consider some means for preventing d e s e r t i o n . B u r k e  noted that
"the main question was concerning the jurisdiction of Congress
and the States," with the debate being mainly between James
Wilson of Pennsylvania and himself.48 The original report of
the committee called for Congress to recommend to the states "Laws
Empowering all Constables, Ferry keepers, and Freeholders to take up
persons suspected of being deserters and carry them before any
49Justice of the Peace." An amendment was moved and passed that 
the power to enforce this law could go immediately from Congress 
without the intervention of the states.
^Thomas Burke, "Abstract of Debates," Burnett (ed.),
Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, II, 275.
48Ibid., II, 275-81.
49Ibid., II, 275; The report Burke referred to was submitted 
to Congress February 13, 1777, by the committee on desertion, 
appointed to study the problem and to act on a request by Washington 
for a stiff apprehension law. The committee's proposed recommendation 
stated:
Whereas several Soldiers and Marines duly enlisted in 
the Service of the United States do afterwards desert, 
and are often found wandering, or otherwise absenting 
themselves illegally from the Service: Resolved that
it be recommended to the Legislatures of the several 
states to provide as soon as possible by law that it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
This amendment distressed Burke, who asked for permission to 
enter a protest against it, but the chair denied his request. He 
then proceeded to voice his protest anyway, so that it could be 
included in the Journals, for the purpose, he noted, of letting 
his constituency know that he had opposed it. He felt that 
Congress was wrongfully assuming power to give authority to 
persons within states to seize and imprison other persons of any 
state, which, thereby, endangered the personal liberty of every 
man in A m e r i c a . W i l s o n  argued in opposition to Burke that every 
object of continental concern was a proper subject of debate 
for the Continental Congress, and that all provisions made by 
Congress must be executed with Continental authority. The army, 
he continued, was a Continental organization and "preventing 
Desertion in it was certainly as Necessary an object as the raising 
of it." Wilson added: "Nothing could be more Necessary to prevent
Desertion than to take Effectual Measures for Apprehending
shall and may be lawful as and of any Constable, free­
holder, or keeper of any public ferry, within any of 
the United States, to apprehend, or cause to be 
apprehended, any person being a Deserter, and 
cause such person to be brought before any Justice 
of the Peace, living in or near the place where such 
person shall be taken, who shall have power to examine 
such person, and . . . (if a deserter to convey him 
to the army).
Report of the Committee on Desertion, February 13, 1777, Papers 
of the Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 30, 53-57.
^^Burke, "Abstract", Burnett (ed.), Letters of Members of 
the Continental Congress, II, 276.
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51Deserters." He contended that power must necessarily be in the
Congress, and that Congress certainly had power to authorize any
persons in the states to put congressional directives into execution.
Every officer and soldier already had the power to apprehend
deserters, and Congress had the authority to make any justice of
the peace in any state an officer and give him power to do the
same. Wilson stated that the officers and soldiers of the army
were certainly not subject to the laws of the states. To give
justices of the peace this power was no more than was being done
every day in authorizing persons to purchase provisions for the
army by actions of Congress, and Congress had never been denied the
power to put such resolutions into execution.
The delegate from North Carolina then retorted with a long,
impassioned speech restating his objections to the apprehension law:
"the states alone had Power to act coercively against their Citizens,
and therefore, were the only Power competent to carry into execution
any Provisions against citizens whether Continental or Municipal."
Only by violence, ha argued, could any power on earth obtain authority
to act coercively against any of the citizens of the state he
52represented "except under their own Legislature." Burke was
51Ibid.
52Ibid., II, 276-77.
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actually striking at the very foundation of Congress' authority.
Burke added another factor in the argument. He admitted 
that the army was a proper agency to be governed and directed by 
the Continental councils, and that it was right for Congress to 
punish deserters, since desertion was a great evil; but the basic 
question was, just who is a deserter and who is not? Desertion, he 
said, must be determined prior to punishment, and the person with 
the authority to make this decision has power over the life and 
liberty of the citizens:
If the Congress has the Power to appoint any Person to 
decide this Question the Congress has the Power un­
limited over the lives and Liberties of all men in 
America and the Provisions so anxiously made by the 
respective States to Secure them, at once Vanish before 
this Tremendous Authority.^
However correct it was for Congress to punish desertion, Burke felt 
that it was necessary for the states to prevent arbitrary and unjust 
punishments and imprisonment of their citizens. According to Burke, 
the state codes provided that no man should be imprisoned or in 
any degree injured in person or property except under the laws of 
the states. Congress, therefore, could not give power to anyone 
within a state to hear and determine cases of this nature or to seize 
and imprison people of any state.
Burke was especially alarmed by Wilson's statement that the 
officers and soldiers of the army were not responsible to the laws
53Ibid., II, 277.
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of the states. If the members of the armed forces, he continued, 
were not "subject to the Laws of the Respective State, it would 
follow that a powerful Body of men within any State might Violate 
with Impunity all the Rights of the Citizens and subject them to the 
worst of Oppressions."^ The North Carolinian felt that if this were 
the case, then all society and government might well be dissolved, 
for they were fighting against the same type of oppression imposed 
by the British. He argued that to give power to individuals to take 
deserters into custody would make waste paper of the state constitu­
tions' basic rights. Burke reasoned that no military officer had 
the authority to act in any civil department whatever in any state.
In regard to Congress' power to make purchases, he saw a great 
difference since mere money was the object of concern, whereas 
with apprehending deserters personal lives and liberty were at stake.
Wilson, in his reply, admitted that officers and soldiers 
were subject to state laws and only in their military duty were 
subject to Congress. In reply to the last part of Burke's argument, 
Wilson maintained that this was an essential power Congress needed 
to insure discipline in the army:
If the states alone were competent to this Power it would 
follow that no deserter could be punished or apprehended 
but in the state where he inlisted, and consequently by 
keeping out of that state he was sure of Impunity— that 
he was in Effect declaring that desertion could not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
be punished and consequently that the army might be 
immediately disbanded.^
Wilson then moved that the words "suspected of being," be removed 
from the amendment, hoping that all objections to it would be 
silenced.^
Other members of Congress joined the debate; it seemed that 
most of them were amazed at the furor created over this issue. 
Apparently only Thomas Burke held to his views at this time. Richard 
Henry Lee said that he could see no more in the problem than he 
saw every day in the newspapers advertising rewards for the return 
of deserters, which "was certainly exercising no Magisterial Power." 
John Adams confessed that the matter passed without attracting his 
attention, and from the discussion it would seem that the Articles 
of War were intended to be effective in every state. Burke responded 
to Wilson by saying that the "Plea of Necessity would subvert all 
restraint laid on persons entrusted with power and authority, and 
always had been used by tyrants for that purpose." He felt that 
this plea had no foundation in the American Congress since the 
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As Burke further commented, it was untrue that desertion 
could not be prevented or punished, if the states alone could 
exercise this power. Nor was it true that deserters could be 
apprehended nowhere but in the states where the soldiers enlisted:
That desertion was a Crime and like all other Crimes 
to be punished whereever it should be committed, and 
by the Power who had competent Jurisdiction. That 
the crime once committed the offender might be appre­
hended in any state and removed to the Jurisdiction 
who had power to punish, but every Individual who 
might be apprehended had a right to call for the 
Interposition of the state where he was apprehended 
to Enquire whether he was a person liable to 
suspicion, whether the restraint of his liberty 
was lawful or not.-*®
Burke rejected the idea that the removal of the word "suspected" 
would render the amendment satisfactory to him. To Lee, Burke 
said that there was a difference between advertising for a 
deserter, and Congress giving power to individuals to decide the 
question of his guilt or innocence. To Adams, Burke explained that 
Congress had the power to raise and govern an army, but the
Power of Congress could not extent to subject any 
other but such as enlisted and personally consented 
to the articles of War, and it was the Duty of the 
states to Interpose whenever the Question arose 
whether soldier or not, because otherwise their 
citizens might be subjected to Martial Law against 
their Consent . . . .
58Ibid.. II, 279-80.
59Ibid., II, 281.
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Finally, Burke argued that whenever any soldier surmised that "the 
courts-martial exceeded their Jurisdiction he had a right to bring 
the matter before the civil Tribunal of the State where he was, 
because otherwise the Military might become absolute and Independent 
of the civil authority.
Had Thomas Burke's argument prevailed in Congress, then 
every court-martial held by the Continental army would have been 
subjected to review or cancellation by the various state court 
systems. To say the least, the relationship between laws of the 
states and the central government was at times confusing and often 
conflicting. It is not difficult to see how questions of this 
nature could very easily arise. According to the rules and 
regulations of the army passed in 1775, a soldier who deserted 
would have been subjected to a penalty of only thirty-nine lashes, 
whereas if he were tried in certain state courts (New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island) for the crime of desertion he could 
have been given the death penalty. After 1776 the death penalty 
was allowed under military law, upon conviction, for a number of 
offenses, including desertion. But if the soldier were tried for 
this offense in the majority of the state courts, he would have been 
subjected to a much more lenient penalty. It has already been 
shown that conviction for desertion in some states carried a penalty 
of a fine of only a few shillings, or corporal punishment not
60Ibid.
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exceeding thirty-nine lashes. A switching of jurisdiction from
military to civilian courts would have been chaotic for the army,
and would no doubt have further encouraged soldiers to desert
since they could reasonably assume that a dispute would arise over
jurisdiction that could prohibit a trial from ever taking place.
Fortunately for the army, Congress dismissed the objections of
Burke and proceeded to pass laws for the strict enforcement of the
Articles of War.
Congress eventually passed a number of laws authorizing
various individuals to apprehend deserters. On July 31, 1777,
Congress voted to divide the states into districts and appoint
recruiters with power to apprehend deserters. The sum of five
dollars, with expenses, was allowed for every deserter taken up 
61and secured. Three months later, Congress amended this law to
allow an additional five-dollar reward for the capture of runaways
plus "12/90 parts of a dollar for each mile between the place in
62which he may be taken and to which he may be conveyed." The 
same law provided that the premium and other expenses for catching 
quitters be taken from their pay. The impression left by the Burke- 
Wilson debates probably accounted for the expunging of part of this 
resolution, which would have recommended that the states pass laws
61 Journals of the Continental Congress, VIII, 593-94.
620etober 7, 1777, Ibid., IX, 813-14; October 7, 1777,
Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 30, 135-36.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
authorizing any citizen to apprehend deserters and receive the
63congressional reward.
An additional part of the resolution of October, 1777, was
a recommendation to state legislatures that they enact laws to
punish persons who knowingly harbored, concealed, or assisted
d e s e r t e r s . M o s t  states complied with the resolution by either
passing new laws or revising existing statutes governing the
apprehension of deserters.^ Congress enacted resolutions pertaining
to the harboring of deserters as early as November 4, 1775. At
that time, it recommended to the state governments that offenders
be punished by a fine of from thirty to fifty dollars, and if they
could not pay the fine, they be subject to "whippings, not exceeding
thirty-nine lashes for each o f f e n s e . A  five-dollar reward and
reasonable expenses were also provided for any person who brought
in a deserter; the paymaster general of the army would make the
payment to the person who retrieved the shirker, and the same
67amount was to be deducted from the pay of the deserter. In
63Journals of the Continental Congress, IX, 814.
64Ibid., IX, 814-15.
^~*Cf. ante, Chapter III.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, III, 324-25.
67Ibid.s III, 325.
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April, 1777, a committee requested a resolution that forfeited
to the United States all pay and allowances due soldiers or officers 
68who deserted. After some debate this proposal was ordered to lie 
on the table.
A report prepared by the Board of War and read in Congress 
on May 28, 1779, outlined a very strong and definite policy to 
be followed in arresting deserters. The Board asked Congress to 
recommend to the state legislatures that they "faithfully capture 
deserters, return them to their regiments, and appoint trustworthy 
officials in every state to pay the rewards and m i l e a g e . T h e  
Board further requested that the reward be increased to thirty 
dollars for each captured deserter delivered into safe custody, 
and that 36/90ths of a dollar be paid for each mile between the 
place of capture and the place of confinement. Congress was asked 
to provide the funds for this expense. In addition, every military 
officer was to collect such deserters as might be turned over to 
him and convey them to their regiments, or to some other place of 
confinement where they would be punished or worked while waiting 
to join their parent units. Congress adjourned without taking
68Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives,
Roll 30, 131-35. Committee report was read before Congress, April 
19, 1777.
69April 21, 1777, ibid., Roll 30, 132.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, XIV, 663-64.
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action on this proposal. Fortunately, most of the states had 
already passed similar laws or were in the process of doing so, 
and Congress, no doubt, did not wish to touch off another long 
debate over state versus Congressional control.
Another problem that plagued Washington was enlisting enemy
deserters in the American army. In compliance with a request from
the Commander in Chief, Congress declared (February 26, 1778) that
"no prisoner of war or deserter from the enemy be inlisted, drafted,
or returned to serve in the continental a r m y . Y e t  Washington
continued to be troubled by reports of enlistments of enemy
deserters, who shortly after enlisting in the American army fled
again with their arms and other equipment. Acting on a report
from the Board of War, Congress in May, 1778, recommended to the
states that they enact laws exempting from all military duty persons
72who deserted from the British army or navy. Congress further 
asked that the states disqualify by law all enemy deserters from 
serving as substitutes, and void all contracts made for their service 
in this capacity. To encourage compliance with the law, it was 
recommended that all money paid deserters enlisted as substitutes 
be retained by them. A person who might have engaged an enemy 
turncoat to serve in his place would therefore lose the fee paid
71Ibid., X, 203.
72Ibid., XI, 522-23.
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to the substitute and still be compelled to serve the tour him­
self.
In March, 1782, Congress recommended that the states pass
laws for the seizing of deserters from the enemy who escaped from
their places of confinement. A reward of eight Spanish-milled
dollars was offered for every enemy escapee captured, plus l/8th of
a dollar per mile for traveling expenses and 5/90ths of a dollar
per day for subsistence of the deserters while confined, the money
73to come from the congressional treasury.
Since many enemy deserters did join the American army despite 
all the laws forbidding this practice, some question arose over 
the punishment of those who joined, then ran off, and were captured. 
In March, 1778, Brigadier General Samuel H. Parsons asked Congress 
if "deserters from the enemy are permitted to enlist into the 
service of these United States, and whether, in case such are 
inlisted, a deserter of that character can be legally condemned and 
executed for desertion?"74 Congress gave its opinion that, although 
it had recommended against enlisting deserters from the enemy, "yet 
such being inlisted and receiving bounty and pay, are in all respects
73Ibid., XXII, 154-55.
74Ibid., X, 247-48.
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subject to the articles of war, and liable to suffer death for
desertion.I'7'’ Congress said the Articles of War were for the
governance of the army and did not make any distinction between
inhabitants of the states and deserters from the enemy.
Numerous complaints reached Congress from the army regarding
civilians who assisted the enemy in some way either by encouraging
desertion or supplying the British forces.
In a letter to Congress, Major General John Sullivan complained
about certain Quakers who had given intelligence to the enemy.
The Congressional committee reporting the complaint recommended
that the state of Pennsylvania arrest several men reported to belong
to the Society of Friends. After debating the question, Congress
76approved the resolution on August 28, 1777. Two months later, 
Congress followed with another resolution setting a policy for 
all states to follow in dealing with civilians who aided the enemy. 
General Washington was empowered to seize such persons who had 
acted as guides, given intelligence, furnished supplies, provisions, 
money, clothing, arms, fuel, or any other kind of stores, within 
thirty miles of any town in Pennsylvania, Jersey, or Delaware.
Those apprehended would be tried by court-martial, and, if convicted, 
were to suffer death, or any other punishment the court felt
75Ibid., XXII, 248.
76Ibid., VIII, 694-95.
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was adequate.77 It was further resolved that all "magistrates
and officers, civil and military, and all good people . . .  be
vigilant in apprehending, securing and bringing to punishment all
such persons, in order that a speedy and effectual stop may be put
78to such a pernicious practice." A number of civilians were
apprehended under the authority given to the military and some of
79them were sentenced to be executed.
770ctober 8, 1777, ibid., IX, 784.
78Ibid., IX, 785.
79Washington ordered the capture of a Dutchman believed 
to be carrying intelligence to the enemy, and, if convicted, he 
was to be "hanged instantly." Washington to Brigadier General 
William Maxwell, February 18, 1777, Writing of Washington, VII, 158. 
Joseph Worrell, an inhabitant of Pennsylvania, was court-martialed for 
giving intelligence to the enemy and sentenced to death. General 
Orders, March 1, 1778, ibid., XI, 11-12. Worrell's execution was 
postponed the next day, however. General Orders, March 2, 1778, 
ibid., XI, 12. For supplying the enemy, William Morgan of 
Pennsylvania, was sentenced to hard labor for the duration of the 
war with the stipulation that if he tried to escape he was to "suffer 
Death." General Orders, April 3, 1778, ibid., XI, 202. Thomas 
Shanks, confessing to being a spy for the enemy, was ordered 
hanged on June 4, 1778. General Orders, June 3, 1778, ibid., XII,
14. Edward Hicks, charged with conveying information to the enemy, 
was tried by court-martial and sentenced to be imprisoned for the 
duration of the war. "Court-martial Proceedings," March 19,
1779, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 56. At the same 
trial, Robert Lands was convicted of aiding the enemy, and sentenced 
to "Suffer Death," ibid. Thomas Osborn of New Haven, charged with 
being a spy, was ordered executed if the commander saw fit to do 
so. Washington to Samuel Parsons, August 26, 1780, ibid., Roll 70.
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Alexander Hamilton, in behalf of Washington, wrote the 
New York committee of correspondence in April, 1777, that civilians 
who aided the enemy should be punished capitally, or by heavy fines 
and imprisonments. "An execution or two," he said, "by way of 
example would strike terror, and powerfully discourage the wicked 
practices going on." He further cautioned that the corporal 
punishment of inhabitants might also "excite compassion and breed 
disgust," and furthermore, "confiscation of property is not 
cognizable by martial law."®® Gouvemeur Morris answered from 
Kingston, New York, that the spirit of the Tories had been broken 
in his state by taking strong actions. He added that "they shall 
have a few more executions than which nothing can be more
Q1
efficacious.,IOi John Eddy was charged with enlisting men for the 
British service. He was indicted for treason by a grand jury, 
but escaped before he could be tried.®®
Colonel Israel Shreve from New Mill wrote Washington on 
April 10, 1778, that he was doing everything possible to stop 
the "Disaffected from Trading" with the enemy.®® Shreve had already
80Hamilton to New York Committee of Correspondence, April 21,
1777, Harold C. Syrett (ed.), The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (15 vols., 
to date, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1967),1, 237.
Hereinafter cited as Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton.
^"Morris to Hamilton, May 16, 1777, ibid., I, 254.
^Hamilton to William Livingston, April 21, 1777, ibid., I, 235-36.
QOColonel Israel Shreve to Washington, April 10, 1778, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 48.
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court-martialed two deserters from the army, William Seeds and
Samuel Carter, who were supplying the enemy, and both were
84sentenced to death. Washington confirmed the sentence of Seeds, 
but not that of Carter. He said it was necessary to consult with 
Brigadier General William Livingston of the New Jersey militia 
on the matter:
Introducing martial law into this State [Pennsylvania], 
was intended to remedy the weakness of the Civil 
[law]; but in the State of New Jersey where there 
is a law framed expressly for the purpose of trying 
inhabitants taking Arms on the side of the Enemy,
I think such person should be delivered to the 
Civil power.85
Washington seemed always ready for the civil authorities 
to take action whenever there was a possibility of conflict between 
the army and any state government. The problem of dealing with 
civilians who supplied the enemy was never solved, regardless of 
the efforts made by Congress, the states, and the army. Washington 
complained in October, 1778, that he had "no authority to punish 
the persons taken in the fact of illicit commerce, any further than 
by seizing their merchandize, and delivering their persons to the 
civil magistrate."88 As late as 1782 the Commander in Chief of the
^Proceedings of a General Court Martial, April 8. 1778, ibid.
QC
Washington to Colonel Israel Shreve, April 14, 1778, 
Writings of Washington, XI, 258.
88Washington to Brigadier General Charles Scott, October 3, 
1778, ibid., XIII, 18.
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army was still writing letters to Congress and the states, trying 
to persuade them to pass rigorous laws to prevent inhabitants from 
furnishing the enemy with provisions. He said that in other 
nations this practice was punishable with death, and unless the 
states of this continent passed similar laws, "I see no means of 
putting a stop to that destructive practice," for "anything the 
Military could do in that matter would be in vain."®^
Numerous other problems arose that Washington felt could be
remedied with adequate laws. In 1778 he wrote to George Read that
there were disaffected persons in Delaware that made a practice of
harboring deserters, and were encouraged to do this, "knowing there
is at present no law to punish this crime, which is most pernicious
to the service."®® Washington advised General William Smallwood,
in regard to a certain Jetson who had been charged with committing
a number of crimes, that the only offense specific enough to
warrant trial was his firing on Continental troops, and this was
89no crime because there was not a law against that practice! 
Washington suggested turning him over to the civilian authorities to
87Washington to Chevalier de la Luzerne, November 13, 1782, 
ibid., XXV, 334.
88Washington to President George Read, February 26, 1778, 
ibid., X, 517.
O Q Washington to Brigadier General William Smallwood, May 19, 
1778, ibid., XI, 420.
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be tried for treason. He further suggested to Governor George
Clinton that three inhabitants of New York arrested for enticing
soldiers to desert be tried in civilian courts rather than by the 
90military.
On one occasion an officer was prosecuted on a felony 
charge for apprehending civilians who trafficed with the enemy. 
Washington explained to Governor George Clinton of New York that 
"prosecutions of this kind may discourage officers from the dis­
charge of their duty." The General cautiously mentioned that the 
"good of the service sometimes required things to be done in the 
military line, which cannot be supported by the civil law."^1 
In most instances of this nature, the Commander in Chief was very 
careful not to appear to be infringing on the rights of the states 
or individual citizens. He fully recognized the need of maintaining 
popular support among the people, and every incident that violated 
this policy was quickly smoothed over if possible.
It was Washington's desire that all matters pertaining to 
the army be handled through the authority of the central government 
and not the various states. He recognized that there were in­
equalities of provisions for the various state lines caused partly
^Washington to Governor George Clinton, September 25, 1778, 
ibid., XII, 497.
^^Washington to Governor George Clinton, December 13, 1779,
ibid., XVII, 252.
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by the differences in state appropriations and laws. Washington 
reasoned, no doubt correctly, that everything relating to the army 
must be conducted by regulations passed by Congress; "this alone," he 
said, would bring "harmony and consistency to our military establish­
ment."92
The record left in the Journals of the Continental Congress 
gives the impression that Congress was sensitive to (and whenever 
possible responded favorably to) every petition and request that 
came from Washington or any of the military commanders in trying 
to relieve the distress caused by desertion. Resolutions were 
passed almost daily to meet various military needs, and changes 
were made when needed to render better enforcement of discipline in 
the army. Yet resolutions did not mean the problem had been solved; 
it was often not affected at all. At times, mere changes in rules 
or additional grants of authority, or the clarification of issues, 
did help in future prosecutions of offenders, but the real causes 
of desertion were seldom dealt with by the adoption of a resolution, 
despite the good intentions of Congress. Congress did, however, 
establish a legal basis for apprehending and punishing those who 
deserted. It was the responsibility of the army, coupled with a 
firm determination of the civilian population, to see that offenders 
were captured; it was here that the major task of stopping this most
92Washington to President of Congress, April 3, 1780, 
ibid., XVIII, 210.
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harmful practice rested. There were many basic causes for 
desertion that had to be remedied before men would choose to remain 
with the army during their legal tour of duty. A closer look at 
some of the causes of desertion will help in understanding the 
problem.
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CHAPTER V
CAUSES OF DESERTION: PHYSICAL FACTORS
Desertion during the Revolutionary War could not be ascribed 
to a single cause any more than it could be curbed by a single statute. 
One source alone, the Calendar of Virginia State Papers, -̂ reveals 
dozens of causes. Court-martial proceedings, private letters, 
general orders, and official correspondence all contain information 
on desertion, which Washington characterized as "the most pernicious 
Vice that can possibly prevail in an Army." For clarity, some 
of the reasons for desertion discussed on the following pages are 
grouped into several categories: physical, military, domestic,
political, and miscellaneous.
General Distress
Physical hardship and personal distress caused hundreds of 
men to desert the army. Hunger, sickness, and exposure to the 
elements were constant companions of the American army, along with 
inadequate shelter, insufficient clothing, poor medical attention, 
and extended periods of duty without pay or provisions. From Valley 
Forge in February, 1778, Washington complained to William Buchanan,
^Palmer and others (eds.), Calendar of Virginia State Papers.
2Washington to Colonel David Mason, September 2, 1777.
Writings of Washington, IX, 165.
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commissary-general of purchases, that "the murmurs on account of 
Provisions are become universal," and he added, "what may ensue, 
if a better prospect does not speedily open, I dread to conjucture."^ 
Two months later, he wrote proudly to John Banister of Virginia that 
the army, while suffering greatly, had shown remarkable patience:
. . .  no history, now extant, can furnish an instance 
of any Army's suffering such uncommon hardships as 
ours have done, and bearing them with the same patience 
and Fortitude. To see Men without Cloathes to cover 
their nakedness, without Blankets to lay on, without 
Shoes, by which their Marches might be traced by 
the Blood from their feet, and almost as often 
without Provisions as with; Marching through frost and 
Snow, and at Christmas taking up their Winter 
Quarters within a day's March of the enemy, without 
a House or Hutt to cover them till they could be 
built and submitting to it without a murmur, is a 
mark of patience and obedience which in my opinion 
can scarce be parallel'd.^
While Washington's letter was complimentary to the soldiers, he 
failed to mention that some were not able to endure irksome 
conditions and departed illegally to seek comfort elsewhere. During 
the first year of fighting Sergeant Ephraim Squire of the Connecticut 
Line explained some of the conditions the troops endured:
This morning early it began to rain and we [had] no 
shelter, and are obliged to go to carry over our 
Battooes, and Barrells, the way muddy and slippery,
Washington to William Buchanan, February 7, 1778, ibid.,
X, 427.
^Washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778, ibid., XI,
291-92. Washington wrote a similar letter to James McHenry, October 17,
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hard for poor soldiers, that have to work hard in 
the rain and cold, and wade a mile and a half knee 
deep in water and mud, cold enough and after night, 
to camp in the rain without any shelter.
Numerous letters from Washington's headquarters to governors 
and other officials complained of discomforts. Washington 
assured Colonel Theodorick Bland in 1779 that the want of supplies 
and other necessities was the principal cause of discontent, 
desertions, and mutinies.*’ Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, 
complaining about the poorly equipped and provisioned troops sent 
to him, made an impassioned plea to Washington in 1777: "For
God's sake rouze your Field and other officers from their Lathargy" 
and supply the leadership needed to meet our needs.^ Responding to 
this and similar pleas, Washington communicated almost daily with 
Congress and the governors seeking supplies. To Governor William 
Livingston of New Jersey, Washington explained that the absence of 
shelter and the loss of baggage caused numerous soldiers to abandon 
the army. He said "it is difficult to determine the extent of the 
evils if at so critical a juncture we shall experience a failure
1782, stating that "the patience, the fortitude, the long and great 
sufferings of this army is unexampled in History; but there is an 
end to all things, and I fear we are very near one." Ibid., XXV, 269.
■*Ephrim Squire, "Diary of Ephrim Squire: Sergeant in the 
Connecticut Line of the Continental Army," Magazine of American 
History, II (1878), 688.
^Washington to Theodorick Bland, August 20, 1779, Writings of 
Washington, XVI, 139.
^Anthony Wayne to Washington, March 25, 1777, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 20.
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g
of the provisions which we should have every reason to apprehend."
In 1781 he wrote again to Livingston urging him to call on the 
legislature to make provisions for procuring needed items for the 
army. The alternative would be for the army to use coercion in 
obtaining supplies, a procedure "highly disgusting and oppressive
Q
to the inhabitants" and ruinous to the discipline of the army. Some 
commanders and individual troops sought to improve their plight 
by their own initiative. James Moore, from Rantas Mills, New 
Jersey, wrote Washington in 1780, that "the want of provision, I 
was afraid would Excite the Soldiers to frequest desertions"; he 
therefore sent his quarter-master out with a party to procure 
supplies from the people.^ In 1781, Washington advised Brigadier 
General James Clinton to seek relief for his distressed troops 
from the counties near him in Massachusetts.^ Washington pointed 
out that the more that could be regularly obtained through established 
channels, the less occasion there would be to resort to measures 
of a disagreeable kind. Even rum was in short supply. To the New 
Hampshire governor, Washington noted that no rum had arrived from 
that state. "This Article," he said, "is so necessary for the
Q
Washington to William Livingston, December 21, 1779,
Writings of Washington, XVII, 293.
9June 15, 1781, ibid., XXII, 223.
I®James Moore to Washington, April 28, 1780, Washington Papers, 
Library of Congress, Roll 66.
^Washington to Brigadier General James Clinton, May 5, 1781, 
Writings of Washington. XXII, 36.
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Health as well as comfort of the Soldiery at this Season, that I
1 9wish it might be particularly attended to.
Jealousies among the soldiers from different states often 
erupted because of the inequity in the way the soldiers were 
supplied. Hamilton complained to the New York legislature that his 
troops were not receiving the quantity of subsistence prescribed 
as standard for the Continental army:
My Men, you are sensible, by their articles,
[are] entitled to the same subsistance with the 
Continental troops; and it would be to them an 
insupportable discrimination, as well as a breach 
of the terms of their enlistment, to give them 
almost a third less provisions than the whole army 
besides receives.13
Moses Hazen, in a "Memorial" to Washington, made a similar 
complaint; his Second Canadian Regiment had not been properly 
supplied by Congress, nor any of the states since most of the troops 
arrived from Canada: "Belonging to no one of the Thirteen United
States consequently no kind of Provisions is or has been attempted 
to be made for them."^ He noted with pride, however, that only 
one of his men had deserted because of this distress; the others 
had endured the suffering patiently.
^Washington to Mesheck Weare, August 5, 1781, ibid., XXII, 467.
^Hamilton to the Convention of the Representatives of the State 
of New York, July 26, 1776, Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 186.
^Colonel Moses Hazen to Washington, November 20, 1779, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 62.
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In answer to a letter from Colonel James Livingston, First
Canadian Regiment, Washington expressed regret for the desertions
that occurred "on account of the superior advantages possessed
by other troops," and promised to solicit aid from Congress to
15satisfy their needs.
Congress was not unaware of the needs of the army. A
committee appointed to inquire into the state of the army and to
suggest means for supplying its needs visited the troops near New
York in 1776. Its report to Congress described not only the need
for food and clothing, but suggested that the real reason the army
was destitute was the poor discipline of the troops and the
inferior quality of some of the officers. Congress promptly
requested that in the future the states be more careful in selecting 
16officers. Congress subsequently passed a resolution directing 
commanders to select suitable garden spots near general hospitals 
to supply the army with vegetables and authorized the hiring of 
civilian laborers to cultivate the fields. This arrangement was 
not successful in producing an adequate food supply and was discontinued.
^Washington to Colonel James Livingston, July 29, 1779,
Writings of Washington. XVI, 3.
^Report of the Committee sent to the camp near New York,
24, 1776, Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives,
Roll 30, Items 21 and 22.
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Washington seldom pointed an accusing finger at an individual
administrator or officer in an attempt to shift the blame for the
army's deplorable condition. His letter to William Buchanan in
1778 illustrates this attitude: "I pretend not to assign the causes
of the distress, we experience in this particular, nor do I wish
to throw out the least imputation of blame upon any person.
Moreover, he frequently attempted to reassure the troops that
everything possible was being done to remedy the abuses. Through
general orders Washington let the men know that he would share the
same difficulties they experienced and tried to lift their spirits
by encouraging them to be diligent in their activities and in
building shelter. Yet as late as 1782 the General wrote to the
superintendent of finance that "minds soured by distresses are
1 fteasily rankled," causing desertions and mutinies.
Food Shortages
The shortage of food plagued the army constantly. George 
Norton of Ipswich, in his diary, recorded numerous examples of 
hardships, reduced rations, and severe weather conditions to which
^Washington to William Buchanan, February 7, 1778, Writings 
of Washington, X, 427.
18Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, May 17, 1782, 
ibid., XXIV, 289. Similar statements found in many other letters, 
ibid., X, 14; XVI, 139; XVII, 293; XXII, 36, 223, 467.
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soldiers were subjected. On January 18, 1777, he wrote, "nothing
to eat but frozen meat and bread . . .  it was said 3 froze to 
19Death." James Varnum of Rhode Island wrote to Washington in 
1777:
According to the saying of Soloman, hunger will break 
thro' a Stone Wall . . . Three Days successively we 
have been entirely without Meat. It is not be be had 
from the Commissaries. Whenever we procure Beef, it 
is of such a vile Quality, as to render it a poor 
Succerdemium for Food. The Men must be supplied, 
or they cannot be commanded . . . The Complaints 
are too urgent to pass unnoticed. It is with Pain 
that I mention this Distress.^
Varnum was astonished that so many men had endured the suffering so 
long without leaving. It is little wonder that officers were 
reluctant to punish men who went off because they could not take 
these extreme discomforts. Varnum was so depressed by February, 1778, 
that he felt the army would soon be dissolved. Writing to Major 
General Nathanael Greene, he said the "troops are distitute of 
Meat," the horses were dying for want of forage, and the country in 
the vicinity of the camp was exhausted. As a result, he lamented,
"Our Desertions are astonishingly great; the Love of Freedom, which
^George Norton, "Revolutionary Diary kept by1 George Norton 
of Ipswich, 1777-1778," Essex Institute, Historical Collections, 
LXXIV (October, 1938), 337.
20James Mitchell Varnum to Washington, December 22, 1777, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 46.
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once animated the Breasts of these born in the Country, is controlled
by Hunger, the Kennest of Necessities."^ Varnum suggested that
the army be moved to a different and more productive location if
22effective remedies could not be supplied in their present area.
He viewed the situation with horror: "It is unparalleled in the
History of Mankind to establish Winter Quarters in a Country
23wasted, and without a single Magazine." In a letter to Congress,
Washington stated his mortification to learn that his troops were
unable to move out against the enemy who were foraging in the area
near Derby, Pennsylvania, because there were no provisions. He
feared the men were on the point of mutiny at that time, for there
was not a single hoof to slaughter and less than twenty-five
barrels of flour for the entire force, nor was any expected to 
24arrive.
While Washington might not have wanted to accuse anyone of 
negligence of duty, Alexander Hamilton did not mind doing so. He 
wrote George Clinton that "by injudicious charges and arrangements in 
the commissary's department, in the middle of a campaign, they have
21James Mitchell Varnum to Nathaniel Greene, February 12, 
1778, ibid., Roll 47.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
^Washington to President of Congress, December 23, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, X, 193.
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exposed the army frequently to temporary want, and to the danger of
a dissolution, from absolute famine." He continued: "At this very
day there are complaints from the whole line, of having been three
or four days without provisions; desertions have been immense, and
25strong features of mutiny begin to show themselves." Hamilton, 
like many others, was surprised at the unparalleled degree of 
patience shown by those who did not desert. He felt the situation 
could be partially remedied by replacing men who had lost hope in 
the cause of freedom with men of stronger determination and 
purpose.^
In March, 1778, from Valley Forge, Washington voiced a 
slight ray of hope to John Cadwalader while recounting the sufferings 
experienced: "By death and desertion, we have lost a good many Men
since we came to this ground, and have encountered every species of 
hardship, that cold, wet, and hunger, and want of Cloathes were 
capable of producg; notwithstandg. and contrary to my expecta­
tions we have been able to keep the Soldiers from Mutiny and 
d i s p e r s i o n . T h e  hope was short lived; in June, Hamilton was 
again complaining. Eight miles from Allen Town, New Jersey, with
25Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, February 13, 1778, 
Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 526.
26Ibid., I, 427.
^Washington to Brigadier General John Cadwalader, March 20, 
1778, Writings of Washington, XI, 117.
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the enemy within four miles of the American force, the Continental
troops had halted. Hamilton said that the reason was "the extreme
distress of the troops for want of provisions," and that General
Wayne's detachment was "almost starving and seem both unwilling
28and unable to march further 'till they are supplied. Desertions
I imagine have been pretty considerable today; I have seen 8 or 10
29deserters and heard of many more."
Major General William Heath reported to Washington in November,
1779, from Peekskill, New York, that his troops had been without
bread for several days, "which has created great uneasiness, and
30the men are driven to duty." To Brigadier General William Irvine,
serving as superintendent of military stores at Cranes Mills,
Washington wrote in January, 1780, that the commissary had not
provided the food they promised and he had been without bread for 
31days. Washington borrowed some buckwheat and corn from the local 
28Hamilton to Washington, June 26, 1778, Syrett (ed.),
Papers of Hamilton. I, 504.
29Ibid., I, 505.
30Washington to Jeremiah Wadsworth, November 22, 1779,
Writings of Washington, XVII, 163.
31Washington to General William Irvine, January 4, 1780, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 63.
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inhabitants, but had to promise to repay in food rather than in
currency. Washington pointed out that the farmers were reluctant
to supply any more: "My Credit begins to run low and they make
32a thousand apologys particularly scarcity for their families."
As a result of poor provisions, Washington declared the spirit of
desertion still prevailed. He reported that six men had left from
an outpost near his camp, induced to escape because of the absence
of supplies. From Morristown, Washington wrote Philip Schuyler
that the army had been put to a severe trial, being five or six
days without bread or meat. On this occasion Washington had prevailed
on the local magistrates to supply food and they responded to his
requisitions punctually. "Nothing," he reported, "but this great
exertion could have saved the army from dissolution, or starving;
33as we were bereft of every hope from the Commissaries." From
his headquarters near Fort Lee, in August, 1780, Washington wrote
Thomas Jefferson, governor of Virginia, that the army was almost
destitute of meat, which had voided hope of any successful operation,
34and had further caused "A most licentious spirit in the soldiery."
"An army," he said, "should be well fed, well cloathed and paid and
33Washington to Philip Schuyler, January 30, 1780, Writings 
of Washington, XVII, 467.
34Washington to Thomas Jefferson, August 29, 1780, ibid.,
XIX, 470.
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35then You may expect almost any thing from it." Food and
provisions were still a problem as late as May, 1781. To Colonel
Timothy Pickering, Washington related the condition of the troops
on the frontier in upper New York who were on the point of
mutinying and abandoning their posts for want of provisions of every
kind. On this occasion Washington dispatched a hundred barrels
36of flour to Albany, but had no meat to send to them. He also
instructed Heath to collect food from Connecticut, Rhode Island,
37Massachusetts, and New Hampshire for the frontier garrisons.
Schuyler was then informed that provisions were on the way in hope
38that the garrison would hold.
qeJIbid.; Washington to Augustine Washington, June 6, 1780, 
ibid., XIX, 136. Washington listed the distresses of the army.
^Washington to Timothy Pickering, May 7, 1781, ibid., XXII,
52.
"^Washington to William Heath, May 9, 1781, ibid., XXII, 
63-64; a similar letter was sent to Jonathan Trumbull in 1777, which 
solicited this reply from the governor: "It does not seem in my
power to send any relief to Gen. Schuyler, the few Continental
troops raised are scattered, unpaid, and uncloathed. Shall
therefore have no way but to send militia, and so many of them are
now volunteer men New Young, at Providence and New London, and since
past of them in their tours having been Doubled be very necessary 
have suffered extremely by Sickness and the last season and many 
dies, that it has be like the Sentence of Death to send any more, 
and at this extreme season to the north, and militia are at best, 
but a poor relief. Besides that the frequent calls upon them to 
the great fatigues they have suffered has much tended to give many 
a Distaste to the Serving, and is one great and principal means of 
distressing the project . . . ." February 7, 1777, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 40.
38Washington to Philip Schuyler, May 14, 1781, Writings of 
Washington, XXII, 82.
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After 1781, the food problem apparently did not recur, for 
there is little mention of it in Washington's correspondence, but 
insufficient food already had taken a heavy toll in desertions 
during these six years.
Clothing Problems
The scarcity of clothing caused almost as much trouble as 
that of food. Soldiers often complained about the lack of uniforms 
and blankets to give them protection against rain and snow and 
severe winter cold. The misery of camp life at Valley Forge is 
vividly described by Albigence Waldo, a surgeon in the First 
Connecticut Regiment:
I am Sick— discontented— and out of humor. Poor 
food— hard lodging— Cold Weather— fatigue— Nasty 
Cloaths— nasty Cookery— Vomit half my time—  
smoak'd out of my senses— the Devil's in't—
I can't Endure it— Why are we sent here to starve 
and Freeze . . . There comes a Soldier, his bare 
feet art seen thro' his worn out shoes, his legs 
nearly naked from the tatter'd remains of an only 
pair of stockings, his Breeches not sufficient to 
cover his nakedness, his Shirt hanging in Strings, 
his hair dishevell'd, his face meagre; his whole 
appearance pictures a person forsaken and dis­
couraged .
Doctor Waldo was deeply touched by the wretched condition of the
soldiers. No doubt many came to him with their complaints:
39Albigence Waldo, "Diary of Surgeon Albigence Waldo, of the 
Connecticut Line, Valley Forge 1777-1778," Pennsylvania Magazine of 
History and Biography, XXI, No 4 (1897), 306-307.
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He cones, and crys with an air of wretchedness and 
dispair, I am sick, my feet lame, my legs are sore, 
my body cover'd with this tormenting Itch— my 
Cloaths are worn out, my Constitution is broken, 
my former Activity is exhausted by fatigue, 
hunger, and Cold, I fail fast I shall soon be no 
more! And all the reward I shall get will be—  
Poor Will is Dead.
Bad air and smoke in huts and around camp fires added to
the soldiers' misery. Waldo wrote that cold and smoke made men fret;
he said that he did not "know of anything that vexes a man's soul
more than hot smoke continually blowing into his Eyes, and when he
attempts to avoid it, he is met by a cold and piercing wind."4^
John Cadwalader, brigadier general of the Pennsylvania militia,
informed Washington in December, 1777, that he knew his men were
in great want of clothing but he felt the army would be supplied
sooner if it remained in the field and suffered, thereby gaining
42the sympathy of the people. Nathaniel Smith, captain of an 
artillery company, wrote to the Maryland Council of Safety in 1777
/ Oseeking clothing for his men who were almost naked.
40Ibid.
41Ibid., XXI, 312.
4^Cadwalader to Washington, December 3, 1777, Washington
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 46. Washington had solicited the
advice of several of his general officers on the desirability of a
winter campaign or going into the winter quarters.
/ ONathaniel Smith to Council of Safety (Annapolis), February
15, 1777, Bernard Steiner and others (eds.), Archives of Maryland (71
vols. to date, Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1883), XXI, 139.
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Clothing was in such short supply in 1777 that Washington
doubted his ability to keep the troops in the field during the winter 
44season. A muster taken in the field on December 23, 1777,
indicated "2898 Men unfit for duty by reason of their being barefoot
45 46and other wise naked." A month later, the total was 3,710.
By April, 1778, Washington was particularly upset about the inability
of Congress to provide clothing. Writing the President of Congress,
he expressed astonishment that the army should "be deficient in
any article of Cloathing when it is commonly asserted that the Eastern
States alone can furnish Materials enough, to cloath 100,000 Men."
If this was true, he said, then "there is a fatal error somewhere,
to which may be attributed the death and desertion of thousands."^
A month later, Washington informed the president of Congress that
doctors had attributed the loss of hundreds of lives to the dearth
44Washington to President of Congress, November 17, 1777, 
Writings of Washington. X, 76.
^Circular to the states, December 29, 1777, ibid., X, 224.
Returns of the Army of the United States, War Department 
Collection of Revolutionary War Rolls, 1775-1783 (138 Rolls,
Record Group 93, Microcopy No. 246, National Archives), Roll 137. 
Hereinafter cited as Revolutionary War Rolls.
47Washington to President of Congress, April 10, 1778, Writings 
of Washington, XI, 240; Major General William Heath at Boston wrote 
Henry Laurens, president of Congress, on March 10, 1778, that the 
service was suffering unspeakably for want of clothing and stores. 
"Heath Papers," Papers of the Continental Congress, National 
Archives, Roll 177.
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of clothing, and he added, "I am certain Hundreds have deserted
48from the same cause." In 1780 Nathanael Greene, from Richmond,
after surveying his troops, was appalled at their distressed
condition. His army was nearly immobilized; he could neither stay
nor move because the soldiers had no provisions, arms, clothing,
or wagons. New recruits from Virginia could not be retained in
service for want of clothing; they deserted "in shoals," Greene 
49reported. Washington probably reached the bottom of despair 
in 1780, when he wrote to John Sullivan from Passaic Falls:
At present we do not know where, or to whom to apply.
I have made the distresses of the Army known to 
Congress, the Board of War and the States Individually 
without learning from whence the supplies are to 
come and can without the aid of a perspective see a 
very gloomy prospect before us this Winter on the 
Score of Cloathing.
Fortunately for the army, after 1781 the discomforts caused by lack 
of clothing were eliminated in most army units, thereby correcting a 
glaring abuse that had led to thousands of desertions.
A O Washington to the President of Congress, May 18, 1778, 
Writings of Washington, XI, 417. Washington wrote that "For the 
troops to be without Cloathing at any time, is highly injurious to 
the service and distressing to our feelings; but the want will be 
more peculiarly mortifying when they come to act with these of our 
allies." To President of Congress, June 20, 1780, ibid., XIX, 36.
49Nathanael Greene to Washington, November 19, 1780,
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 72.
^Washington to John Sullivan, November 20, 1780, Writings of 
Washington. XX, 373. The expected clothing from France still had not
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Illness
Illness caused some men to leave the service. Sickness was
to be expected where troops were poorly fed, inadequately housed
and clothed, and frequently exposed to harsh weather and fatiguing
work. Seeing their physical condition slowly deteriorating, many
soldiers chose desertion to dying. Others* already sick and
receiving scant medical attention, fled in the hope of finding
medical assistance at home or elsewhere. Some soldiers regained
their health and then sneaked away. From Morristown in 1777,
Washington wrote Doctor William Shippen that the soldiers, after
being dismissed from the hospitals, "instead of joining their Corps
they belong to, go Stroling about the country at their own option,
to the great detriment of the S e r v i c e . A s  a corrective measure
Washington ordered the surgeons to release the men to the commanding
officer nearest the hospital, who would then furnish officers to
52escort them to their units.
Sickness was prevalent in the army throughout the war; 
rarely did the number of men unfit for duty come under 1,000 
and often rose to over 3,000 from an army that averaged 10,000
arrived two months later. Washington to Nathanael Greene, January 9, 
1781, Ibid., XXI, 86.
•^Washington to Doctor William Shippen, March 26, 1777, 
ibid., VII, 320.
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53soldiers. A committee of Congress reported in August, 1777,
that there were 3,745 soldiers sick in the army hospitals, or about
54one-fifth of the total number then on duty. A committee appointed
to enquire into the state of the army in New York reported to
Congress on October 3, 1777, that there were 6,927 sick in hospitals
or absent sick."^ It could be assumed from the musters taken two
months earlier, that about half of this number were absent from
camp. Soldiers who became ill in camps which lacked medical
facilities were often permitted to go home. After their recovery,
they sometimes were slow to return. On May 21, 1781, Washington
ordered commanding officers of regiments and corps to insert
advertisements in the newspapers "Requiring such of their men as
are sick or absent . . .  to join their respective corps or give
information where they are and the cause of their detention within a
56reasonable time on pain of being treated as deserters." Regimental 
officers were prohibited from releasing patients from hospitals 
to go home on furlough; releases were valid only when ordered by
■^Revolutionary War Rolls, National Archives, Rolls 137, 138.
^Committee of Congress, August, 1777, Papers of the 
Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 30.
55Journals of the Continental Congress, V, 842.
■^Orderly Book, No. 51 (26 April to 1 July, 1781), Orderly 
Books, 1775-1783 (70 vols., Nos. 12-72, 193-197, War Department 
Collection of Revolutionary War Records, Record Group 93, Entry 5-b, 
National Archives), p. 7. Hereinafter cited as Orderly Book (with No.).
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the senior surgeon or administrative head of the hospital.
Surgeons were also restricted in their authority to release 
convalescent patients on furloughs.
Medical treatment available in hospitals was grossly ineffec­
tive. Washington's troops distrusted the army hospitals and the 
surgeons. Fear of sicknesses that would send them to the notoriously 
bad army hospitals caused many to decide desertion was the lesser 
of two evils. The General, writing to Congress in 1777, stated that 
if the hospitals were not improved, "our Regiments will be reduced 
to Companies, by the end of the Campaign, and those poor Wretches, 
who escape with life, will be either Scattered up and down the Country 
and not to be found, or if found, totally enervated and unfit for
C Ofurther duty." He further said that the "dread of undergoing 
the same Miseries for want of proper care and attention when Sick, 
has much retarded the new inlistments. Writing to Doctor John
Morgan in 1779, the Commander in Chief said the deplorable medical 
facilities and poor treatment of sick in hospitals had sown the
570rderly Book, No. 16 (23 May, 1777 to 20 October, 1778),
p. 36.
58Washington to President of Congress, February 14, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, VII, 149.
59Ibid., VII, 150.
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seed of disorder and violence that had broken out in the winter of 
1778-1779.60
While some men were sincerely concerned about their health,
others took advantage of the situation and ran away on the pretext
of being sick. Once assigned to a hospital as a patient the
opportunity to escape was greatly increased. Captain William Reily
reported that nine men deserted from the hospital at Pluckeimin and
61Baskin Ridge, but were captured and confined. Some men who fled
from infirmaries were captured before they reached home. Heath
caught several men who fled from a Light Infantry company; some in
this group possessed certificates from the governor of Maryland
stating they left the army legally, because they were sick and
planned to return promptly after recovery. However, Heath confined
62as deserters those without certificates.
The inoculation of soldiers against smallpox caused a mild 
uproar in the army; it was especially disruptive during the first 
two years of the war when the disease was widespread among both
^Washington to Doctor John Morgan, January 6 , 1779, Writings 
of Washington, XIII, 481. A biography of Morgan is Whilfield J.
Bell, Jr., John Morgan Continental Doctor (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).
^Capt. William Reily to Robert Hanson Harrison, May 21, 1780, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 66; Robert H. Harrison 
to William Reily, ibid.
62Major General William Heath to Washington, February 17,
1781, ibid., Roll 76.
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soldiers and civilians. Inhabitants shunned army camps where 
epidemics of smallpox raged, and most of the soldiers were uneasy 
about their close contact with those who were ill with the disease.
The failure of a few military operations was attributed to smallpox. 
The disease was apparently as much responsible for the unhappy 
outcome of the Carolina campaign as anything else; a report reached 
Washington that "small pox is ten times more terrible than Britons, 
Canadians, and Indians together."^ In a scorching letter, Major 
General Horatio Gates said that "as fine an army as ever march'd 
into Canada, has this year been intirely ruined by the Small pox."^ 
Gates felt the disease had been spread needlessly by the surgeons, 
and he strongly requested that Washington order the inoculations 
of troops stopped and the doctors jailed!*’"’ Civilians feared both 
the disease and inoculation. The governor of Maryland received a 
request from the townspeople of Chestertown, asking that inoculation 
of the soldiers in that area be stopped to quell the outcry against 
it.*’*’ Besides Gates, several other commanders objected to the
65Freeman, George Washington, IV, 122; Force (ed.), American 
Archives, 4th ser., IV, 174-76.
64Major General Horatio Gates to Washington, August 20, 1776,
U. S. Revolution, Miscellaneous Manuscripts (18 File Boxes, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress), File Box I.
65Ibid.
^T. Smyth, Jr. to Governor Johnson, April 9, 1777, Archives 
of Maryland, XVI, 204-205; Council of Maryland to Colonel William
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Inoculation of their troops and asked permission to delay or avoid
"the operation." Major General Samuel H. Parsons excused some of
the troops in his command who had objected to immunization. He
justified his actions to Washington by explaining that the few
troops who refused inoculation were sent forward, since he supposed
it was not Washington's intention "to compell any against their will
to receive that d i s e a s e . W a s h i n g t o n  had already made it clear
68that his orders were to be obeyed in regard to inoculation. As 
early as December, 1776, Washington had undertaken measures to have 
the troops inoculated against smallpox to avoid having the army 
devastated as it was in Canada.^
The medical committee of the Continental Congress, in 
consultation with Washington, decided in April, 1777, to inoculate 
all the troops against the disease.^® It had already greatly 
weakened the effectiveness of the army. The committee observed 
that new troops were often of little use becuase of the prevalence
Richardson, April 12, 1777, ibid., XVI, 209-10.
^Major General Samuel H. Parsons to Washington, April 15, 
1777, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 41.
68Hamilton to Major General Adam Stephen, March 13, 1777, 
Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 204-205, 206-207.
^Washington to Doctor William Shippen, Jr., January 6, 1777, 
Writings of Washington. VI, 473-74.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, VII, 110, 292; 
Writings of Washington, V, 83.
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of smallpox. Some men, realizing the danger, had inoculated them­
selves voluntarily. However, a few soldiers, fearing both smallpox 
and the preventative, abandoned the army altogether.
Not only were lives lost to the disease but the smallpox 
scare also discouraged enlistments. Queen Anne County, Maryland, 
recruiters told the Committee of Safety that smallpox, allegedly 
brought to that country by the soldiers of the "Flying Camp," 
had discouraged countless men from enlisting "who would otherwise 
have offered themselves for s e r v i c e . J o s e p h  Marbury of Port 
Tobacco, Maryland, asserted that he had only recruited nineteen 
men, mainly because most eligible persons believed that smallpox
was widespread in the army and feared coming into contact with
72soldiers who had been exposed to the disease.
A few commanders used the excuse of inoculations to keep
their men from returning to the field, fearing too early exposure
to the elements would worsen their reactions. Washington sent a
stem reprimand to Lieutenant Colonel David Greer in May, 1777,
for not sending his men out sooner after their inoculations; he
ordered Greer to march immediately with all soldiers who had
73recovered from the infection of the inoculation.
^Committee of Observation of Queen Anne's County to the 
Committee of Safety, February 5, 1777, Archives of Maryland, XVI, 120.
72Joseph Marbury to Colonel Mordica Gist, March 12, 1777, 
ibid., XVI, 170-71.
73Washington to Lieutenant Colonel David Greer, May 16, 1777, 
Mount Vernon Library, Mount Vernon, Virginia.
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By June, 1777, the smallpox epidemic had subsided considerably 
in the army. Washington wrote Parsons that only one case of smallpox 
had been reported that month.7^ The General attributed the success 
over the disease to the immunization of the entire force including 
recruits and reinforcements.7"* This encouraging report was not 
entirely accurate, for the disease continued as a threat to the 
soldiers throughout the war, and many felt they could cope with 
the situation better at home than in the army.
Pay Problems
The payment of soldiers was notoriously slow and uncertain 
throughout the war. Hardly a day passed that Washington did not 
receive grievous complaints on this score.7** Long intervals without 
pay naturally caused both irritation and unnecessary harassment 
for the American troops. Even before serious inflation occurred, 
army wages were inadequate; almost every type of civilian laborer 
received better pay than military personnel in spite of the numerous 
wage and price control laws enacted by the states.77 While some
^Washington to Major General Samuel H. Parsons, June 17,
1777, Writings of Washington, VIII, 259.
75Ibid., VII, 38, 44-45, 73-74, 105, 128-29, 130-31, 153,
162-63, 219, 220, 229-30, 233, 237, 349-50, 423, 432; VIII, 85,
259; X, 165; Journals of the Continental Congress, IX, 1016, 1039.
7^Washington to the President of Congress, June 18, 1776, July 
30, 1776, February 14, 1777, Writings of Washington, V, 107, 354; VII, 148.
77Richard B. Morris, Government and Labor in Early America 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 92-135.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
civilians were amassing fortunes from the war, the soldiers were 
compelled to do without. The injustice was particularly galling to 
married men, who worried about their families, and to officers who
70struggled to keep their finances in order. Some destitute dependents
applied to the army for relief but were often rebuffed. John
Hancock expressed surprise in 1776 when he learned that the army's
contractors had refused to supply soldiers' wives and families with 
79meat and bread. As a rule, provisions were made for providing
relief to dependents of enlisted men, but officers' families were
not included in this assistance. Officers' pay was far below
the British standard, and many American officers gradually consumed
their private fortunes and sank into p o v e r t y . F i f t y  or more
men holding commissions in Greene's division at Valley Forge resigned
in a single day because their families at home were suffering.
By April, 1778, officers were resigning at the rate of two or three
a day. Officers and soldiers suffered alike; while officers could
81resign, enlisted men could only complain or desert.
^®Smith (ed.), The St. Clair Papers, I, 461.
^John Hancock to the Committee of Lancaster, January 19,
1776, Force (ed.), American Archives, 4th ser., IV, 762.
^Washington to the President of Congress, September 24, 1776, 
Writings of Washington, VI, 108.
81Petition of Captain Nathaniel Smith's Company to Council of 
Safety (Maryland), January 24, 1777, Archives of Maryland, XVI,
73-74; January 25, 1777, ibid.; XXIV, 28; Albingence Waldo, "Diary 
Kept at Valley Forge by Albingence Waldo, Surgeon in the Continental 
Army, 1777-1778," Historical Magazine, 1st ser., V (June, 1861), 169; 
Writings of Washington, XI, 237.
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Currency depreciation became serious by the end of 1778.
Congress was unable to keep up with the army's financial needs.
By August, 1780, Washington reported that wages had not only fallen
below the price level of the barest necessities, but they were so
82hopelessly in arrears that mutiny was imminent.
Early in the war Congress authorized a pay table for the army.
Privates received six and two-thirds dollars per month, a corporal
seven and one-third dollars, and a sergeant eight dollars. Recruits
were paid six pence a day subsistence from the time they enlisted
until they marched for camp. Mileage was paid at the rate of one
83penny per mile from their homes to the regiments they joined.
From these meager wages about one-fourth was deducted each month to
pay for the soldier's clothing. Some states provided additional
benefits. The noncommissioned officers and privates from New York
received one pound of sugar, two ounces of tea, and one pound of
84tobacco each month, but no rum. Increased amounts of money were 
authorized by some states to make up for depreciated Continental
82Washington to the President of Congress, August 20, 1780, 
Writings of Washington. XIX, 411.
83Leonard L. Lerwill, Personnel Replacement System in the 
United States Army (Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet No. 20-21, 
1954), 12.
84James A. Robert, New York in the Revolution as Colony and 
State (Second edition, Albany, N. Y.: Press of Brandow Printing Co.,
1898), 11.
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currency. Authorized pay, therefore, varied from unit to unit 
because of the additional state support, and the amount due each 
soldier was increased from time to time by Congressional action. 
Regardless of how little the pay, the soldiers wanted what was 
coming to them; problems arose when the troops received no pay at 
all, a circumstance that sometimes caused them to become almost 
unmanageable. Washington warned Congress early in the war that 
the army pay scale was too low. A soldier’s entire monthly pay 
would not buy "necessities." While some soldiers sold their 
clothes to eke out a living, others quit the service entirely.
Understandably, the shortage of money caused a lowering of 
morale in most of the Continental regiments. Writing to John 
Hancock in April, 1776, seeking financial relief for five regiments 
that had come from Boston, Heath noted that "these Regiments were 
reluctant to leave the Camp, before they had Received their pay, 
but the Treasury being bare they could not have it— they suffered 
much on the Road for want of money and would have Suffered more had 
they not been relieved by their officers, who spent all their money
QCto relieve their men." Heath explained that the men of one 
regiment were exceedingly discouraged at not having been paid for 
three months. Somehow Heath was able to borrow enough money to pay 
three rifle companies one month's pay. Lieutenant John Richardson of
85Major General Heath to John Hancock, April 3, 1776, Papers 
of the Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 177.
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the Fifth Pennsylvania Battalion wrote on September 24, 1776, from
Morris Heights, that while visiting the "Flying Camp" in New Jersey,
he found absolutely no discipline in the units, the troops were
"mutinous about pay," and the men in two battalions had all "mutinied,
86and most all deserted." Lieutenant Colonel Goose Van Sheick from
Albany complained in 1780 that his men had not been paid in seven
87months, which caused wholesale desertion. Greene declared in 1781
that he had not been furnished a shilling in specie since he assumed 
88command. In 1781 the Virginia troops had not received a cent of
pay for two years. Washington informed Congress that same year of
a great dissatisfaction prevailing in the York line for want of
pay; they had sixteen months compensation coming to them. The New
89Jersey troops were due about the same amount. The Commander in 
Chief believed that a small amount of pay would stop desertion and 
avert other evils that were expected if no money was received
86John Richardson, "Letters of Lieutenant John Richardson, 1776," 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XVI, No. 2 (1892), 205.
87Lieutenant Colonel Goose Van Scheick to Washington, June 1, 
1780, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 66; Washington 
answered that "he had neglected no method to endeavour to obtain 
for them their pay, shoes, shirts." June 10, 1780, ibid., Roll 67.
88Greene to Jethro Summer, April 19, 1781, quoted in 
Howman, Morale of the American Revolutionary Army, 25.
89Washington to the President of Congress, April 8, 1781,
Writings of Washington, XXI, 431.
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soon. He sought aid from both Congress and the various state 
governments.
In 1781, Washington pointed out to Mescheck Weare, governor
of New Hampshire, that the troops had not received pay for many
months, and that it was "vain to think an army can be kept together
much longer tinder such a variety of suffering as ours has experienced."
He said that "unless some immediate and Spirited measures are
adopted to furnish at least three months' pay to the troops in
90money . . . the worst that can befall us may be expected."
Similar letters deploring the situation of the army which he sent
to state governors and to the Superintendent of Finance created
91some interest and concern but produced few immediate results.
Later in the war, the states seemed to have turned a deaf ear to
the Virginian's pleas for funds for the army. "The Army, as usual,
are without Pay," Washington scribbled to John Armstrong in 1783,
92"and the States seem perfectly indifferent to their cries." The
93General, however, continued to press for relief from all sources.
90Washington to Mescheck Weare, 1781, Mount Vernon Library,
Mount Vernon, Virginia.
^"Hfashington to Colonel Timothy Pickering, May 7, 1781, Writings 
of Washington, XXII, 52; to the Superintendent of Finance, May 17,
1782, ibid., XXIV, 289.
^Washington to Major General John Armstrong, January 10,
1783, ibid., XXVI, 26.
goWashington to Major General William Heath, June 6, 1783, 
ibid., XXVI, 472.
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The state governments were also experiencing money woes. They
often wanted to provide more funds to the central government, and
thus to the army, but were usually beset with staggering financial
loads at home. No doubt some states did not exert sufficient
efforts on the home front to adequately meet the money challenges
brought on by the war and the new experiences associated with
94political independence. Gouveraeur Morris, in a letter to New 
York's Governor George Clinton, said that the "want of Money in the 
several Departments in a Complaint reverberated to us from all
QCQuarters . . .; that it would be wise for the state of New 
York immediately to "tax very heavily even if it should answer no 
other Purpose than to pay their own Subjects." He said that to 
delay taxation was a bad policy as indicated by the chaotic 
financial condition of New York, and suggested that reprisals be 
taken against any official who persisted in delaying the establish­
ment of a proper taxation program. Morris went on to state that 
heavy taxation was really a good policy, reasoning that the money 
collected would, in the end, enrich the whole state and help create 
a healthy financial situation. Morris noted that the state that 
taxes heavily over a given number of years will end up with a
Q A E. James Ferguson, Power of the Purse; A History of 
American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 
University of North Carolina, 1961).
^Gouverneur Morris to George Clinton, March 16, 1778, U. S. 
Revolution, Miscellaneous'Manuscripts, Library of Congress, File Box VI.
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better monetary base than a state that refuses to tax.9** This 
official's advice, while sound and reasonable, came too early for 
most states to accept. In any event taxation by one state alone 
was not the real solution to the army's monetary difficulties. As 
long as Congress did not have the power to levy a uniform tax on 
all the states, the army would continue to be plagued by insufficient 
funds and commanders would be destined to continue to face soldiers 
in need.
Some states did exert extra efforts to provide funds for their
Continental Lines and militiamen. In some cases, monetary woes
were partly solved, but in other situations new problems came with
additional state funds for troop wages. Altering his usual plea for
money, Washington informed Governor William Livingston of New
Jersey in 1779 that a very disagreeable consequence would result
from an increase in the pay of that state's militia forces: "It
would create an additional cause of discontent to the Soldiery, who
would naturally draw a comparison between their situation and that
of the Militia and would think it very hard and unjust that these
should receive for temporary services a greater reward than they
97for permanent ones." Washington reasoned that the extra money for
96Ibid.
97Washington to William Livingston, May 4, 1779, Writings 
of Washington, XIV, 489-90.
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the militia "would occasion disgust and desertion, if not mutiny,
among these already in the army," and would also be a "new
98discouragement to others from entering into it." The Commander
in Chief said the only remedy was to increase all the soldiers' pay
to the same level —  a condition which was not possible at that
time. The General also discouraged payment in silver unless all
the troops could receive the same type of money. He said it would
"open the eyes of the whole" and set them "to reasoning upon the
99difference between specie and paper [money]." Thus, even when some 
states tried to satisfy the needs of their soldiers with more pay, 
it caused added unrest and jealousy among those receiving less. 
Piecemeal increases in pay administered by the states in a haphazard, 
uncoordinated manner was not the answer to the problem of insufficient 
pay for the army.
As noted earlier, some men grew restless because they did not 
receive the same pay that soldiers in other units were receiving. 
Hamilton complained to the Provincial Congress of New York that his 
artillerymen had not received the income authorized by the 
Continental Congress; he said this difference in pay had "a very
98Ibid.. XVI, 490.
99Washington to Richard Henry Lee, September 23, 1778, ibid., 
XII, 484; to John Armstrong, May 18, 1779, ibid., XV, 98.
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pernicious effect on the minds and behavior of the men.""^
Artillerymen in other companies registered similar grievances.
Informing the president of Congress in December, 1776, that three
additional battalions of artillery had been called, Washington
said that to recruit and retain men in this capacity the army
would have to pay them more; therefore, artillerymen were promised
a twenty-five per cent increase in pay by Washington with the
provision that if they did not get the additional money their
101enlistments would be considered null and void. Writing to the
Council of Safety of Maryland in 1777, Nathaniel Smith of Baltimore
reported that his artillerymen had been very uneasy "in regard to
not having as much pay as the Continental troops" and said it would
102be "very troublesome keeping them in order." Court-martial 
transcripts attest to the fact that disorderly troops were often 
the most prone to desert.
Another troublesome problem that irritated both the soldiers 
and the commanders was the deliberate misappropriation of funds by
‘''^Hamilton to the Provincial Congress of New York, May 
26, 1776, Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 184. On the same day 
New York resolved "that the artillery company of the said Captain 
Hamilton be allowed the same pay as the Continental artillery." 
Journals of the Provincial Congress . . . of_ the State of New York, 
1775-1777 (2 vols. Albany, 1842), I, 462.
^■^Washington to President of Congress, December 20, 1776, 
Writings of Washington, VI, 401.
102Nathaniel Smith to the Council of Safety (Annapolis), 
February 6, 1777, Archives of Maryland, XVI, 139.
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certain finance officers who cheated the men out of their pay or
withheld it for their own use. Irregularity in receiving wages
that were promised perplexed the troops exceedingly. As
Washington admitted to Major General Benjamin Lincoln, he was
convinced "that the amazing desertions, which have of late prevailed
among our Troops, proceed intirely from their not being regularly 
103paid." Faced with no money, the soldiers were extremely
vulnerable to the small inducement of money the British offered to
any soldier who deserted and brought in his arms.
In answer to the complaints that the army paymasters had
frequently absented themselves from the army and used the funds for
their own needs, Congress, on June 7, 1777, passed a resolution
directing the Commander in Chief "to take the most effectual means
for compelling all regimental paymasters to attend punctually to
the duties of their office," or be subject to punishment or 
104replacement. Washington had already taken steps to correct this 
abuse. He ordered all pay officers to prepare proper payrolls and 
to draw money for their troops —  for which they would be held 
strictly accountable. Some pay officers made various excuses for
103Washington to Major General Benjamin Lincoln, April 27, 
1777, Writings of Washington, VII, 480.
104Journals of the Continental Congress, VIII, 425.
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not preparing payrolls, but few explanations satisfied the 
General. Washington felt there was just cause to believe that a 
few officers had "drawn large Sums, under pretence of paying their 
Men," but had, from extravagance or for other purposes, appropriated 
the money to their own use. The Commander in Chief ordered 
inquiries into the accounts of regimental pay officers in an effort 
to detect fradulent use of government funds. Regardless of the 
pressure exerted by military commanders to enforce honesty in 
handling the payrolls, the paucity of money available to the army 
continued to cause disgust.
The shortage of food and clothing, the inadequacy of quarters, 
the poor medical services, and the dearth of money caused unwarranted 
physical suffering for American soldiers, and desertion was a not 
uncommon result. A deserter from an earlier war expressed in 
graphic terms the sentiments held by countless men serving in 
armed forces: "Gentlemen, you seem surprized at our Desertion,
but you'l not be surprized if you'l consider that we have been 
starved with Hunger & Cold in the Winter, and that we have received 
no pay for seven or eight Months; Now we have no Cloaths & you
..106cheat us out of our allowance of Rum & half our working Money.
^"’Washington to Lincoln, April 27, 1777, Writings of 
Washington, VII, 481.
106Note left by a deserter from Fort Ontario, 1756, Stanley 
M. Pargellis (ed.), Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765; 
Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle 
(New York: Appleton-Century, 1937), 174-75.
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Many of Washington's soldiers, enduring the same hardships during 
the Revolution, assumed similar attitudes when too little effort, 
in their opinion, was made to bring relief —  they simply departed 
from the army.




Colonial Americans had long expressed unfavorable opinions 
of professional military forces. Such sentiments against "standing 
armies" were part of their British heritage that dated back to 
Parliament's confrontations with the Stuarts over military matters 
in the seventeenth century. It was from the colonial militia that 
the revolutionary forces in America were first formed. Many 
practices, some good and some bad, used in the colonial era were 
inherited by the Continental army. The colonial governments had 
usually included nearly all free white males in the militia system, 
thereby avoiding any need for a standing army. The colonists had 
considered their militias preferable to long-service mercenary 
troops.^-
^Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," 
Military Affairs, XXII (Summer, 1958), 75-82; Jack S. Radabaugh, 
"The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts," ibid., XVIII (Spring, 
1954), 1-18. Robert C. Pugh, "The Revolutionary Militia in the 
Southern Campaign," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XIV 
(April, 1957), 154-75, argued that the militia was not totally 
useless during the Revolution, pointing out its several contri­
butions, particularly in the South.
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In order to make this type of military establishment workable, 
able-bodied men were carried on muster rolls and were required to
Otrain periodically in militia units. Usually the colonial govern­
ments listed every male on the muster rolls to insure that no one 
escaped his military obligation, although certain individuals were 
exempt from service: especially those under sixteen or over sixty
years of age; justices of the peace, sheriffs, ministers, physicians, 
schoolmasters, shipmasters, notaries, and public servants. After
O1775, most states provided similar exemptions from military service. 
In Pennsylvania, for instance, at the beginning of the Revolutionary 
War, exemption from military service was limited to delegates in 
Congress, members of the executive councils, judges of the supreme 
court, masters and faculties of colleges, ministers of the gospel 
of all denominations, and servants purchased "bone fide and for a 
valuable consideration."^ By 1780 the exemption list in Pennsylvania 
had doubled, which accounted for some of the discontent among those 
selected to serve; but the Quakers and Mennonites, who opposed
2Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," 76.
3Marvin A. Kreidberg, and Merton G. Henry, History of Military 
Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: 
Department of the Army, 1955), 3.
^Arthur J. Alexander, "Pennsylvania Revolutionary Militia," 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXIX (January,
1945), 18.
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military service and who refused to share in the burdens of defense, 
were allowed no special favors by the Pennsylvania laws.̂
Substitutes
Militiamen and draftees, called out for a tour of duty, were 
able to avoid military service if they could manage to hire an 
approved substitute. A Pennsylvania act of 1780 allowed an individual 
to avoid personal service by paying a fine which was computed on 
the basis of the value of a day's labor for each day absent from 
service; anyone owning an estate was assessed an extra levy of 
fifteen shillings per'hundred pounds of property!^ Substitutes 
provided a convenient out for Quakers and members of other religious 
sects opposed to war. Usually a delinquent's (a person who wished 
to avoid military duty) place in the army was filled by the county 
lieutenant who located a suitable substitute, who in turn was paid 
by the person whose place he took. After 1780, in Pennsylvania, 
delinquents located their own substitutes; and even if a substitute 
was found, the delinquent had to attend regular drills with the 
militia or pay a fine based on a day's labor. Those determined to 
shirk military duty usually found some way to circumvent the law.
Journals of the Continental Congress, II, 187-90.
£
Alexander, "Pennsylvania Revolutionary Militia," 22.
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Often county lieutenants were remiss in performing their duty in 
compelling men to serve or in regard to the collection of fines 
for delinquency from military duty.^ Some men moved to new locations 
to avoid being drafted.
Washington was especially annoyed with the substitute system 
of Pennsylvania and the other states. He felt this practice was 
both harmful to recruiting and an encouragement to desertion.
The General asked the Board of War to stop men from using this
O
method to escape service; The money or bounty paid to 
substitutes was equally disgusting to Washington. In 1777 he wrote 
Patrick Henry that it was almost fruitless to try to enlist men 
in the Continental establishment because "the amazing Sums given 
for Substitutes in the Militia, induces all those, who would 
otherwise have gone into the Continental service, to prefer a line 
in which neither duty or discipline is severe; and in which they 
have a chance of having the bounty repeated three 01 four times 
each year." Washington suggested drafting, without allowances
^General Orders, January 21, 1778, Writings of Washington, X, 
333. A lieutenant was tried for embezzling recruiting funds and 
taking bribes to discharge enlisted soldiers. Recruiting officers 
occasionally padded their books by reporting soldiers as deserters. 
See R. Don Higginbotham, The War for American Independence (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1971), Chapter XV.
^Washington to the Board of War, November 11, 1777, Writings 
of Washington, X, 39.
^Washington to Patrick Henry, November 13, 1777, ibid., X, 54.
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for substitutes, as the most efficient method of raising an army.
The Board of War agreed with Washington concerning substitutes
and asked Congress to prevent substitution since a number of bad
effects resulted from this practice. The Board, in a report to
Congress, specified that the practice of hiring substitutes
to perform militia duty impeded the effectiveness of the militia,
harmed recruiting, and "encouraged desertions from the Continental
Army."^ Congress passed a resolve on December 4, 1777, requesting
that Pennsylvania repeal the clause in its militia law which
permitted the hiring of substitutes to perform militia duty.'*''*'
Most states continued to follow the substitute method, and Washington
continued to complain about the matter. To the committee of Congress
with the army he stated: "A stop put to the militia substitution laws,
would probably be attended with very happy consequences. A number of
idle, mercenary fellows would be thrown out of employment, precluded
from their excessive wages, as substitutes for a few weeks or 
12months." Once on active duty as a continental soldier the 
privilege of obtaining a substitute ended.
"̂ Journals of the Continental Congress, IX, 1002.
11Ibid.
^Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army,
January 29, 1778, Writings of Washington, X, 367.
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Raising an Army
The organizing of a respectable army was an enormous assign­
ment for the new nation. During the winter of 1775-1776, Washington
replaced practically the entire army while continuing the siege of
13Boston. Recruiting parties went out from each regiment to 
regions where they were well known. Since the Continental Congress 
did not have the power to draft men or to order that they be recruited, 
these officers were under state regulations while on recruiting 
duty.^ State executives were urged to provide additional recruiters 
from the militia. The states selected general places of rendezvous 
where recruits assembled.^ There physical examinations were 
given and the states were requested to replace all men who were 
rejected for medical reasons.^ The names of those accepted were 
entered on muster rolls; when eight or ten men were available, they 
were sent to regiments. Recruits frequently were permitted to 
select the regiment from their state in which they desired to serve, 
if there were vacancies.^
■^General Orders, October 31, 1775, ibid., IV, 56-58; Journals 
of the Continental Congress, III, 321-24.
14General Orders, February 5, 1781, Writings of Washington,
XXI, 186.
^Margaret B. Macmillan, The War Governors in the American 
Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 170.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, XVI, 249; IV, 63.
^Orderly Book, No. 23 (April 18 to July 21, 1778), National 
Archives.
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In 1776 the Congressional committee on safety, which had an
important role in the control of the army, realized that one-year
enlistments would not fulfill military requirements. Congress, on
December 27, passed a resolution proposing that men be enlisted
1 8for the duration of the war. The resolution gave Washington the
power to offer bounties and to prevail on the troops to reenlist
when their tours ended. Unfortunately, most of the men would not
enlist in the Continental army for the duration of the war while it
was possible to enlist in the militia for a shorter period and
receive larger bounties. Thus, short enlistments prevailed, and
Washington never overcame the disadvantages arising from the continuous
turnover of manpower. In July, 1777, Washington recommended that
the states be divided into recruiting districts with appointed
managers for each district, who would select civilians to both
19recruit soldiers and apprehend deserters. This plan would have 
relieved the army of various recruiting burdens had the states 
carried it out forcefully.
18Journals of the Continental Congress, VI, 1043. Similar 
resolution passed January 23, 1779, ibid., XIII, 108.
19Washington to Philip Livingston, Elbridge Gerry and George 
Clymer, July 19, 1777, Writings of Washington, VIII, 440.
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Often the recruiters were criticized for improper conduct,
and some state officials hindered the work of Washington's recruiting 
20officers. In February, 1779, the army was so short of men that
Congress called upon the states to draft, for a nine-minth period,
enough men to fill up the battalions. The states decided themselves
the extent to which they could comply with the draft request; most
states resorted to drafting men from their own militia forces to
21serve with the Continental army. In some cases, the states first
filled their own militia battalions and then sent the older, less
desirable recruits to Washington. The General naturally complained
about this practice, warning that it jeopardized the common
22defense of the nation. The states continued to have a large
part in army administration. As late as 1780 the Commander in
23Chief still questioned whether he had one army or thirteen.
20Report of a Committee to Congress, August, 1777, Papers of 
the Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 30. As late as 
1782, Washington was complaining about the poor recruits being sent 
to the army. He wrote to Heath: "I am astonished to hear the
Recruits which have arrived from Massachusetts are so very improper 
for service, after all the precautions and pains that have been 
taken to avoid . . . such horrid impositions on the public . . .
I think the officer who mustered them ought to be instantly relieved, 
ordered to Camp, and arrested upon his arrival." May 8, 1782, 
Writings of Washington. XXIV. 232; XIX, 413.
21Journals of the Continental Congress, XVIII, 809; Macmillan, 
The War Governors, 169.
22Washington to Governor Nicholas Cooke, January 20, 1777, 
Writings of Washington. VII, 42.
23Washington to President of Congress, August 20, 1780, ibid.,
XIX, 413.
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The indifferent success of the states in raising the quotas
assigned to them by Congress always left the army considerably
under full strength. Washington frequently turned to the state
militia forces to fill deficiencies in his battalions. Usually
these militiamen served only short periods of from three months to 
24a year. While on active duty with the Continental army,
recruiters tried to persuade these men to join the regular force
for the duration of the war.
The critical shortage of men in 1776 caused Congress to
authorize the placing of 10,000 men in a "Flying Camp," commanded
by Brigadier General Hugh Mercer, which was to protect New Jersey
25and Philadelphia while the Continental army was in New York.
The plan was to collect the armed inhabitants into a large reserve
26without enrolling them as regular members of the army, and 
Washington refused to allow recruiters to interfere with this force. 
After the British took New York the Flying Camp, authorized to serve 
only until December 1, was discontinued. Its strength never exceeded 
3,000.
^Acts of the Council and General Assembly of New Jersey, 
1776-1783 (Trenton, New Jersey, 1784), 157, 190, 212.
^ Writings of Washington, V, 87n. Resolution passed Congress 
June 3, 1776.
^Lerwill, Personnel Replacement System in the U. S. Army,
16-17.
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The Bounty
After the initial patriotic surge in 1775, recruiting became
more difficult each year, forcing the army to offer bounties to
attract enlistees. Washington discouraged use of the bounty as an
inducement to military service in the earlier period of the war, but
later he and Congress felt bounties were necessary. On November 30,
271775, Congress voted to pay no bounties for recruits, but within
ten months the Continental representatives agreed to offer twenty
28dollars and one hundred acres of land as a bounty. Since the land
was to be provided by the states, there were some objections to
this procedure. The convention of Maryland substituted a payment of
ten dollars for the one hundred acres determined by Congress.
Congress informed the Maryland convention, through a resolution,
that its policy would prove detrimental to the states, because it
would "induce such soldiers as are to compose the remainder of the
levies, to require an equal sum from the United States, and . . .
compel Congress to the immediate payment of an additional bounty,
29far beyond what is reasonable."
27November 30, 1775, Papers of the Continental Congress, 
National Archives, Roll 8.
28Congress passed a resolution, June 26, 1776, authorizing 
a ten-dollar bounty to soldiers who would re-enlist for three 
years, Journals of the Continental Congress, V, 483; a twenty- 
dollar bounty was authorized September 16, 1776, to assist in 
recruiting to fill the eighty-eight battalions, ibid., V, 762.
29Ibid., October 30, 1776, VI, 912.
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Congress, however, retreated from this position a short time later
30and authorized a payment in money for reenlistments.
In an effort to compete with the ever-increasing state
bounties, Congress raised its bounty from twenty dollars to eighty,
then to one hundred, and finally to two hundred dollars for
privates who enlisted for the duration of the war. Besides the
money rewards, land grants, clothes, amelioration of small claims,
help in legal difficulties, and pensions were offered to
31individuals who joined the Continental forces.
Three things were involved in the bounty system: (1) the
term of the enlistments, which was often less than the duration of 
the war; (2) the amount of money to be paid, causing the states 
to compete with each other for recruits and in some cases to 
compete with Continental recruiters; and (3) the stimulus to 
desertion —  men enlisted for the money reward only to desert and 
enlist in another unit for another bounty.
onDecember 27, 1776, Papers of the Continental Congress, 
National Archives, Roll 8.
31Journals of the Continental Congress, IV, 103; V, 855; 
Kreidberg and Henry, Military Mobilization, 14. On September 
5, 1778, Washington turned down Gouvemeur Morris' suggestion that 
half the bounty be paid in specie because he said "it would have 
a tendency to depreciate our paper Money," Writings of Washington, 
XII, 403. In 1777, Washington advised one of his company 
commanders to pay as little bounty as possible, Washington to 
Captain Barthelomew Burke, March 4, 1777, ibid., VII, 246.
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Most commanders were affected by the bounty system. Colonel
Henry B. Livingston wrote Washington from Fishkill, New York, in
1777, that his unit was not complete "owing in a great measure to
the great Bounty given by our Eastern Friends and the disadvantage
of having most of the Militia of that State Employ's for two or three
months at a Time: The Bounty that is given for that Short Service
[is] much more advantageous than the Continental Bounty, and this
thing was very Discouraging to those already inlisted and has been
the means of many desertions. Washington wrote to John Augustine
Washington from Morristown in 1777 that "Desertion is a growing
evil; it is become a kind of business, under the present bounty,
33to Desert one Corps to Enlist in another." He insisted that
vigorous measures be taken to apprehend and punish deserters to
stop the evil. General Heath was advised to administer severe
0/punishment to those who deserted to receive double bounties. 
Recruiting in the "Country," Washington stated, was dependent
32Colonel Henry B. Livingston to Washington, February 7,
1777, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 40.
33Washington to John Augustine Washington, February 24,
1777, Writings of Washington. VII, 198-99.
^Washington to Heath, May 23, 1777, "Heath Papers," 
Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, XLIV (1878), 56.
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"on the abolishing State bounties," and if this was not accomplished, 
there was no need for the army even to try to compete in recruiting.^ 
Even while Washington was warning that state bounties had 
been a "source of immense expense and misfortunes,"^ the states 
were busy providing greater money inducements for attracting 
recruits. Washington sounded a note of alarm to Congressman Burke 
of North Carolina in regard to the $300 bounty voted by his state 
in 1779:
Men who inlisted at early and intermediate periods 
for the war for moderate bounties have become dis­
satisfied at seeing such enormous sums paid for 
short services, and there are numbers on this account, 
who were always esteemed Soldiers for the War, that 
are trying by every possible artifice to prove that 
their engagements were only temporary. Tho' they 
should not succeed in this, it is certain there will 
be great desertions, murmurings, perhaps what will 
be worse.^
At this point Washington confessed that he was not sure that an 
offer of a bounty was advisable, even though the soldiers agreed 
to enlist for the duration of the war.
As Washington confided to the Board of War in July, 1779, 
he was convinced that most of the illegal departures, other
O C Washington to President of Congress, March 15, 1779, 
Writings of Washington, XIV, 242.
^Washington to Thomas Burke, April 5, 1779, ibid., XIV, 
337; XVII, 431-32.
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than those where the men went over to the enemy, were caused as a
38direct result of the bounty system used in recruiting. While 
Washington was pleading for the wholesale abolishment of state 
bounties, the amounts offered by the states soared. New Jersey pre­
sented a bounty of $250 to her recruits, in addition to the Continental 
bounty. Georgia gave a bounty of $300 for enlistment for the
duration of the war. Virginia allowed $750, a suit of clothes
39yearly, and 100 acres of land. Congress fought back by voting
an additional gratuity of $100 to those soldiers on active duty
who reenlisted before January 23, 1779. A few months later,
Washington reported to the president of Congress that Rhode Island
and Connecticut were giving a bounty of $300, and that the New
Jersey bounty had been increased to $1,000, this in addition to
40the bounty provided by Congress.
38Washington wrote to the Board of War in 1779 that "the 
enormous bounties given by the States, Towns and by Individuals 
to Men for very short temporary services, are the source of the 
present discontents and of a thousand evils among soldiery . . . 
they induce the soldier who has undergone a long service and who 
engaged for the War in the first instance on a very moderate bounty 
to reason upon his situation, and to draw a comparison between 
what he does not receive and the great emoluments Others get . . . 
and from this comparison and those consideration it is I am 
convinced, that most of our desertions proceed . . June 9,
1779, ibid., XV, 252-53.
39Ibid., XV, 253n; XIII, 438.
^Washington to President of Congress, March 28, 1780, 
ibid., XVIII, 170; February 9, 1777, Washington Papers, Library 
of Congress, Roll 40; April 9, 1777, ibid., Roll 41.
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After long and careful consideration of the pros and cons 
of short enlistments, Washington finally decided in January,
1779, on a policy of enlisting all men for the duration of the war 
and making full use of the bounty for that purpose.^ But the 
large state bounties then being given dulled the offers of Continental 
army recruiters. Washington, consequently, reasoned that if all 
state bounties were abolished, Congress could raise its bounty to
42as much as $150 and in a short time have all army vacancies filled.
In February, 1779, recruiters for the Continental army began 
offering bounties up to $200, clothing, and land to men who would
/ Oenlist for the duration of the war.
Washington was no doubt correct in surmising that the large 
bounties attracted men who enlisted only to receive the cash reward 
and who, on the first opportunity, deserted and enlisted again in
Washington to the Committee of Conference, January 13, 
1779, Writings of Washington, XIV, 3. On several occasions 
Washington had recommended drafting for a shorter period of time 
to fill the battalions, ibid., VII, 52-53; X, 366; XI, 238-39;
XIII, 80-81; XXII, 384. In a circular letter to the states sent 
in 1780, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with short enlist­
ments, stating that it was partly responsible for many misfortunes 
the army endured, had helped destroy the value of paper currency, 
and had greatly hurt public credit. Circular Letter to the States, 
October 18, 1781, ibid., XX, 205.
^Washington to the Committee of Conference, January
13, 1779, ibid., XIV, 4.
^^Washington to Moses Rawlings, January 30, 1779, Washington
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 55. Washington said that
"whatever salutory effects might have been expected from giving
the bounty which has been directed, essentially depended on
abolishing the state bounties," Washington to the Committee of
Conference, February 27, 1779, Writings of Washington, XIV, 159.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
another military unit. In general orders Washington had already 
cautioned his army against this fraudulent and abusive practice 
and threatened strict and severe punishment for those apprehended 
and convicted, with little hope of a reprieve if sentenced to 
death.44 A method used to help officers in detecting men who had 
already been enlisted was a requirement that each recruit have a 
piece of blue, red, or yellow ribbon fixed on his hat at the time 
of his enlistment. The soldiers were required to wear the hat with 
the ribbon clearly visible until their regiments were assembled 
and marched off to camp. Failure to comply with this regulation 
was punishable by thirty-nine lashes.4^ Nevertheless, abuse of the 
bounty system grew enormously. Patriotic-minded men, who entered 
the service with no intention of deserting, were discouraged when 
they saw new recruits coming to their camps with large bounties, 
occasionally as much as "one hundred Pounds lawful Money"4** for as 
little as fifteen months' service. Many of the old soldiers, there­
fore, chose to desert and take advantage of the enlistment rewards to 
the chagrin of Washington and Congress.
Revolutionary War orderly books are replete with accounts of 
courts-martial of men who enlisted, received bounties, then deserted,
44General Orders, February 6, 1777, ibid., VII, 111.
45Ibid., VII, 112.
^Washington to Governor Nicholas Cooke, April 3, 1777, 
ibid., VII, 349.
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and continued the practice until captured. Benjamin Barbersby of
Lieutenant Colonel William J. Winds' First New Jersey Regiment was
tried on September 1, 1776, for deserting and enlisting in another
regiment, for which he received a sentence of thirty-nine lashes.
A soldier at Ticonderoga was tried and sentenced to a total of 117
lashes for slipping away from the Sixteenth Continental Regiment
and joining the Thirteenth Continental Regiment. The bounty of
eighteen shillings which he had received was to be recovered by
deductions from his future pay and was to be returned to the commander 
48who had paid it. Another soldier at Ticonderoga in 1778 was shot 
after being convicted of seven desertions followed in each case 
by another enlistment for which he had collected a bounty.^
David Hand and Benjamin Floyd of Colonel Enoch Poor's Eighth 
Continental Regiment were tried for deserting their company, 
joining a militia unit, and afterwards deserting the militia unit.
They were found guilty and sentenced to thirty-nine lashes on the 
bare back."5®
^Orderly Book, No. 13 (February 22, 1776-September 11, 1777), 
National Archives. Benjamin Hale of Colonel Enoch Poor's regiment 
and John Donley of Colonel Cook's regiment were tried and convicted 
for the same offense, ibid., 69.
48Ibid.
49Lerwill, Personnel Replacement System in the U. S. Army, 20.
^Orderly Book, No. 13, National Archives, 42.
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At a court-martial held March 16, 1779, at Minisink in
upper New York, Frederick Whortman of Colonel Spencer’s Regiment
was found guilty of deserting his regiment and enlisting in another
battalion for which he received one hundred lashes and was required to
51return the bounty money. In 1780, Thomas Morgan of Colonel Webbs'
Regiment was tried for deserting and enlisting in the First New
Jersey Regiment; he was sentenced to receive one hundred lashes and
"half of his monthly Pay to be stopt, till the Bounties and other
Expensies incurred in Consiquence of his Desertion and second
Inlistment are paid, and to rejoin Colonel Webbs’ Regiment into
52which he was first Inlisted during the war." On the same day,
Nathaniel Hand and Samuel Burrough were tried for the same offense
53and received similar sentences. The temptation to desert to 
receive bounties was a problem experienced by the army in all the 
states. Levi Springer of the Fourth North Carolina Regiment was 
charged with desertion and then joining Captain Sims’ company of 
the Tenth North Carolina Regiment. He received fifty lashes and 
was forced to return the bounty to Captain Sims."^
^Orderly Book, No. 27 (October 30, 1778-June 26, 1779), 
National Archives, 18.
^Orderly Book, No. 34 (1780), National Archives, 191.
"Orderly Book of the Pennsylvania State Regiment of Foot, 
May 10 to August 16, 1777," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography, XXIII, No. 3 (1898), 210. An article in the Virginia 
Gazette tells of the death of an unknown deserter: "Yesterday was
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Poor Soldiers
While the bounty system took its toll of desertions, there 
were other factors that played an influential roll in the desertion 
issue. Many of the recruits inducted into the army after 1776 
seem to have been of a poorer sort, ill disciplined, and little 
inclined to fulfill a military commitment.*^ John Adams declared 
that none but "the meanest, idlest, most intemperate and worthless" 
could be obtained in New England to serve for the duration of the 
war.*^ General Nathanael Greene stated that in New England the 
common people were "exceedingly avaricious," with little interest 
in endeavours not financially gainful.^ The attempts by state 
recruiters to meet their quotas resulted in many nay-do-wells 
and convicted criminals being enlisted, who usually bolted the 
service on the first opportunity. Henry Knox complained about the 
type of men being recruited, saying the army was only a home for
executed at Peekskill a soldier who had several times enlisted and 
received the bounty, and was deserting to the enemy; he had enlisted 
and deserted from the enemy also." Virginia Gazette (Alexander 
Purdie), July 18, 1777.
"^Washington to John Parke Curtis, January 22, 1777, Writings 
of Washington. VII, 52-54.
■^Charles F. Adams (ed.), The Works of John Adams (10 vols., 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1850-1856), III, 48.
^George W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene (3 vols., New 
York: Hurd and Mifflin Company, 1871), I, 75.
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C Oragamuffins. Anthony Wayne called them "Food for Worms . . .
miserable sharp looking Catiffs, hungrey lean fac'd Williams.
Greene said the militia of the Carolinas was the "worst in the
60world" and "of no more use than if they were in the moon." On 
January 23, 1776, Timothy Downey, a soldier in Brigadier General 
Sullivan's division, was tried and sentenced to receive thirty- 
nine lashes, but the court decided he was "worthless and Incorrigable, 
so he was drummed out of the regiment.^ The least provocation 
caused troops of this character to flee the service regardless 
of the threat of punishment.
Foreign-born Soldiers
Foreign-born troops seemed especially desertion-prone. During 
the summer of 1777, quitters among soldiers not b o m  in America had 
become so general that Washington warned against enlisting more
58Noah Brooks, Henry Knox, a Soldier of the Revolution (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900), 71.
59 'Charles J. Stille, Major-General Anthony Wayne and the
Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army (Philadelphia: J. P.
Lippincott Company, 1893), 44.
^Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, February 15, 1781 
"Greene Papers," quoted in Bowman, The Moral of the American 
Revolutionary Army, 14.
^Enoch Putnam, "Orderly Book .of Captain Enoch Putnam of 
Danviers, 1776," Essex Institute, Historical Collections, LXVII 
(April, 1931), 122.
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of them, especially for the cavalry, unless they were well 
62recommended. Both the cavalry and corps of sappers were closed
6 ̂to all but native-born soldiers in 1778. According to Joseph
Galloway, three-fourths of the deserters from Valley Forge who
came into Philadelphia were foreign-born. Henry Brodrick, a
German officer in the British service, in a letter to Thomas
Townshend on March 16, 1777, attested that large numbers of Irish-
64men were abandoning the American army in Pennsylvania. From New
England came the same report: foreign-bom troops seemed to desert
mroe frequently than native-born men. Washington, therefore, warned
against recruiting foreign-bom individuals and forbade enlisting
6 Sdeserters from the British army as Continental soldiers.
62Washington to Colonel George Baylor, June 19, 1777,
Writings of Washington, VIII, 264; X, 230. James Wood from 
Chariotteville, wrote to Washington in 1780 in behalf of a deserter,
La Brun, who he characterized as "extremely ignorant, and is in 
my opinion, an object worthy of Mercy." La Brun was a recruit who 
deserted a few days after enlisting and was sentenced to death by 
a general court-martial. Wood to Washington, March 25, 1780,
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 65.
63Washington to Count Pulaski, May 1, 1778, Writings of Washington. 
XI, 337; General Orders, June 9, 1778, ibid., XII, 40.
^Henry Brodrick to Thomas Townshend, March 16, 1777, U. S. 
Revolution, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Library of Congress, File 
Box III.
65Washington to Governor Thomas Jefferson, April 8,
1779, Writings of Washington, XIV, 349. On August 27, 1776,
Congress had encouraged the enlisting of British soldiers who 
deserted by offering bounties of twenty dollars and two hundred acres 
of land, Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 8.
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Although Washington wanted to encourage British soldiers
to desert from their units, he was extremely leery of enlisting
them into the American regiments. Intelligence reports indicated
that a considerable number of British soldiers were deserting. In
March, 1777, Hamilton reported to the New York Committee of
correspondence that the British army was being decreased daily by
66deserters who were coming into the American posts. Recruiters
for the state militia forces and for the Continental army were sorely
tempted to meet their quotas by enlisting these British deserters.
Some even considered signing up prisoners of war. Washington had
stated emphatically on several occasions that British deserters
and prisoners of war were not to be inducted into the Continental
corps.^ Congress passed several resolutions supporting this 
68policy. These troops usually ran off as soon as they were issued 
a rifle and clothing, causing a double loss to the American forces.
^Hamilton to New York committee of Correspondence, March
2, 1777, Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 209-10; March 20,
1777, ibid., I, 211.
^Orderly Book, No. 18 (1777-1779), 66, National Archives.
" . . .  particular Care is to be taken that no Prisoner of War are
inlisted into the Continental Army, the Officers who inlist such 
will be answerable for all the expense they may be to the Continent."
68Washington to President of Congress, March 12, 1778, Writings 
of Washington. XI, 73; 145-46, 80, 320-21, 337, 424; XI, 404-405;
XI, 470; XV, 493-94; XVIII, 2; XXV, 401-402; February 26. 1778,
Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 9.
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The warning against enlisting British deserters seems not to have 
been entirely effective, for many of this sort were actually enlisted 
as soldiers in state and Continental units. Israel Putnam from 
Peekskill informed Washington in July, 1777, that a deserter picked 
up at Fort Washington had taken the oath of loyalty to New York and 
had enlisted in his unit. Washington felt that taking of an 
oath meant nothing to British runaways. In regard to escapees from 
Burgoyne's Convention army, Washington said "there is not the smallest 
confidence to be placed in the professions of the Soldiery and let 
them be as solemn as they will, and even sanctified by an Oath, 
they will seize the first opportunity to escape to the Enemy. 
Washington wrote in March, 1778, to James Bowdoin, president of the 
Massachusetts Council: "The evil which I apprehended from the
inlistment of Deserters . . . has already made its appearance. One 
of the Colonels informs me, that every British Deserter sent to his 
Regiment, except one, is already gone off Washington said that
he hoped that this proof would put a total stop to engaging
69Israel Putnam to Washington, July 21, 1777, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 42.
^Washington to Colonel Theodorick Bland, July 27, 1779, 
Writings of Washington, XV, 493-94.
^Washington to President James Bowdoin, March 31, 1778, 
ibid., XI, 180.
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British deserters as soldiers; but the practice of enlisting enemy 
turncoats continued with little let up.
The Commander in Chief was astonished that so many officers
persisted in violating his orders and the resolutions of Congress;
he was especially annoyed by the enlisting of fugitives from
Burgoyne’s Convention army. "These troops," he said, "did not
originally come into our hands thro' choice, they were conquered,
brought to our possession by compulsion."72 Washington pointed
out that the fear of punishment in case of capture, which usually
operated on the mind of American deserters, was totally absent with
these troops. Rather than being punished, the British commanders
applauded them for their fidelity and cunning in escaping by merely
enlisting in a Continental regiment and then deserting it.
Washington noted that, while recruiters were rejoicing at their good
luck, the American commanders were counting on men who could not be
trusted and who embraced the earliest opportunity to leave and
strengthen the enemy, with American arms, clothes, and bounty 
73money. A number of examples were given by Washington to enforce 
his statement:
72Washington to Major General William Heath, April 29,
1778, ibid., XI, 320.
7^Ibid., XI, 321.
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But very few, if any, of those who Deserted from 
General Burgoyne and who came on with the two 
detachments under Lieutenant Col. Smith, now 
remain with him, they are gone . . .  a detachment 
from Col. Henley, which marched from Boston 
60 strong arrived here . . . with 13 Men only, 
and had it not been for a detachment of New 
Hampshire Troops, it is highly probable, one 
of 'em would not have been seen . . . If we would 
wish to reinforce the Enemy with the whole of 
Mr. Burgoynes Army, we can not pursue a mode 
that will be more effectual or more certain, 
than to inlist it in our service.^
The General concluded that it would be better to send men directly 
back to the British, unarmed, without clothes, and without paying 
them an exorbitant bounty. The officers who continued this practice 
were to be required to pay for all expenses and losses that occurred. 
To Washington this slight punishment was small recompense; nothing 
could really compensate for the injury the army suffered.
Washington took a slightly different view in regard to 
enlisting German deserters and prisoners of war. Brigadier General 
Casimer, Count Pulaski, persuaded Congress to allow him to fill his 
legion with British deserters, and Washington agreed to the 
arrangement with the understanding that only Germans would be 
inducted to fill no more than one-third of the foot regiment, with 
none being permitted to join cavalry units.^ However, when
^Washington to Count Pulaski, May 1, 1778, ibid., XI, 337.
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Washington learned that Pulaski had engaged British prisoners for
his legionary corps, he ordered the prisoners returned to confinement
and instructed Pulaski to adhere strictly to the regulations of
76Congress and orders of the Commander in Chief.
The issue, however, was not closed. From Boston a report
reached Congress in May, 1778, that a large desertion had occurred
among foreign-bom troops in the British service when they learned
that the Americans were in the process of recruiting a battalion of
Germans. General Heath informed the president of Congress that
Colonel Tuffin Charles Armand was engaging large numbers of
British and German deserters.^ Heath was a little embarrassed by
this situation, since he did not know whether to wink at it or try
to check the enlistments. During the summer of 1778, Washington
and Henry Laurens had discussed the desirability of forming a
78corps consisting of Hessian refugees; however, it was not until the 
summer of 1780 that an agreement was reached to go ahead with the 
Hessian unit.^ Colonel Armand, who took command of Pulaski's
^General William Heath to Henry Laurens, May 25, 1778,
Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives, Reel 177.
^®Washington to Henry Laurens, August 9, 1778, written by 
Hamilton, Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 533.
79Washington to Chevalier De Luzerne, August 16, 1780, 
and to Comte De Rochambeau, August 17, 1780, Writings of Washington. 
XIX, 384, 388.
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legion in 1779, engaged goodly numbers of Germans in his unit, and
on October 21, 1780, the designation of the command was changed to
"Armand1s Partisan Corps," which he commanded until the close of the 
80war.
Except for Armand's German corps, Washington remained opposed
81to the use of enemy deserters as soldiers in the Continental army, 
yet he made another slight deviation from his announced policy in 
1780 when he allowed a few skilled prisoners to be employed in the 
rear areas where they would be safe from capture. A few British 
prisoners of war continued to find their way into the American army 
throughout the war, especially in Massachusetts. As late as 
April, 1781, the General requested the names of officers who had 
sent a few former British soldiers to the Massachusetts Line as 
recruits.®2
Washington was also highly suspicious of British officers 
who deserted and agreed to serve in the Continental forces. He
80Francis E. Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the 
Continental Army During the War of the Revolution . . . (Baltimore: 
Genealogical Publishing Co., 1967, originally published 1914), 73.
81Washington to President Jeremiah Powell (Massachusetts),
May 19, 1778, Writings of Washington. XI, 424; to the Board of War 
September 19, 1778, ibid., XII, 470; to the Committee of Arrangement 
of Congress, October 5, 1778, Syrett (ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 
559; Heath to Jonathan D. Sergeant, November 12, 1779, Pennsylvania 
Archives. VIII, 6-7; Stephen Sushet (?) D. Croux to Lieutenant 
Thomas, July 7, 1779 (?), Original Letter, Record Group 93, Document 
No. 034059, National Archives.
82April 29, 1781, Orderly Book, No. 51, National Archives.
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wrote to Brigadier General Elias Dayton, in regard to Lieutenant 
Angus McDonald, deserter from the Seventy-first British Regiment, 
stating that "many reasons may be alledged to justify the Desertion 
of a Private Soldier, but such a Conduct in an Officer cannot but 
impress a very unfavorable opinion of his Character."®^ The 
commander suggested that his person be watched very closely.
Negro Soldiers
Negroes served in various capacities in the army during the 
Revolutionary War. The substitute system naturally accounted for 
the presence of many Negroes, but many free colored soldiers 
volunteered. New England states allowed recruiters to openly 
engage blacks to fill their quotas; all the states except South 
Carolina and Georgia eventually accepted Negroes as soldiers.®^
John C. Miller suggested that Washington's army averaged about 
fifty Negroes per battalion and that "at least 700 were among the 
13,500 troops in the Monmouth Campaign. A special return of 
Adjutant General Alexander Scammell, dated August 24, 1778, reported 
755 Negroes in the army, of whom 148 were in Samuel Parsons'
®^Washington to Brigadier General Elias Dayton, July 5,
1782, Writings of Washington, XXIV, 401.
84Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 52-57.
^John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom, 1775-1783 (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1948), 509.
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86brigade, and 162 in three Virginia brigades. Benjamin Quarles
has estimated that as many as 5,000 Negro soldiers served in the
American forces during the Revolution, with only about one third
87being identified by color.
After 1776, Congress discouraged the enlistment of black
recruits. However, it allowed free Negroes who had served faith-
88fully at Cambridge to be reenlisted, but no others. Washington
had strictly forbade the recruiting of all men of color on several
occasions. However, since sizable numbers were being inducted,
Congress in 1779 decided to enlist 3,000 slaves as soldiers, but
89was rebuffed by southern slave owners. Regardless of announced 
policies, during the course of the Revolution, hundreds of blacks 
served in various Continental regiments; most of them were listed 
by the muster masters only as "a Negro man."
It is difficult to determine how extensive desertion was 
among Negro soldiers since so few were identified by color in court- 
martial transcripts. Quarles listed by name several dozen who 
deserted, with the suggestion that blacks were less prone to leave
86Freeman, Washington, V, 99n.
87Quarles, Negro in the American Revolution, ix.
88January 16, 1776, Journals of the Continental Congress, IV, 60. 
^Miller, Triumph of Freedom, 510-11.
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the service since "they had less to desert to." He further noted 
that a considerable number of blacks left to join the British 
thinking their situation would be improved. In any event, a few 
were court-martialed for desertion, and at least one was executed 
for the crime.^
Induced to Leave by Comrades and Friends
Apparently some soldiers deserted for no real reason on their 
part, but were simply induced to leave by comrades, who might or
onQuarles, Negro in the American Revolution, 79.
91Josiah Dashiell of Worcester County, Maryland, requested 
information from Governor Thomas Johnson about the alledged execution 
of a Negro named James. Josiah Dashiell to Governor Thomas Johnson, 
April 23, 1778, Calendar of Maryland State Papers, The Red Books, 
(Baltimore: Hall of Records Commission, 1936-1967), Part Three,
31. A court inquiry was held at Morristown, March 12, 1780, to 
ascertain facts concerning the death of a Negro soldier, apparently 
executed by Captain John Van Dyke. The court exonerated Van Dyke 
declaring his action on that occasion was in the line of duty and 
was "highly justifiable." Washington approved the court's decision. 
Orderly Book, No. 34, National Archives. William Placey, a 
mulatto, accused of desertion twice from the Continental service, 
was tried by general court-martial on March 31, 1777. He escaped 
the death penalty because the court decided he was "Ignorant of the 
Continental Articles prohibiting his offense, that he is unskill'd 
in Reading, and never heard these articles read." The court did 
punish him with fifty stripes on the naked body with a cat o'nine 
tails, and ordered him to return to duty. Major General Parsons 
to Washington, April 8, 1777, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, 
Roll 40. Edward Hand captured and confined a Negro soldier named 
Robert serving in Colonel Durkee's regiment, who had attempted to 
desert after being wounded. Brigadier General Edward Hand to 
Dwight McKnight, May 16, 1781, Copies of Letters written while 
Adjutant General from 27th March 1781 to July 6th 1783, Miscellaneous 
Record Books, No. 162, Record Group 93, Entry 5-d, National 
Archives. Hereinafter cited as Hand, Copies of Letters,
Miscellaneous Record Book No. 162. "Negroes as
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might not have had a reason themselves. A mass desertion occurred
at Fort Schuyler in May, 1780, when thirty-one men decamped from
Colonel Goose Von Schaick's regiment and Captain William Brown's
artillery. Three of these men were captured by a force commanded
by Lieutenant John Johnston, which was sent in pursuit. Johnston
reported: "I enquired of the prisoners the reasons why they had
Deserted, they told me they had been deluded off by Conway & some
92of the rest, but could give no other reasons." A few soldiers
were persuaded to quit the service by their officers, who either
going on furlough or leaving the service took the soldiers along
93in the capacity of servants. Captain Thomas Massie of the Sixth 
Virginia Regiment advertised in the Virginia Gazette offering a 
forty dollar reward for the return of one James Patterson, a 
deserter from his company who had escaped from the jail in
Soldiers," Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, VI (1862- 
1863), 172-248, is a scathing article condemning the South for not 
using more Negroes to fill their battalions during the Revolutionary 
War. A fuller account is Quarles, Negro in the American Revolution.
^Lieutenant Abraham Hardenberg (Albany) to Colonel Goose Von 
Schaick, May 31, 1780, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 66.
^General Orders (Valley Forge), May 16, 1778, Writings of 
Washington, XI, 399. Lieutenant Davis, Eleventh Virginia Regiment was 
tried May 22, 1778, "for encouraging a soldier to stay away from 
his regiment," but was acquitted. General Orders, May 24, 1778, 
ibid., XI, 442-43. As early as July 15, 1775, both soldiers and officers 
were threatened with severe punishment if they conversed with the enemy, 
William Henshaw, "Orderly Book," Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Proceedings, XV (1876), 124-25.
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Williamsburg; the paper stated that Patterson had been "decoyed 
off by his father."^
Soldiers who were opposed to an American victory often
persuaded members of the Continental forces to desert to the British.
A certain John Springer, Jr. enlisted in Colonel Moses Hazen's
Canadian Regiment in the spring of 1777, deserted to the enemy
shortly thereafter, and served in the British armed forces. In
July, 1779, Springer returned to the American army, taking advantage
of a pardon offered by Washington to deserters who returned. He
asked to be employed where he would be safe from capture by the
British forces and was obliged by being assigned to the Wagon
Master's Department. In that capacity he immediately began to
95enlist men from the Maryland Line for the enemy's service.
Washington reported "there was every reason to believe he occasioned 
several desertions which happened in the Corps with which he was 
tampering." Washington requested that Springer be confined aboard 
a ship to prevent him from influencing more men to join the enemy.^
^ Virginia Gazette, July 9, 1777.
95Washington to Abraham Ackerman, October 9, 1779, Writings 
of Washington, XVI, 443-45.
96Washington to the Marine Committee, October 9, 1779, ibid., 
XVI, 442. Springer was court-martialed July 7, 1779, on the charge 
of "Being a Spy and seducing soldiers to enlist in the British army," 
for which he received one hunfred lashes and confinement, General 
Orders, July 11, 1779, ibid.. XV, 407.
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Returned prisoners of war and escapees from the British 
prison camps often went to their homes rather than back to their 
military companies, believing that they had been freed from their 
former obligations.^ Washington explained that there could be no 
possible foundation for this claim, and if it were allowed would 
soon prove detrimental to the army. The Commander in Chief ordered 
Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg to take measures to inform those 
of this persuasion in Virginia that if they did not return in a 
reasonable time they would "be treated as d e s e r t e r s . I n  1781 
Washington authorized Brigadier General Daniel Morgan to seize 
as deserters soldiers released from captivity, or those who had 
enlisted in the British army and then escaped, and had not reported
99to their corps, provided their original enlistment had not expired.
Women who came into the camps occasionally persuaded soldiers 
to desert. Orders were issued as early as 1776 to keep "lewd 
women" and other dangerous persons from entering the camp
97Washington to Governor Thomas Jefferson, August 14, 1780, 
ibid., XIX, 375; Washington wrote: ". . .many Soldiers who have been
captured in the course of the War, and escaped from the Enemy, have 
gone to their homes and consider themselves as discharged from the 
service."
98Washington to Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg, August 
15, 1780, ibid., XIX, 382.
99Washington to Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, December 
12, 1781, ibid., XXIII, 383.
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a r e a s . W h i l e  at Valley Forge, Washington warned the soldiers,
through general orders, against women who came from Philadelphia
under the pretense of visiting relatives, but who really came "with
101an intent to intice the soldiers to desert." Officers were 
ordered to arrest any women they suspected of having interviews 
with soldiers for the purpose of causing them to desert.
Fear
Fear, no doubt, was another reason that led to a number of 
desertions— fear of combat, fear of being wounded, fear of being 
captured, and fear of dying. Most of the reasons for desertion 
mentioned in letters of commanders involved physical discomforts 
and complaints about food and clothing; however, most diarists noted, 
when desertion was mentioned, that it occurred during combat.
Seeing men dying all around acted powerfully on the minds of 
young men who naturally began considering every avenue that would 
lead them to safety. Jonathan Burton, in his diary, remorsefully 
wrote: "This morning Died and at night was buried Benj. Daley
of our company who made the 20th which we have Lost from our Regt
■^^General Orders, June 30, 1775, Henshaw "Orderly Book,"
112: Washington to Pennsylvania Board of War, April 26, 1777,
Writings of Washington, VII, 478.
^^February 4, 1778, Orderly Book, No. 21 (February 1 
to March 1, 1778), National Archives; Writings of Washington, X, 
420-21.
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102Sence we came to this Place." Many like Burton chose to leave
before they became the next to die. A minister in Pennsylvania
recorded in his diary that several deserters passed through his
town fleeing the battle of Long Island where their battalion had
103been "badly cut up." Lieutenant James McMichael of the 
Pennsylvania Line reported being ordered to parade to see a man 
shot who left his post during a battle fought on September 16,
1776.104
Some soldiers reasoned that the safest place during a 
battle was behind the enemy lines, thus frequent desertions 
occurred while conflicts raged. Captain John Montresor, with 
Lieutenant General Knuphuysens1 force in Pennsylvania while on a 
foraging raid reported that "two deserters came in from the Rebel 
army," during a skirmish July 23, 1 7 7 7 . In another report,
Montresor mentioned "a light horse deserter coming in," and that 
during a fire fight on September 1, 1777, two more rebel "light
102Jonathan Burton, "Diary of Lieutenant Jonathan Burton, of 
Wilton," State Papers of New Hampshire . . . »  edited by N . Bouton and 
others (40 vols., Concord, New Hampshire: Parson B. Cogswell, 1867-
1943), XIV, 667-702. Reference is October 7, 1776, while on an 
expedition near Canadian border.
^^John W. Jordan (ed.), "Bethlehem during the Revolution . . ." 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XII, No. 4 (1889),
391, September 4, 1776.
^■^James McMichael, "Diary of Lieutenant James McMichael of the 
Pennsylvania Line, 1776-1778," ibid., XVI, No. 2 (1892), 136.
Probably battle fought at Harlem Plains, New York.
■^John Montresor, "Journal of Captain John Montrisor," 
ibid.. V, No. 4 (1881), 411.
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horse" deserted to the British. Several soldiers, mainly from
Brigadier General William Maxwell*s unit, went over to the
enemy during the fighting that took place in Pennsylvania during 
106September, 1777. An article in the New York Gazette on May 3, 
1779, stated that during a minor engagement near the city several 
deserters took advantage of the opportunity by joining the King's 
troops.
Ebenezer Wild, a soldier from Braintree, Massachusetts,
who served throughout the war, left an account in his diary of the
desertion of several men during combat. In 1777 he was out with a
scouting party that came upon several British soldiers. Wild said
that a "very hot fire ensued for the space of two or three
minutes" in which eight enemy soldiers were killed, and the remainder
of their party were run off. After Wild's scouting party returned
to camp at Prospect Hill, they discovered that four of the men who
went out with the group did not return, and it was "supposed they
108tarried with the enemy, as they were all Old Cuntreemen." Major 
John Rose, a Russian serving in the American army, recorded in his 
journal, while on an expedition to Sandusky in 1782, that many
106Ibid., V, 412.
^ ^ New York Gazette, No. 1437, May 3, 1779.
■^®Ebenezer Wild, "The Journal of Ebenezer Wild . . .," 
edited by James B. Bugbee, Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Proceedings. 2nd ser., VI (1890-1891), 95, September 25, 1777.
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American soldiers deserted during the action against the Indians. 
His graphic account of the battle well illustrates the fear many 
soldiers felt:
. . . the moment we halted we were fired on . . . 
the larger part was quite bewildered and by the 
dread that hung upon their souls, incapacitated 
for action —  another part thinking this was the 
last for the dreadful moment, deserted . . . .109
Colonel Marinus Willett, who had distinguished himself with 
repeated instances of bravery in combat in the Continental Line and 
retired to serve as colonel of New York levies and militia, 
reported to General Stirling an account of a battle fought in 1781 
where some of his men had fled during combat. Willett noted that 
as his force advanced in two columns, without any apparent cause, 
one whole wing "turned about and fled," and it was not "possible
to ralley them" —  they even abandoned a field piece that fell into
the hands of the enemy. On this occasion, Willett finally 
collected his troops, returned to battle, and routed the enemy.
In a letter written to his son, William Chamberlin recounted
the apprehension and fear he felt as a soldier being called upon to
109Rosenthal, Baron (John Rose), "Journal of a Volunteer 
Expedition to Sandusky . . .," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography, XVIII, No. 3 (1894), 310.
^^Colonel Marinus Willett to General Lord Stirling,
November 2, 1781, Papers of the Continental Congress, National 
Archives, Reel 177.
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enter combat. A courier summoned him at night to be ready the next 
morning to march against a large British force that had penetrated 
New Hampshire. Chamberlin spent all night getting his equipment 
ready, and early the next morning bid farewell to his family "not 
without some dismal forebodings that I should never return."
While marching to camp, he thought:
I could not help reflecting on the horrid news I had 
heard, and on the doubtful issue of the contest, & 
that if I should not be killed in battle, that those 
who had taken up arms, if overcome, would be executed 
for treason. It operated as a damper to my courage, 
and brot me to a full halt for a moment . . .
Fortunately, Chamberlin did not stop, but continued to his company, 
learning upon his arrival that the British had halted their drive, 
and he was permitted to return home. For other men in similar 
situations the decision was often different; numerous soldiers 
chose to steal away while marching to camp or to battle.
Long marches not only stimulated the desire to desert, but 
gave the men the best opportunity to run away. The least 
difficult time to depart the service was while the unit was moving 
from one location to another. Washington constantly warned 
regimental commanders to keep close guard over the men while 
marching, especially those expected to desert on the first opportunity. 
He also insisted that his generals prevent soldiers from "straggling"
^■^William Chamberlin, "Letter of General William Chamberlin," 
Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, 2nd ser., X (March, 
1896), 495.
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112or lagging behind. In 1779 the Commander in Chief cautioned 
Brigadier General William Woodford, whose Virginia brigade was 
moving south, that he "was apprehensive" about his troop passing 
through their own state, for "the March will be attended with very
I I Oconsiderable desertion." Washington advised Woodford to use
rigid discipline on the march and post a chain of sentries around
the encampment during the night to prevent desertion.
Jonathan Mifflin, deputy quartermaster-general, inscribed
in his journal an account of the army going through Morristown in
1778. The weather was so hot and the march so difficult that even
the horses died of fatigue. By the time the wagon train had
reached Germantown the murmuring of the men was so sharp that thirty
1 1 /applied for and obtained discharges and thirty more deserted. 
Washington instructed Gates in 1777 to be especially careful in 
sending small groups of men from one location to another without 
sufficient officers to ensure that they all arrived. The General 
explained that many of them returned to their homes, sold their 
equipment provided by public funds, and were consequently rendered
112Writings of Washington. XI, 18-19; XIV, 209, 257;
XVII, 253-55; XVIII, 60, 86, 199, 367; Papers of the Continental 
Congress, October 22, 1781, November 2, 1781, National Archives,
Roll 177; Washington Papers, February 5, 1777, March 28, 1777, 
Library of Congress, Roll 40.
^^Washington to Brigadier General William Woodford, December
13, 1779, Writings of Washington. XVII, 253.
Jonathan Mifflxn, "A Narrative of Jonathan Mifflin," U.S. 
Revolutionary War, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Library of Congress, 
File Box V.
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115unable to return to the field. Washington ordered Gates to make
a complete list of the men who left in small bodies and to include
all the equipment they took with them. Benjamin Tallmadge explained
to Heath in 1781 that his unit was moving slowly because his men
were barefooted, and he did not want to leave stragglers along 
116the way. Numerous soldiers who fled during marches were captured
and punished. In October, 1777, Roger Lord of Colonel Wiggles-
worth’s regiment was tried for leaving his unit while on the
march, "absenting himself from camp an unreasonable time &
for loosing [sic] or disposing of his Arms, Accoutrements,
Cloathing, for which he received one hundred lashes and was
required to pay for the articles he had lost. Most commanders
experienced desertions while on the move; the problem was greatest
when the troops were being moved out of their state or region to
118another part of the country, especially to the south.
These factors —  the method of enlistment, use of substitutes, 
bounties, personal persuasion, straggling, and fear —
■^Washington to Gates, February 5, 1777, Writings of 
Washington, VII, 110.
^^Benjamin Tallmadge to Heath, October 22, 1781, Papers of 
the Continental Congress, National Archives, Roll 177, 358.
^■■^October 1, 1777, Orderly Book, No. 26 (Providence), 
National Archives.
^■^Washington to Marquis De Lafayette, April 22, 1781, 
Writings of Washington, XXI, 493-94; XXIII, 60, 86, 376; XXIV, 209.
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influenced a large number of soldiers to scamper off, shirk their 
duty, and leave the mark of "deserter" beside their names on the 
muster rolls.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V I I
DOMESTIC, POLITICAL, AND OTHER CAUSES 
OF DESERTION
Soldiers have always been disturbed by vexatious news from 
home. If family difficulties appeared severe and of such a nature 
that the soldier's presence would bring relief, those who could not 
manage authorized leave very often went home without proper 
authority. Soldiers were especially concerned about the safety 
of their families when large elements of the British army came near 
their homes.^ Major General John Burgoyne's army in upper New 
York in 1777 presented an immediate danger to many frontier families 
whose men-folk were serving in the American forces. Robert R. 
Livingston wrote Hamilton in August that the approaching danger 
of Burgoyne had alarmed soldiers who felt the position of Gates' 
army in the north was defenseless, and placed their families 
in great jeopardy; the result was desertion of a sizeable 
portion of the army who returned home to move their families to a
^Jefferson to Major General Baron Steuben, April 27, 1781, 
Julian P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (17 vols., to 
date, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951-
1965), V, 565. Jefferson to Benjamin Harrison, April 27, 1778, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 54.
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safer place. Livingston also reported that most men drafted to
meet this imminent threat had refused to leave their homes, and the
few that did join units left the service in a day or so, because they
2feared the exposed plight of their own families.
Soldiers of the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, drawn from the 
west side of the Allegheny Mountains, were alarmed at the Indian 
disturbances in 1778 which jeopardized their families and, subsequently,
3caused many of them to desert. Captain William Bratton of the 
Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment wrote Washington in April, 1779, 
requesting acceptance of his resignation so that he could return to his 
distressed family on the frontier of Pennsylvania. He had shared the 
fatigues and hardships of war from the beginning and was willing to 
continue to do so; but since ha had "a family and an Aged Father in 
that Part of the Country that lies within reach of the Enemy," he 
asked for his immediate release.^
On other occasions soldiers left in the spring at planting 
time or in the fall at harvest time to attend to their own affairs,
Livingston to Hamilton, August 10, 1777, Syrett (ed.), 
Papers of Hamilton, I, 310-11.
3Washington to President of Congress, February 27, 1778, 
Writings of Washington, X, 519-20.
^Captain William Bratton to Washington, April 17, 1779, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 57.
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The same magnet which drew men from the army when most needed 
deterred others from responding to the call. Such excuses did 
not impress Governor Thomas Jefferson, who observed that "the 
enemy will not suspend their operations till we can sow or reap.
Unplowed fields were not the only reasons men deserted the 
colors; urgent appeals from parents or wives caused untold 
desertions. Letters came to Washington and other commanders 
pleading for the release of relatives. "Hope also my pore boy in 
your Company is Still a Live," wrote one father concerning his son, 
"pray Sir as he murst be Very Much w o m e  out if a Live Dow Let Him 
Com out awhile for a Recrute and if He is so unwell as not Likely 
to be fit for Duty pray get Him Discharg'd." An American officer 
commented on the misery of many wives and children as reported to him 
by one in his command:
Not a Day Passes my head, but some Soldier with Tears 
in his Eyes, hands me a letter from his Wife Painting 
forth the Distresses of his family in such strains as 
these, '1 am without bread, and Cannot get any, the 
Committee will not Supply me, my Children will 
Starve, or if they do not, they will freeze, we have 
no wood, neither Can we get any, Pray Come Home.'
Jefferson to Colonel Abraham Penn, May 4, 1781, Andrew A. 
Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (eds.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
(20 vols., Washington: Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903-1905),
IV, 421.
^Rupert Hughes, George Washington (3 vols., New York: William
Morrow and Company, 1926-1930), III, 86-87.
^Ebenezer Huntington, "Letters of Ebenezer Huntington, 1774- 
1781," American Historical Review, V (July, 1900), 720.
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Understandably, soldiers could not easily resist such 
appeals. Authorized leaves were often given in such cases, but 
not in all, since most soldiers could have produced similar letters 
if they thought it would be effective. Furloughs granted were at 
times abused by soldiers who overstayed the leave period specified 
in their orders, causing them to be listed as deserters. Washington 
frequently had to warn his commanders against awarding leaves of 
absence; during a few periods of the war furloughs were stopped
Qaltogether. In 1778 Washington wrote to General Heath that it was 
"shameful to see the number of Men that have been admitted to 
Furlough"; he ordered Heath to have his furloughed men rejoin their
Q
units "tinder pain of being treated as Deserters." The General 
was just as insistent that officers who had exceeded their terms 
be ordered to return "without loss of time."^ During the winter 
of 1778, the General refused to grant leaves to officers who sought 
to comfort their wives or to repair their finances, or to those 
who wanted to visit their sweethearts.^ The officers, however, 
could resign their commissions, and many of them did.
Q
Thomas Crafts, "Orderly Book of the Regiment of Artillery . . .," 
Essex Institute, Historical Collections, XIV (July, 1877), 191. On 
April 30, 1778, all furloughed soldiers and recruits were ordered to 
return immediately to their regiments or be treated as deserters.
^Washington to Major General Heath, April 8, 1778, Writings 
of Washington. XI, 226; similar letters to Major Moses Knap, February
25, 1783, ibid., XXIV, 161.
10Ibid., XI, 226.
^Freeman, George Washington, IV, 615.
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Many soldiers, especially the very young who most likely had 
never been away from home for a long period, became extremely home­
sick. Two brothers, Peter and Cornelius Ten Broeck, entered the 
army in the summer of 1779, and very soon became worried because
they had received no mail. In August, Peter wrote to his father:
12"I have been almost ready to Despair to hear from you . . . ." In
November, Cornelius complained: "I have not heard a syllable from
you since your letter by General Morris which is some considerable
time ago —  which makes me not so happy as if I could hear from you
oftener, but suppose you have no opportunity to write you would not
13willingly omit once in a while to let me know how you do." In 
another letter sent a year later, the homesick soldier complained 
that he had "not heard a word from . . . any of the family since 
Mr. John De Lamater came to camp," which caused him "to have a great 
Anxsiety to receive a line."^ Letters similar to these 
eventually led some men to abandon the war to be with their families. 
Washington reminded a committee of Congress, from his headquarters
12Peter Ten Broeck to Cornelius Ten Broeck, Sr., August 24, 
1779, "News from Camp: Letters Received by Cornelius Ten Broeck of
Rocky Hill, New Jersey, from his Sons Cornelius and Peter Serving 
in the Continental army 1779-1780." Magazine of American History, II 
(1878), 172.
13Cornelius Ten Broeck, Jr., to his father, November 10, 1779, 
ibid., 174.
^November 2, 1780, ibid., 175.
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at Kings Ferry, how disagreeable and frequently distressing it was 
for men "to be t o m  from their families to a life which they are 
totally unacquainted," but it was absolutely necessary that a 
permanent force be kept in the field regardless of the hardships 
involved.̂
To maintain this permanent force, Washington made it clear 
that those who left illegally would be punished regardless of the 
justice of their action in their own thinking. He ordered 
commanders to keep a careful watch around camps to prevent would-be 
deserters from escaping. Men who had deserted and were confined 
for their crimes occasionally petitioned Washington for release to 
visit their families. Denwood Turpin, Solomon Ward, and Isaac 
Esten, or Worcester County, Maryland, petitioned the Council of 
Safety for leniency and permission to return to their suffering 
families.^ John Winterson, a deserter, sought consideration for a 
discharge, stating that he very much wanted to see his family.^ 
Vincent Trapnall of Baltimore petitioned the House of Delegates 
at Annapolis for release, asking that they consider his "wife and 
poor children who might have suffered greatly" during his
^Washington to Committee of Conference, August 21, 1781, 
Writings of Washington, XXIII, 30: Washington to Thomas Wharton,
May 11, 1778, ibid., XI, 369-70.
^Petition, July, 1776, Archives of Maryland; Red Books,
Part Three, XXIV, 3.
^Stephen Steward to Major John Steward, 1777, ibid., XXIV, 36.
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X8confinement. On this occasion, Trapnall was released when he put
19up the sum of one thousand pounds.
It was difficult for Continental army commanders to keep 
soldiers from fleeing their posts in order to rescue their families; 
the hazards of desertion counted for little when wives and 
children were in a more precarious position. While the reasons for 
leaving might have seemed perfectly good to the troops, it was 
nevertheless desertion in the eyes of the army, and of a particularly 
damaging sort, since the army often was weakened at crucial moments. 
The causes of desertion are often many sided, and it is almost 
impossible to isolate specific reasons when so many influences 
were operating on the minds of the soldiers at the same time. 
Political issues such as the defense of the rights of the colonies 
collectively, as well as the protection of cherished personal 
liberties, inspired Americans to take up arms against the British 
in 1775 and to continue in the fight for their beliefs until their 
goals were finally achieved. During the eight years of war, there 
were those who fell by the wayside, either fatigued by the rigors of 
the ordeal, or discouraged by its long duration, or perhaps unsure 
of their original beliefs. Sometimes a shift in the policy of
18Vincent Trapnall to House of Delegates (Maryland),
February 18, 1777, ibid.. XVI, 142.
19Ibid.. XVI, 153.
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either the British government or the Continental Congress caused 
soldiers to shift from one side to the other. Some American colo­
nials were willing to fight for their constitutional rights as 
Englishmen. In time many of them would support the idea of 
independence and express their cause in terms of the rights of all 
men. Some Americans, regardless of the issues, could not bring 
themselves to fight for independence; consequently, they switched 
to the British side after the Declaration of Independence in July,
1776. At least a few patriots during the first two years of the 
war became loyalists when the Americans allied with the French and 
later, indirectly, with the Spanish, two traditional enemies of 
British Americans. The only visible reason for others to switch 
was the difference in religious backgrounds of the two belligerents—  
Protestant England and Catholic France. Many Americans were 
violently opposed to the Roman Catholic church and could not bring
themselves to fight against Protestant England and alongside troops
20who were supporters of Roman Catholicism. For others the hope 
of an American victory seemed very remote; and rather than take a 
chance on being hanged as a traitor by the British, they refused
oito take up arms against the King.
^^Ray A. Billington, The Protestant Crusade: 1800-1860; a.
Study of the Origins of American Nativism (New York: Macmillan Company,
1938), Chapter one.
21William H. Nelson, The American Tory (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1961) and Paul H. Smith, Loyalist and Redcoats: £  
study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1964), provide valuable discussions of American loyalism.
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British sympathizers, as well as English military commanders, 
were quick to encourage American soldiers to desert from their 
regiments. Appeals were especially effective during periods when 
the morale in the American camps was low and when soldiers were 
suffering from hunger, fatigue, homesickness, and financial 
distress. It might be noted that there was no factor during the 
war that could be used to predict when soldiers would be most prone 
to desert or would be most susceptible to British propaganda. Indeed, 
there was often less desertion during the periods of incredible 
hardships than during those of relative ease. British encourage­
ments did not always increase desertions, but they did worry the
22American commanders, especially Washington. Even so, if only one
American soldier was tempted to desert because of a deliberate 
course of action taken by the British, it warrants comment. For 
various reasons, large numbers left the ranks of the American army 
to join the opposition. These defectors had obviously lost confidence 
in the ability of the Continental forces to win a victory over the 
better trained British troops. In 1776, the British offered pardons 
and money and promised land grants to any American soldier deserting. 
At first sixteen dollars was paid for each man who went over; later 
this was raised to twenty-four dollars if he brought along his musket.
22Bowman, The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army, 57-61.
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By January, 1777, when military operations had come to a
temporary halt, a propaganda war began. General William Howe's
staff in April, 1777, made appeals that successfully lured away
some Americans. One promised rebel soldiers not only full pardon
and pay for their weapons, but also the opportunity of joining a
23provincial corps being formed to serve in the British army.
Another appeal promised two hundred acres of land to every non­
commissioned officer, and fifty acres to every private who enlisted 
in the provincial corps for two years. In May, Washington reported 
to Congress that these British endeavors had had "an unhappy
influence on too many of the Soldiers; in a particular Manner on
0 /those who are not Natives."
The British used a number of methods to get their propaganda 
to the American soldiers. One was through planting deserters and 
prisoners of war inside the American camp. Hamilton wrote to 
Robert Livingston from Coryells Ferry in July that the British 
prisoners and deserters were spreading rumors and "manufactoring 
stories calculated to serve the purposes of the side they belong
23Carl Berger, Broadsides and Bayonets; The Propaganda War 
of the American Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1961), 143; Max von Eelking, The German Allied Troops in the 
North American War of Independence, 1776-1783, translated and edited 
by J. G. Rosengarten (Albany, New York: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1893),
100.
^^Washington to the President of Congress, May 3, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, VIII, 8.
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to." He advised that no dependence be placed on such informa­
tion.^
Another commonly used method was to send out a party under
a flag of truce to talk with military or civilian personnel on any
pretence whatever. During these conversations various information
was passed. William Livingston from Princeton complained to
Washington in April, 1778, that the British General John Campbell
had made a constant practice of sending his flags "by a set of
dirty villains who are traitors by the laws of this State and who
being intimately acquainted with Elizabethtown, and frequently not
sufficiently watched by our Militia Officers at the Post, generally
made it an opportunity of sowing the seeds of disaffection among
26their old cronies." On this occasion Livingston arrested one
of the envoys on the charge that he was a deserter from the American
army, stating that "however sacred a flag may be . . .  it can [not]
protect a Deserter from the punishment incurred by his Desertion
27from the Army in which he was enlisted."
Another very effective British propaganda procedure was 
to circulate among the people, and in the army camps, false but 
authentic looking acts of Congress containing information that would
25Hamilton to Robert L. Livingston, July 29, 1777, Syrett 
(ed.), Papers of Hamilton, I, 294.
^William Livingston (Princeton) to Washington, April 15, 1778, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 28.
27Ibid.
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be harmful to the American cause. In April, 1778, the British
distributed a leaflet containing a spurious act of Congress which
gave the impression that those men who had been drafted or had
enlisted in the Continental army for a limited time would be held
for the duration of the war regardless of the enlistment agreement.
Washington responded from Valley Forge through general orders to
the army, assuring the troops that the act was false and had been
issued by the British to persuade those who had just enlisted to
28desert and to discourage others from entering the service.
He further explained that the promise to send deserters from the 
Continental army to England or Ireland, without cost, there to be 
set free, was also false. The Commander in Chief made it clear 
that most of the American turncoats were being confined on board 
ship and were later forced either to serve as seamen in the navy or 
in British garrisons. The General was naturally upset by these false 
reports coming at a time when recruiting was critical, for it had 
alarmed many would-be enlistees. In a letter to John Augustine 
Washington, the General said that the enemy had lost all "Sense
nQof virtue and honor" by resorting to such "low dirty tricks."
He wrote to Congress in October that he would try to intercept all
^General Orders, April 23, 1778, Writings of Washington,
XI, 299-300.
^Washington to John A. Washington, May, 1778, ibid., XI, 500.
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"seditious papers calculated to excite dissention and mislead the 
people" when they came by way of a flag of truce, but he feared that 
there were so many avenues available to the enemy that no way could 
be found to stop every communication.3®
To counter the British propaganda efforts, Congress passed
a resolution on November 13, 1775, appointing three delegates to
a committee to answer the "sundry illegal ministerial proclamations"
31that had appeared in America. The committee, consisting of 
Richard Henry Lee, James Wilson, and William Livingston, published 
a lengthy address, To the Inhabitants of the United States, re­
viewing the background of the struggle and warning against British 
trickery.32
Besides disaffected servicemen, civilian loyalists encouraged 
American soldiers to desert. In April, 1779, the Commander in Chief 
informed the governor of New Jersey that the "enemy appear to have 
a number of active emmissaries . . . who have been very successful 
in corrupting our men" as was evidenced by "an alarming spirit of 
mutiny and desertion" which had shown itself on several occasions.
onWashington to President of Congress, October 22, 1778, ibid., 
XIII, 132.
31Journals of the Continental Congress, III, 353.
32Ibid., VIII, 397-404.
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He further stated that "there is no saying how extensively the
qqinfection might spread." A few days earlier, he had written to
Brigadier General William Maxwell that "the spirit of desertion
which of late made its appearance in some extraordinary instances,
seems to have its source in corruptions artfully introduced by the
e n e m y . W a s h i n g t o n ' s  instruction to Maxwell was for the officers
to be especially watchful of the company with whom the soldiers were
spending their time and to note the houses they visited. He
presumed it was from these civilians that the British promises of
various sorts, including offers of gold, "had reached the soldiers
tempting them to desert." As a remedy the General again suggested
"strict discipline, frequent roll calls* fco keep] an eye over those
who may have been in foreign service, and now in ours, and to [watch]
all strangers who under any pretense whatsoever mix with the 
35soldiery." Washington hinted that capital punishment should 
immediately accompany any found guilty of luring the soldiers off 
to the enemy. This policy was easier written than put into practice 
as time would prove.
Hamilton wrote Governor Livingston of New Jersey in 1777 
that a number of tories had been apprehended for conversing with
■^^Washington to Governor William Livingston., April 22, 1779, 
Writings of Washington, XIV, 427.
Washington to Brigadier General William Maxwell, April 18, 
1779, ibid., XIV, 403.
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emissaries from the enemy and for refusal to take the oath of 
allegiance to the state. He reported that a "spirit of disaffection 
shows itself with so much boldness and violence in different parts 
of this state, that it is the ardent wish of his Excellency, no delay 
might be used in making examples of some of the most atrocious 
offenders," for if left alone they would destroy the American 
cause by threatening those loyal to Congress.^
In the summer of 1776, Congress issued a secret order for
the arrest of Fletcher Matthews, a New York loyalist, for enlisting
men for the King's service. Washington was, at the time, defending
New York with forces and facilities far inferior to those of the 
37British. In April, 1776, Captain Bernard Romans, commander of 
the Independent Pennsylvania Artillery Company, complained to 
Governor Clinton of inhabitants near Ticonderoga Landing encouraging 
his men to desert. Although he had not lost a single man en route 
to that place, he had lost four men since arriving, mainly because 
rum had been sold to the soldiers prior to their being enticed 
away. Besides luring the men away, the inhabitants had caused a 
great commotion by accusing the soldiers of stealing their livestock
^Hamilton to William Livingston, April 29, 1777. Syrett (ed.), 
Papers of Hamilton, I, 242-43; similar letter sent to Gouverneur 
Morris, May 12, 1777, ibid., I, 251-53.
37Washington to Governor George Clinton, June 20, 1776,
Mount Vernon Library, Mount Vernon, Virginia.
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and using abusive language against the troops. Romans was hardly 
able to restrain the more patriotic continentals from inflicting 
serious damage on the people and their houses because of the clamour; 
the only disrespectful action taken by the men, however, was to 
shout at the inhabitants in a reproachful manner, calling them 
"tories." Since the citizens threatened to complain to the 
governor, Romans' letter was a denial of any wrongdoing during this 
incident.̂
Brigadier General William Smallwood told the Maryland Council 
of Safety that many citizens had refused to take the oath of allegiance 
to the state; some of them were harboring deserters, encouraging 
Continental troops to sign General Howe's proclamation, and misleading
O Qand corrupting the minds of ignorant people. 7 Washington instructed 
Smallwood in April, 1778, to have recruiting officers in Delaware send 
all recruits to camp as fast as they were enlisted because "the dis­
affected make a point of seducing the Recruits to desert" and then either 
hid them or sent them "off to the E n e m y . N a t h a n e l  Gist, while at
O O Captain Bernard Romans to Brigadier General George Clinton,
April 25, 1776, U. S. Revolutionary Miscellaneous Records, Library 
of Congress, File Box II.
39Major General William Smallwood to Demit of St. Thomas 
Jenifer, President of the Council of Safety, March 16, 1777, Archives 
of Maryland, XVI, 178-79.
^Washington to Brigadier General William Smallwood, April 12, 
1778, Writings of Washington, XI, 251.
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Tilton Falls, reported in April, 1779, to Lieutenant Colonel Tench 
Tilghman, aide-de-camp and military secretary to Washington, that 
desertion was still rampant in his unit: "if some method cannot
be prevailed upon to prevent this spirit, there is no knowing where 
it will End.1' Gist took particular care to stop the soldiers from 
mixing with the inhabitants, who had "been principally to blame" for 
the desertions; if a few incendiaries were discovered it would have 
the effect of stopping the desertions.^ In May, 1779, Brigadier 
General Henry Knox, chief of Continental army Artillery, broke up 
a ring of civilians near Pluckamin, New Jersey, who had been assist­
ing American soldiers to escape from the army. He wrote to 
Washington that he suspected the enemy had agents among the country 
people who enticed the soldiers away. In April eight men deserted 
in a body, and although they were pursued immediately, they managed 
to escape and remained at large for about a week; they were finally 
captured near Staten Island when a Continental sympathizer turned 
them in. During the interrogation of the deserters no information
41Colonel Nathanael Gist to Lieutenant Colonel Tench Tilghman, 
April 3, 1779, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Reel 57. 
Similar letter sent March 31, 1779, ibid. On April 4, 1779, Gist 
reported to Tilghman that a riot occurred among the soldiers and 
that desertions rose to twenty-seven. He further stated: "I
am convinced that this post cannot be maintained with Foreigners,
I would Humbly advise that Country Born be substituted in place 
of these," ibid.
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was gained about the method they used to get away; they had taken 
an oath of secrecy. However, one soldier, described by Knox as the 
"greatest scoundrel amongst them, having once deserted from the 
Enemy, enlisted into our Service, deserted back to them, and taken 
in their Uniform last Year . . . for which he was punished with 
one hundred Lashes," decided to talk: he informed the judge
advocate of the persons who had assisted them. These persons had 
established a chain of loyalist safety points from the Artillery 
Park to Staten Island, which they used to "spirit away" the deserters 
to the enemy. Knox ordered the arrest of the people involved. The 
first one brought in confessed that he had piloted the deserters 
twelve miles in secrecy and hid them near Quibble Town for two or 
three days. However, he said he was forced to do it. Knox felt 
that his excuse was unsupported, since he had returned to his home, 
which was within three miles of camp, and had given no hint of his 
actions during the past three days when he knew a detachment was 
out looking for the deserters. The man was definitely one of a 
party that "had repeatedly and constantly assisted our Soldiers in 
their Desertion." Knox wanted a "dreadful example [to] be made of 
these men such as will sufficiently deter others from the like 
practices"; but he was not sure how it could be done legally, 
by either a civil or military court. He therefore asked for
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Washington's advice on this matter before he did any­
thing.^2
Washington apparently did not often know what to do with 
such people. He wrote to Brigadier General William Maxwell a year 
later on the same subject, requesting that Maxwell inquire whether 
there were state laws then in force that provided for the punishment 
of persons arrested for seducing soldiers to desert and conveying 
them to the enemy. Washington suggested that if there were no 
laws covering this offense Maxwell could safely bring the person 
he had captured to trial as a spy. Washington stated that he was 
"fully of opinion that much of our desertion is occasioned by 
Villains of this kind influencing our Soldiery.
^Brigadier General Henry Knox to Washington, May 6, 1779, 
ibid., Reel 58.
^^Washington to Brigadier General William Maxwell, May 19, 
1780, Writings of Washington. XVIII, 389; in 1780 Washington returned 
Joshua Hett Smith to New York after military court jurisdiction 
was found inadequate to try him. Smith was imprisoned by the civil 
authorities but escaped before he was brought to trial. Washington 
to Governor George Clinton, October 29, 1780, ibid., XX, 262. 
Washington wrote to Clinton in 1778, that he arrested three in­
habitants of West Chester County for inticing soldiers to desert 
and offering to conduct them to the enemy. Washington said, "I 
have not punished them by martial law, because I did not know but 
the Civil Law might take cognizance of them . . .  if you think 
proper that they should be delivered to the civil power it shall be 
done." September 25, 1778, ibid., XII, 497.
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Deliberate defectors often influenced their comrades to run 
off with them. Washington constantly cautioned commanders to keep 
close watch on individual men who were prime suspects for switching
Il[l |their loyalty. America1s best known defector, Benedict Arnold, 
attempted to influence Continental officers to go over to the 
British side. In October, 1780, Arnold suggested to Major Benjamin 
Tallmadge that he desert to the British side. Tallmadge was an 
outstanding American soldier who served in the Second Continental 
Dragoons where he earned special recognition from Congress for his 
bravery and excellency in battle. Wrote Arnold:
As I know you to be a Man of Sense, I am convinced 
you are by this time fully of opinion that the real 
interest and Happiness of America consists in a 
reunion with Great Britain. To effect which happy 
purpose I have taken a Commission in the British 
Army, and invite you to join me with as many Men as 
You can bring over with You.^5
Tallmadge immediately sent Arnold's letter to Washington, 
thus rejecting the offer. Unfortunately, a few were not able to 
resist similar appeals, especially when they were offered the same 
rank in the British Service as they held in the American, as was
^Washington to Benjamin Harrison, May 5, 1779, ibid., XV,
9-10.
^Benedict Arnold to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, enclosed in 
Tallmadge to Washington, October 25, 1780, Washington Papers, 
Library of Congress, Reel 72.
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Tallmadge. A few officers who deserted to the enemy were recovered 
and forced to stand trial for their crimes. Captain Moses Carson, 
Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, deserted to the enemy on April 21,
1777, and was captured a year later, tried, found guilty, and 
punished. Carson not only defected, but he also persuaded a 
number of soldiers to go off with him. The court sentenced him to 
be drummed through the army regiments located near West Point with 
a halter around his neck and a label pinned to his breast setting 
forth his offense; he was then ordered confined in prison for the 
duration of the war.^ Responding to a letter from Lieutenant 
Colonel Francis Barter regarding the questionable loyalty of Captain 
William Bernard Gifford of the Third New Jersey Regiment,^
Washington offered an unusual procedure. Rather than discharge the 
officer as Barber suggested, Washington proposed that Gifford be 
arrested on some charge and brought to trial in the anticipation 
that something would turn up during the court-martial that would
AOgive sufficient grounds for his being cashiered from the service. 
Whether found guilty or innocent, Washington felt that Gifford's 
reputation would be tarnished, and he would be rendered less attractive 
to the British. Otherwise, if discharged, Gifford would be free
^General Orders, November 3, 1779, Writings of Washington,
XVII, 65-66.
/ *7
Lieutenant Colonel Francis Barber, December 11, 1780, Papers 
of Washington, Library of Congress, Roll 73.
^Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Francis Barber, December 13, 
1780, Writings of Washington, XX, 466.
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to join the enemy and even if captured would no longer be subject 
to American military law. The scheme against Gifford never 
materialized, for he did not return to the Continental army after 
his temporary release on November 22, 1780. Nevertheless, the 
approach outlined by the Commander in Chief on this occasion is 
a clear indication of the extent to which he was willing to go to 
prevent officer defections.
Along with desertion to the enemy, several other officer
problems caused considerable disturbances in the American army.
The most vexatious to the army was the practice of irresponsible
officers either leaving their regiments without proper authority
or overstaying their furloughs. It was extremely difficult to keep
officers on duty; many felt they could leave whenever they decided
it was time to depart. Numerous junior and senior officers were
court-martialed for being absent without proper authority. While
most officers remained away for only a few days, some were gone for
49months, and even years. Other perplexing problems included
Officer problems began almost as soon as the war started. 
Captain Christopher Gardiner of Colonel Vamum's regiment was 
tried August 2, 1775, for deserting his post, for which he was 
cashiered; Captain Eleazer Lindsey was tried August 16, 1775, for 
absenting himself from his post and discharged as a person improper 
to hold a commission. Henshaw, "Orderly Book," 136. Lieutenant 
Andrew McGaffey, Third New Hampshire Regiment, was tried for 
refusing to return from a furlough, Enoch Poor to Washington,
Hay 31, 1779, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 59. 
Lieutenant Philip Gibbons, Sixth Pennsylvania Regiment, was cashiered 
for "repeated disobedience of orders, and absenting himself 
eleven months" without leave, and for embezzling public money.
General Orders, October 10, 1779, Writings of Washington, XVI, 449. 
Additional courts-martial of officers found in ibid., VII, 337-38,
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disobeying orders,^ setting bad examples for the enlisted men by 
demonstrating,*^ leading in mutinies and attempting to avoid 
p u n i s h m e n t . M a n y  officers tried to escape the ordeal of a court- 
martial and punishment by resigning their commissions. Congress 
attempted to stop this practice by passing a resolution that required 
the immediate trial of officers accused of violating a number of 
specified offences before the acceptance of their resignations.**4 
The Commander in Chief repeatedly issued calls for absent officers 
to return to duty, and he ordered commanders to punish officers 
who did not heed the warnings.
The sour attitude of officers and their resignations often 
influenced the soldiers directly or indirectly to leave their posts.
365-66; X, 88, 259, 299, 432, 404-405, 434; XI, 21, 48, 49,
82-83, 245-46, 261, 367, 433; XII, 24, 29-30, 219-20, 288, 312-13;
XIII, 73; XVI, 41-42, 148-49, 317, 355; XVII, 265; XVIII, 374;
XIX, 465-66; XX, 319-20; XXI, 138; XXII, 224; XXIV, 171-72,
216-17; XXV, 254, 452.
"^Washington to Colonel Josiah Carvil Hall, April 3, 1778, 
ibid., XI, 204-205.
■^Washington to Brigadier General William Maxwell, May 7, 
1779, ibid., XV, 13-15.
■^General Orders, September 21, 1779, ibid., XVI, 317.
53Journal of the Continental Congress, V, 472.
54Ibid.
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In 1778 Washington warned the officers that if they persisted in 
talking of resigning, or if any left their post or command before 
they were regularly relieved and thereby influenced or caused any 
soldier to do likewise, they would be punished "as far as martial 
law will extend without favor or mitigation.
Poor leadership among the officers was a definite cause of 
some men's deserting. Henry Haller, from Reading, Pennsylvania, 
informed Thomas Wharton, Jr., President of the Council of Safety at 
Philadelphia, in December, 1776, that most of the men in his 
battalion of the "Flying Camp" had run away. These desertions could 
have been prevented, said Haller, "had the officers taken proper 
steps but some of the [officers] were as willing as their Privates, 
to break up the Battalion, tuck no pains to git their men, and this 
Conduct incouraged others [to desert
Washington wrote in 1778 that if the motives for desertions 
proceeded from the instigation of officers, the officers were to be 
called to account for their actions.^ Numerous officers were replaced
^Washington to Brigadier General Charles Scott, October 27, 
1778, Writings of Washington, XIII, 166; September 30, 1778, ibid.,
XII, 530.
^Henry Haller to Council of Safety, December 30, 1776, 
Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., V, 144.
"^Washington to Brigadier General Charles Scott, September 30, 
1778, Writings of Washington, XII, 530.
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for inactivity and loss of confidence in their ability by their 
58men. Washington complained to Brigadier General George Weedon
in 1777 that it was almost impossible to get officers and men out
of their comfortable quarters. He proposed demoting a few officers
in every regiment to set an example and bring about a cure for this 
59trouble. Still, many officers left their commands and took long
60furloughs; some general officers were guilty of this abuse.
In a very strongly worded letter to Brigadier General 
William Maxwell in 1779, Washington warned of the bad influence the 
officers were exerting in the First New Jersey Regiment. If their 
example "should be followed and become general," he observed, "how 
would they console themselves for having been the foremost in 
bringing ruin and disgrace upon their country?"^
In an effort to prevent desertion, both civilians and military 
personnel arrested for encouraging soldiers to defect were punished, 
often severely. At a general court-martial held in the Highlands on 
January 13, 1778, by order of Major General Israel Putnam, Matthias
“̂ Washington to Governor William Livingston, February 22, 1777, 
ibid., VII, 186. Colonel Silas Newcomb was removed from his command.
^Washington to Brigadier General George Weedon, March 27,
1777, ibid., VII, 322.
60Ibid., VII, 322-23; on February 10, 1778, Washington wrote 
to Weedon that Muhlenberg was gone, and Woodford and Scott had 
applied for furloughs, which pained him very much. Ibid., X, 448-49.
^Washington to Brigadier General William Maxwell, May 7, 1779, 
ibid., XV, 14-15; to James Duane, May 26, 1779, ibid., XV, 157; XII, 
274-75; XV, 330; XVIII, 181; XXIII, 442-43.
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Colbhart of Rye, New York, was tried "for holding a Correspondence
with the Enemy of the United States, living as a Spy among the
Continental Troops and inlisting and persuading them to desert to
the British Army," and was sentenced to be hanged by the neck until
dead. Washington approved the sentence and ordered his execution
62to be carried out on Gallows Hill at nine o' clock the next day.
The Virginia Gazette reported that on April 23, 1777, two deserters
were shot at Peekskill, and a civilian who was arrested with
recruiting orders in his pocket was scheduled to be executed.
Three other men were captured who possessed British recruiting
63orders and bounty money in gold and silver. Following a resolution
of Congress on February 27, 1778, Isaac Depue and John King of New
York, tried for assisting several soldiers and officers to desert to
the British, were sentenced to death by hanging at a court-martial
held April 6, 1779. Tried for being a spy for General Burgoyne,
Joseph Bettys was also condemned to "suffer death" by the same 
64court-martial. An American soldier, one Straffain, was sentenced 
to death on June 6, 1779, for "attempting to desert to the Enemy & 
endeavouring to persuade others to do the Same at a Critical &
^General Orders, September 14, 1778, Writings of Washington,
XII, 449-50.
^ Virginia Gazette, (Alexander Purdie), May 9, 1777.
^General Orders, July 4, 1779, Writings of Washington, XV, 363-64; 
Stephen Smith was tried on January 6, 1778, for "Being a Spy, by coming 
frequently within the American Lines," and was given the death 
sentence. It is not known if these executions occurred since
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alarming time, when the Garrison were at quarter allowance a day." 
The particular time this offense occurred no doubt influenced the 
court decision.^
William Seymour recorded in his journal that on January 1, 
1781, a "tory" was found guilty of deserting to the enemy and of 
piloting Indian forces against the army, for which "he was hanged 
on a tree the same day till he was dead."^ Three days later, 
Seymour reported that one of Colonel Washington's horse soldiers 
was found guilty of going over to the enemy and shot the same day. 
In March, Solomon Slocum, of the Second Maryland Battalion, 
convicted of deserting to the Crown and returning to the camp as a 
spy, paid for his crime by being "hanged on a tree by the roadside 
in full view of all who passed by."*’7 Five men were executed on 
May 1, 1781; they had deserted from the American army and were 
captured in the battle of Camden in the uniform of the enemy. 
Seymour wrote in April, 1782, that a man named William Peters, a
Washington granted a general pardon to all prisoners in the Army 
under sentence of death on July A, 1779, to commemorate "the 
Anniversary of our Glorious Independence," ibid., XV, 364.
^Proceedings of a General Court Martial, June 6-7, 1779, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 59.
^William Seymour, "Journal of the Southern Expedition," 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, VII, No. 3 (1883). 
293.
67Ibid., 379.
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steward for General Nathanael Greene and his wife, was sentenced 
to death for corresponding with the enemy and for recruiting a 
number of men for service in the British army. General Greene 
wrote to Brigadier General Otho Holland Williams in June that he had 
hanged one of his sergeants for mutiny and sent the other defectors 
away; this action stopped most of his immediate troubles and brought 
a much needed change as Greene noted: "you cannot conceive a change
it has made in the temper of the army."*’®
Several other factors that induced numerous soldiers to 
desert were boredom, inactivity, immaturity, lawlessness, and 
general immorality. To this list might also be added the proclamations 
of pardon issued several times during the war. Many soldiers who 
for various reasons might have considered deserting were encouraged 
to leave when they felt assured that they would be pardoned upon 
their return. Washington indicated a great reluctance to offer 
pardons to deserters. He wrote the Board of War in April, 1780, 
that he was of the "opinion that it would at present rather tend 
to encourage future desertions than bring in any number of those 
who have already gone off." Although he had already tried
®®Ibid., 389; Greene to 0. H. Williams, June 6, 1782, W. B.
Reed, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed (2 vols., Philadelphia: 
Lindsay, 1847), II, 470; Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, III, 450.
^Washington to the Board of War, April 9, 1780, Writings of 
Washington. XVIII, 236.
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proclamations of clemency and probably would use this procedure
again, he had "never found that the offer of pardons to deserters
upon voluntary surrender has been attended with any substantial
advantages."7® Expressing the same sentiment to Major General
Benjamin Lincoln, Washington wrote in February, 1781: "I have
tried the efficacy of proclamations of pardon to deserters so often,
and have found so little good result from them, that I am inclined
to think desertion is rather encouraged than remedied by a frequent
71repetition of them." He said that the soldiers go off or remain 
home after a furlough and look for a proclamation of pardon as a 
thing of course.
Boredom and inactivity disgusted troops who considered that 
their time was being wasted, and many simply departed when they 
felt their continuance on active duty added little to the war effort. 
These men were not necessarily opposed to fighting for independence 
from England, nor did they retreat from commitments to uphold 
political principles. They were more opposed to the rigid discipline 
that army life demanded. Walter Millis' Arms and Men sheds much 
light on this problem. The framework in which eighteenth-century 
European armies functioned directly affected the attitudes toward
70Ibid.
^Washington to Major General Benjamin Lincoln, February 27, 
1781, ibid., XXI, 308.
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the army held by many Americans. In Europe, armies were made up 
of highly skilled professionals, expensive personnel. These units 
were not considered expendable; rather, each soldier was carefully 
guarded against harm. Rarely did a commander wish to expose his 
men to battle, especially if there was the possibility of heavy 
casualties with little to be gained. The typical procedure was 
to maneuver to gain the best position insuring victory if battle 
occurred. The disadvantaged commander would normally concede and 
withdraw from the field; thus victory was often accomplished with 
few lives lost. This procedure resulted in armies experiencing 
long periods of inactivity when little was done outside of normal 
camp life. This was almost the rule during the winter months of the
7 0American Revolutionary War for both the British and American armies. 
During these periods, soldiers became bored, and many Americans, 
considering their time to be more valuable at home, left their units. 
When the fighting started again, they often returned. Having nothing 
to do between battles doubtless caused desertions. The militia 
troops were especially prone to take this attitude. At times the 
militia fought well, even when quickly assembled and poorly 
officered, but when the battle was over, they melted away, returning
72Walter Millis, Arms and Men; A Study of American Military 
History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956).
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to their homes. They were ready to be called to fight another day,
but were unwilling to stay assembled for the battle which might
73not come until next month. It is doubtless true that most of
these men were never tried for desertion, yet their actions caused
untold anguish for commanders.
Lawlessness and insubordination constituted a major problem
that lasted until the end of the war. From the beginning, the bulk
of the army maintained a fiercely independent spirit which hindered
74efforts to transform the men into a real fighting force.
Officers were often compelled to indulge their troops to a dangerous 
degree lest reenlistment be discouraged. Washington was normally 
a strict disciplinarian, but he had adapted himself as best he 
could to the situation. . Severity would not always solve the 
problems; neither executions nor pardons had been effective. American 
soldiers, though patient under hardships, were too deeply immersed 
in revolutionary ideas of liberty and equality to tolerate 
extremely strict discipline. Brigadier General Richard Montgomery 
was appalled at finding himself almost powerless to control men who,
73Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 12.
^Washington to Richard Henry Lee, July 10, 1775, Writings of 
Washington, III, 331; to Lord Stirling, March 5, 1780, ibid., XVIII, 
71-74.
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he complained, "carry the spirit of freedom into the field, and think 
for themselves.Inspector General Baron Von Steuben was able to 
improve the drilling and maneuvering of the troops, but could do 
little to change the prevailing mental attitude of the American 
soldiers.78 The spirit of insubordination expressed itself force­
fully in terms of numerous desertions from the American ranks through­
out the war.
On several occasions when the army was engaged in combat, 
fear and panic seized American troops tempting them to depart 
from the scene. Hamilton informed Robert R. Livingston in August,
1777, that it was not Burgoyne that had produced all the anxiety 
in the army, but rather the "want of zeal in the Eastern States."77 
There were those in command who were ready to flee from the most 
defensible positions "at the Terror of a small Scouting Parties [Sic]
7 0of Indians." Hamilton concluded that if this continued, it would 
lead to misfortune and a victory for the British without a blow. 
Hamilton reported that the lack of firmness and panicky leaders led 
to a retreat and near chaos among the troops, resulting in three
75Jared Sparks (ed.), Writings of George Washington . . .
(12 vols., Boston: American Stationers Company, 1834-1838), I, 469.
^General Orders, March 22, 1778, Writings of Washington, XI,
132. Ibid.. XI, 211, 328, 363; XXIV, 332.
^Hamilton to Robert R. Livingston, August 7, 1777, Syrett (ed.), 
Papers of Hamilton, I, 306.
78Ibid.
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79hundred men running away from about fifty Indians. A week later,
Hamilton informed Livingston that the misfortunes of the army
"are greatly owing to a panic dread of the Indians."®® He felt
the coming of Colonel Daniel Morgan’s Corps would have a good
effect on the troops, and requested that this news be propagated
widely. In November, Hamilton wrote Washington that a mutiny had
occurred in a Massachusetts brigade in which a captain had killed
a soldier and was shot himself by another soldier. Poor management
81had caused these difficulties.
During the eight years of war, a number of mutinies occurred 
in various units of the Continental army. Mutiny is certainly not 
to be equated with desertion. Normally, in a mutiny men act 
collectively to register their displeasure with some army policy 
or situation. While deserters might go off in groups, usually the 
decision is more individualistic requiring less cooperation with 
others. Both mutiny and desertion represent discontent with the 
army and are therefore related.
Often soldiers felt strongly about the sufferings they were 
undergoing and, rather than desert or mutiny, they wrote petitions to
79Ibid., I, 307.
80Ibid., I, 315-16, August 18, 1777.
^Hanilton to Washington, November 10, 1777, ibid., I, 358.
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Congress explaining their grievances. Congress received hundreds
82of these petitions during the war. Petitioners were often 
considered prime subjects for more radical actions. During a wartime 
situation, the slightest disobedience of an order could be considered 
mutiny. No doubt some of the actions taken by soldiers in opposition
to objectionable orders might better be classified as political
83actions rather than mutiny or desertion.
Flagrant abuses of orders could not be condoned by commanders; 
therefore, whenever men indicated their opposition to orders, they 
were punished for it, if at all possible. Five men of Colonel 
Henry Jackson's Detachment were tried at Providence on September 19, 
1778, for attempting to excite a mutiny and were sentenced to be 
whipped; a week later at the request of their officers they were 
all pardoned except for one, Thomas Wilson, who was punished with 
one hundred lashes.®^ In January, 1779, General James Varnum 
reported to Washington that "a spirit of Mutiny has made its
®^Samuel Chase to the Maryland Council of Safety, January 29, 
1777, Burnett (ed.), Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress, 
II, 226; Calendar of Maryland State Papers, Red Book (Baltimore:
Hall of Records Commission, 1936-1967), IV, 85; Archives of Maryland, 
XVI, 102.
®^For a discussion of this see Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in 
the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary
America," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XXV (July, 1968), 
371-407.
^Orderly Book No. 26 (September-October, 1778), 26-30,
National Archives. The five men were Abiel Trafton, Thomas Wilton, 
Oliver McLean, Alexander Askin, and Josiah Hunt.
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85appearance among the troops" under General John Sullivan's command.
Washington felt that the common soldiers were not at fault, but
had been mislead by a few agitators whom he ordered to be swiftly
and severely punished. The cause of mutiny was reported to be the
depreciation of the currency and the shortage of supplies. Washington
wrote to Henry Champion in May, 1780, that the Connecticut line
mutinied because they had received no meat for several days and their
86rations had been cut to one-eighth allowance. The Commander in
Chief reported to Congress that "the extremity for want of meat"
had caused the two regiments of Connecticut to mutiny, but it was
87quelled by the timely actions of a few officers. The troops 
under Colonel Goose Van Schaick mutinied in June, 1780, for lack of
O Opay and provisions. The most critical period for mutinies came
in January, 1781, when the Pennsylvania and New Jersey lines mutinied,
89and several lives were lost before the disturbance was quieted.
OCWashington to General John Sullivan, February 14, 1779, 
Writings of Washington, XIV, 111: to General James Mitchel Vamum,
February 14, 1779, ibid., XIV, 112.
86Washington to Henry Champion, May 26, 1780, ibid., XVIII, 424.
87Washington to President of Congress, May 27, 1780, ibid.,
XVIII, 428.
88Washington to Goose Van Schaick, June 20, 1780, ibid., XIX, 45.
89Washington to Anthony Wayne, January 3 (4), 1781, ibid.,
XXI, 55-58; to Nathaniel Greene, January 9, 1781, ibid., XXI, 88-89; 
to John Sullivan, January 21, 1781, ibid., XXI, 128; to Isreal 
Shreve, January 21, 1781, ibid., XXI, 123-24; ibid., XXI, 128, 134-35, 
148-49; for a full discussion see Van Dorn, Mutiny in January.
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Two of the principal agitators were executed on the spot, which
anseemed to bring the mutiny to an end. In general orders,
Washington warned that leniency would not be shown in the future if
this continued.^ In 1782 the Connecticut line again attempted a
mutiny that was discovered and suppressed by Colonel Heman Swift
before it could get started; two of the ringleaders were ordered 
92court-martialed. The last mutiny during the war years occurred in
June, 1783, when the Pennsylvania line again rebelled, marching on
93Congress and forcing that body to move to Princeton. There was no 
positive way to suppress all mutinies; they occurred frequently during 
the war, principally because of lack of food, pay, or other 
supplies. In most cases, the mutineers were returned to active 
duty with only a few of the main actors being court-martialed and 
punished for their actions.
Some desertions occurred as an afterthought following the 
commitment of criminal acts. Poorly disciplined soldiers and those
^Washington to Chevalier De Chastellux, January 28, 1781, 
Writings of Washington, XXI, 149-50; ibid., XXI, 151, 156-57,
159-60, 161.
^General Orders, January 30, 1781, ibid., XXI, 159-60.
^Washington to Colonel Heman Swift, May 6, 1782, ibid.,
XXIV, 227-28. Sergeants Bunce and Parker were the ringleaders.
^\ashington to President of Congress, June 24, 1783, ibid., 
XXVII, 32-34.
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predisposed to desert were often involved in numerous crimes.
General orders issued at Fredericksburg, Virginia, to inspire the
troops to obey the civil laws, appealed to the "purity of morals"
as being the only sure foundation for public happiness. Washington
said, "It is painful to see many shameful Instances of Riot and
Licentiousness among us . . . the frequent Robberies which have
lately prevailed in the Vicinity of Camp are truly alarming and
demand the most vigilant Exertions to detect the Perpetrators and
94bring them to the severest punishment." In January, 1780, the 
General expressed astonishment at the crimes committed near camps 
and the "plundering spirit of the soldiery." He said that scarcely 
a night passed without "gangs of soldiers going out of camp and 
committing every species of robbery and depredations" against the
QCinhabitants. An advertisement in the Pennsylvania Gazette offered 
a reward of two hundred dollars for the capture of Henry Rush, a 
deserter from Captain Van Hair's troop of light horse, for having 
stolen numerous articles from a house in Somerset c o u n t y . R o b e r t
94General Orders, October 21, 1778, ibid.. XIII, 119; John 
Yeoman of Colonel Dubois'regiment was tried and convicted on October 20,
1778,for robbery and desertion for which he was sentenced to be shot 
to death. Yeoman was pardoned by Washington a week later. General 
Orders, October 28, 1778, ibid., XIII, 171-72.
9^Captain Parker, "Orderly Book, 1779-1780," Massachusetts 
Historical Society, Proceedings, XVII (February, 1879), 48.
^Pennsylvania Gazette, March 10, 1779. Another ad reported 
that John Harris, a deserter from the First New Jersey Regiment, had 
stolen a number of articles at Roxbury, New Jersey, ibid., May 26,
1779.
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Kennedy, a soldier in the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, was court-
martialed in June, 1779, for desertion and theft. The court,
considering him to be an old offender, sentenced him to receive three
hundred lashes for desertion and one hundred for theft "well laid
97on his bare back." Washington felt that inattention to duty and 
relaxation of discipline were partly to blame for allowing a situation
Q Qto exist that was "pregnant of desertion, Robbery, and even murders."
James Livingston reported to Benedict Arnold in August, 1780,
that seven soldiers had deserted to the enemy near Ver Plunk Point.
Plundering the inhabitants below the rivers, they had been induced
99to desert because of fear of being punished for their crimes.
Fear of punishment for crimes committed was itself an inducement 
to desert.
Washington wrote to Heath in 1781 in regard to several 
deserters from a detachment under the Marquis de Lafayette, suggesting
97Proceedings of a General Court Martial of the Line held 
at Pittsburg, June 6, 1779, by order of Daniel Brodhead, Commanding 
the Western Department, Washington Papers, Library of Congress,
Roll 59.
go
Washington to Lord Stirling, March 5, 1780, Writings of 
Washington. XVIII, 73.
99James Livingst-on to Benedict Arnold, August 28, 1780, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Reel 70. There seems to have 
been some question about the desertion of these seven men; Richard 
Varick said "it appears probably they were taken." Varick to 
Colonel James Livingston, August 28, 1780, ibid.
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that severe examples be made of them if additional troops ran away.
He added that if the desertions ceased, then the punishments should 
be lighter, "lest the fear of Punishment . . . induce them to a final 
d e s e r t i o n . ( S i m i l a r l y ,  a British deserter, named Herbert, who 
deserted from several loyal units, gave the cause of his desertion 
as having been punished so often he feared further stripes.
Washington continually spurred his commanders to take every
precaution to keep their men strictly under observation in order
to curtail crime and desertion. He ordered that all soldiers found
straggling out of camp after the beating of retreat were to be
apprehended and given one hundred lashes on the spot. If they were
found engaging in robberies or other violence they were to receive
from one to five hundred lashes at the discretion of the officer of
the guard. The General ordered commanders to have the rolls called
every hour during the day, and the quarters visited by officers
every hour in the night; besides this, patrols were to be sent out
at frequent intervals to apprehend deserters and to prevent
102surprise attacks from the enemy.
^^Washington to Heath, April 20, 1781, ibid., XXI, 483.
101John Charles Philip von Krafft, "Journals of John Charles 
Philip von Krafft, 1776-1784," New York Historical Society, 
Collections, XV (1882), 108.
■^Parker, "Orderly Book," 48-49; Washington to Colonel 
John Greaton, June 14, 1782, Writings of Washington, XXIV,339-40.
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John DeArmour, a soldier in Colonel Israel Angell's Second 
Rhode Island Regiment, was tried for attempting to pass the sentries 
at night with his arms and equipment, and for endeavouring to 
persuade the guards who stopped him to leave their post and go off 
with him. He was found guilty by a division court-martial and 
sentenced to suffer death, a sentence the Commander in Chief 
approved. While these precautions prevented some from escaping, 
others managed to effect their departure undetected.
When men were determined to leave, there was little Washington 
or anyone could do to stop them. Regardless of the reasons for their 
leaving, whether from physical, military, domestic, or political 
factors, their absence was harmful to the overall efficiency of 
the Continental army.
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CHAPTER V I I I
THE EXTENT OF DESERTION
The exact degree of desertion from the American army during 
the Revolutionary War is difficult to ascertain. Certainly it 
assumed large proportions in view of the enormous number of 
official army reports and private letters complaining of soldiers 
leaving the service. A high percentage of the army's time and energy 
was spent dealing with this problem. Actual statistics on desertion 
are meager. Most documents that refer to desertion merely list 
specific cases, or give warnings of the evil that would result if 
it was not prevented; rarely do these materials give numbers in 
relation to the actual strength of a command. Official muster 
returns were usually grossly inaccurate, and many often ommitted 
entries concerning desertion. Even when deserters were designated, 
normally only those who made good their escape were included; those 
captured immediately after their departure or prevented from leaving 
were usually reported as confined rather than as deserters. Thus, 
it will have to be conceded that no accurate number of deserters 
can be compiled from existing records. This does not mean that an 
estimate cannot be made. Even though the records are not always 
complete, they will of necessity have to be used, since they contain 
the only information available. From three sources data was
217
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gathered to produce a probable percentage of desertion from the 
American army: the official muster returns of the army; the state
muster rolls; and muster reports of a few units of company and 
battalion size picked at random. The approximate percentages 
gleaned from these three groups will no doubt vary, but when 
combined the resulting data may very well show a percentage of 
desertion reasonably close to the actual number of men who fled 
the army during the war.
Continental Army Muster Returns
The accuracy of the muster returns of Washington's army 
was suspect from the time they were received at the Commander in 
Chief's headquarters. It was essential that Washington have accurate 
reports of troop strength for him to devise plausible plans for the 
army. Very early in the war, the returns proved not to reflect the 
true strength of the army. Washington often complained to his 
subordinates about the faulty nature of the returns; through his 
adjutants general he issued instructions for the "returns" and 
"musters" to be more faithfully and correctly posted,
The Commander in Chief was both amazed and alarmed over the 
erroneous reports coming to his headquarters.^- Commenting on a
^Washington warned that "erroneous returns not only marks the 
negligence of an Officer," but also could involve him in "disgrace 
and punishment." General Instructions for the Colonels and Commanding 
Officers of Regiments in the Continental Service, December, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, X, 239.
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return from Major General Horatio Gates received in February, 1777,
Washington expressed considerable skepticism as to its correctness,
calling the report "very extraordinary." He singled out Colonel
Joseph Penrose's "return" as being specifically faulty, since
Penrose had related his unit's strength to Washington personally
two months earlier; it differed substantially from the report sent 
2
in by Gates. According to Washington, Gates' returns for
desertions appeared "to be utterly impossible." The General
suggested that Gates call his colonels together and find out what
was going on, and if some deliberate scheme of falsification was
detected that could be tied to any person, "to bring him to the most
3exemplary punishment." He suggested also that Gates could discourage 
the practice of reporting men present when they were not actually 
at hand by reviewing the companies periodically and by making routine 
Inspection tours.
Washington wrote on the same subject to Brigadier General 
John Armstrong that there seemed to be "scandalous abuses in the 
recruiting Service in Pennsylvania.The  number of desertions
2Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, March 1, 1777, ibid., 
VII, 218-19. Colonel Joseph Penrose, connandar of the Tenth Pennsyl­
vania Regiment since October 25, 1776, resigned from the command 
February 7, 1777. Heltman, Historical Register of Officers of the 
Continental Army. 435.
Washington to Gates, March 1, 1777, Writings of Washington.
VII, 219.
^Washington to Brigadier General John Armstrong, March 5,
1777, Ibid., VII, 230.
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being reported were much beyond what Washington had conceived 
possible; the General said that he was "inclined to think the 
officers pocket the bounty and return men deserted"; that is, 
men were reported as being enlisted, their names were added to the 
rolls, and then they were listed as having deserted. It is 
difficult to ascertain just how widespread this practice was, but 
the results, regardless of extent, added unwarranted desertions 
to the American army's muster returns. For the Commander in Chief, 
the trouble was compounded, for regiments he had counted on being 
complete were often only partly filled. It certainly seemed to 
Washington that several regimental officers were not telling the 
whole story in regard to the strength of their units.^
As a remedy to this abuse Washington suggested that the area 
commanders "force" the recruiting officers "to make actual returns." 
The General wrote to Brigadier General Alexander McDougall that 
the recruiters were drawing arms, clothing, and money on the pretence
of enrolling great numbers of men, but when the returns were made,
£
"they fall Shamefully short of my expectations." Washington related 
an instance where a colonel from Connecticut had drawn 400 arms
^Washington said that some units expected to have four hundred 
men numbered only from fifty to one hundred men, ibid., VII, 251.
^Washington to Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, March 
20, 1777, ibid., VII, 305-306.
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from Peekskill on the claim of having that many men, but when General
Parsons1 return was sent forward, this colonel's regiment consisted
7of only eighty men! These discrepancies were promptly reported 
to the president of Congress by Washington, who stated in 1777 
that he and the Continental regimental commanders had been deceived 
by the returns, and that either the army had the most desertions 
in history or there was a most scandalous fraud taking place among
O
the officers employed in recruiting.
Congress went to work immediately attempting to help improve 
the accuracy of the reports, to curb the falsification of records, 
and to prevent fraud. On April 4, 1777, it passed a resolution 
establishing one commanding general of muster for the Army of the 
United States, and a deputy muster master general for each of the 
Eastern, Northern, Middle, and Southern departments. The appoint­
ments of these deputy muster masters were to be made by Congress. 
According to the resolution, the troops were to be mustered once 
each month by the deputy muster masters. All deficiencies were to 
be reported promptly to the commanding officers of the department
9where the neglect was detected. Congress was also to receive copies 
7Ibid., VII, 306.
O
Washington to President of Congress, March 26, 1777, ibid., 
VII, 318. Washington said this abuse was not found in a single 
regiment, but in many. General Parsons' department reported four 
regiments with less than eighty men each.
QJohn Hancock, President of Congress to Washington, March 
29, 1777, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 40.
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of the musters of the entire army. In 1779 Washington issued 
detailed instructions specifying the procedure to be followed in 
preparing and forwarding returns to his headquarters.^-®
The Articles of War contained a provision that made 
falsification of certificates relating to absence of either officers
The Commander in Chief directed officers commanding regiments, 
corps, and brigades to follow regulations enumerated in fifteen 
points to insure that army returns were similar in every respect 
and regularly submitted. Item 13 specified:
"The regimental returns to be made out weekly signed by the 
commanding officers of regiments and delivered to the commanding 
officers of brigades who are to have them digested into brigade 
returns which after they have carefully examined and signed they 
will transmit to the Adjutant General every Saturday at orderly 
time. The monthly returns to be delivered in the last Saturday of 
each month successively . . . whatever except such as are immediately 
concerned in making and signing them not to be forewarded by any 
others, except under a sealed cover."
Item 14:
"The officers commanding regiments are to keep books in which 
they are to have every return they make regularly recorded, also the 
regimental casualties (viz) the dates of the Deaths, Discharges, 
Desertions, Furloughs, etc. that happen in a regiment. The command­
ing officers of brigades are also to have their brigade returns 
recorded in books kept for that purpose . . . ."
Item 15:
"Morning reports of companies are to be made every day signed 
by the oldest officer of each present to the commanding officer of 
the regiment, immediately after roll-call in the morning which every 
Monday and Thursday are to be digested into field returns and 
delivered to the officer commanding the brigade."
General Orders, March 11, 1779, Writings of Washington, XIV,
224-27.
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or privates a crime punishable by cashiering upon conviction."^ While
a few officers might have chanced sending in returns they knew to 
12be incorrect, it is more likely that most of the errors were made 
by commanders who ignorantly responded to requests for information 
according to their own interpretation of what the reports were 
supposed to indicate. There could have been a reasonable doubt 
just how to report some men. One problem connected with muster 
returns came up over just where to list men who had attempted to 
desert but were prevented from actually leaving the camp. Did the 
Articles of War operate equally against those who intended to desert 
and those who actually attempted to desert? Washington partly 
answered this question in 1779 in a letter to Brigadier General 
Smallwood. He said cases of mere intention, unexpressed in any 
act, did not come under the meaning of the Articles of War; but 
where intention and any act expressive of it corresponded, the 
person could be held in violation of the desertion articles. Any 
deliberate attempt to depart illegally from the service was to be 
considered desertion, according to Washington's reasoning; he felt
^Articles of War, Section IV, Article 4, Journals of the 
Continental Congress, V, 791.
^The Adjutant Robert Ralston of the First Pennsylvania Brigade 
was cashiered for "Making a false return," General Order, December 18, 
1777, Writings of Washington, X, 169; Captain Thomas Lucas of Colonel 
Malchom's regiment was discharged from the service for the same offense, 
May 11, 1778, ibid., XI, 375-76; Lieutenant Robert Nicholson of the 
First North Carolina Regiment was only reprimanded for "making out and 
repeatedly signing false returns," General Order, May 14, 1779, ibid., 
XV, 70.
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that if this was not the case it would be very difficult to prove
desertion unless the deserter actually got away, which would mean in
most cases the quitters might never be apprehended and tried for 
13the crime.
While the number of musters taken increased considerably,
with weekly returns being prepared for most of the time .until the
end of the war, the reliability of the reports left much to be
desired. In April, 1777, Washington wrote to Major General
Benjamin Lincoln in regard to two of his independent companies
that reported returns less than the previous one with the deficiencies
not accounted for. Washington ordered that the captains be called
14upon to explain what had become of their men.
The information included in the weekly and monthly returns 
required a great deal of careful attention by those responsible for 
their preparation. The report submitted by the American commanders 
was very similar to the one used by the British. Along with the 
unit designation and date, columns were drawn to show troops fit for 
duty, sick-present, sick-absent, on command, furloughed, and the total 
number. This was followed by several columns showing the number
^^Washington to Brigadier General William Smallwood,
February 21, 1778, ibid.. X, 488.
^Washington to Major General Benjamin Lincoln, April 20,
1777, Mount Vernon Library, Mount Vernon, Virginia.
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enlisted, killed, deserted, discharged, transferred, and missing.
In 1777 an additional column was added to show the number of mpn 
present but unfit for duty because they had no shoes or clothing.
Some reports also gave the number of men confined in jails. The 
troops listed as sick-present, sick-absent, on command, and fur­
loughed caused the most trouble in attempting to decide just how 
many men had deserted from the army.
The "sick-present" usually were those men sick who could not 
perform duty and were either in their barracks or in the hospital at 
that camp. The "sick-absent" referred to those men who had gone home 
or were in hospitals located at another place. Some units erroneously 
reported deserters as sick-absent. Since this figure was always 
large, and the desertion figure usually small, there is reason to 
believe that the commanders preferred to make the entry in the sick- 
absent column rather than in the deserted column.^ As indicated earlier, 
many troops went home to recover from illness. Some of these men 
never returned to the army and rightfully should have been listed 
as deserters.
Those "on command" were usually sent on special missions as 
individuals or in small parties to perform duty apart from that being
^ I n  1778 Washington instructed officers superintending 
hospitals to make accurate lists of the sick and transmit them 
immediately to the adjutants office for he felt that many listed as 
sick-absent were either dead or deserted. February 28, 1778,
Writings of Washington, X, 526.
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exercised by the main part of their company. For example, soldiers 
might be sent out as messengers, wagon drivers, recruiters, guards 
used in transferring prisoners of war from one location to another, 
regular prison guards, pickets or defenders of small outposts, 
and personal servants for officers. Any person sent away from his 
company on orders, and expected to return eventually was listed as 
"on command." Soldiers so designated often had an excellent 
opportunity to desert, and many did. A certain percentage of the men 
listed as "on command" should more accurately have been listed in 
the desertion column."^
Furloughed men referred to those soldiers authorized by 
written orders to be away for a specified length of time. Frequently, 
furloughed soldiers never returned but were carried under this 
column for months, and in some cases for years, and should have 
been listed as deserters.
Once the army reached Valley Forge, Washington's adjutant 
general added the column listing those not available for duty for 
want of shoes or clothes. This column first appeared in the return 
of December 22, 1777, and was retained for some time. On that date, 
829 men were reported as unfit for this reason. By January 24,
1778, the total had jumped to 3,710.
■^Washington to Board of War, January 9, 1779, ibid., XIII,
498; General Orders, January 22, 1780, ibid., XVII, 424; to Brigadier 
General John Stark, February, 1780, ibid., XVIII, 63.
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The adjutants general worked hard trying to obtain accurate
returns. Host unit commanders attempted to send their musters
promptly, but usually the final army returns prepared by Washington's
staff lacked some units' reports. Often the adjutants general simply
used the latest figures they had and made notes at the bottom of
the return stating the date of the information and the units ex- 
17eluded. Other times the adjutants made entries indicating that the
reports were in error because some brigades had not reported the
correct figures. Adjutant General Alexander Scrammel noted specifically
that certain men from a Virginia regiment had been reenlisted and given
a furlough but had not been reported in the return for that
brigade. Other men in the same Virginia unit had been discharged
and were not shown on the returns. A few units were omitted from
almost every muster. In February, 1778, the Maryland brigade and
Colonel Thomas Hartley's Eleventh Pennsylvania Regiment did not send
in returns. The return of the Ninth Virginia Regiment was not
included in the return of February 21, 1778, because it was reported
that there was no officer belonging to it "who is able to make a 
18Return thereof." The artillery was usually reported separately 
on most returns as were the militia forces.
17Retums of January 12, 19, 1778, Revolutionary War Rolls, 
1775-1783, National Archives, Roll 137.
18February 21, 1778, ibid.
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As late as 1780, Washington was still trying to impress his 
commanders with the importance of accurate returns. To Lord 
Stirling he penned the following instructions:
. . . all returns are [to be] made in due form, in 
proper time,and correctly; comparing one return with 
another in order to prevent mistakes, correct abuses, 
and do justice to the public; and that in visiting such 
parts of the line, and such particular Corps as are 
entrusted to their care praize is bestowed on the de­
serving, reprehension, and . . . punishment on the 
negligent, the good effect would be almost instant­
aneously felt; frequent visits and inspections into 
matters of this kind would produce more real good in 
one month than volumes of the best digested Orders that 
the wit of man can devise wd. accomplish in Seven 
years.19
Most commanders attempted to comply with these instructions and to 
correct their returns; however, errors persisted. Brigadier General 
Edward Hand, serving as adjutant general, wrote to Colonel Philip 
Van Cortlandt in 1782, requesting additional information in regard 
to his return. Hand pointed out that the return had not been dated, 
that the drummers and fifers vacancies and the numbers needed to 
complete those positions did not agree, and that the number of 
sergeants requested, and received, or reduced did not account for 
sixteen sergeants I Several additional entries in this return were 
questioned. Hand demanded that corrections be made and that
^Washington to Lord Stirling, March 5, 1780, Writings of 
Washington. XVIII, 72-73.
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explanations be given in regard to several men stationed at odd
places and doing a variety of things like serving as butchers for
20the local contractors.
Hand requested similar information from several other regimental 
commanders who had sent in returns that were grossly incorrect. The 
Tenth Massachusetts Regiment returned three men on "extra guard," 
which caused Hand to ask what they meant by that remark. Two men 
had been returned on extra service with Major Rochefontain when he 
was entitled to only one. The same regiment returned a man on 
extra service with the artificers in garrison, which Hand felt should 
have been included under another more appropriate column. The 
chaplains were also listed incorrectly, causing Hand to remark 
that he could not tell if they were present, sick, at liberty, or
21in jail. He ordered that these irregularities be promptly rectified.
Regardless of the actions taken by Washington and his adjutants 
general, the reports were never as accurate as they should have been.
Army Returns
Even with all the irregularities, the returns provide valuable 
information. In 1775 Washington requested that weekly, or at least
20Brigadier General Edward Hand to Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt, 
July, 1782, Hand, Copies of Letters, Miscellaneous Record Book, No.
162, National Archives, 64-65.
21Ibid., 54-56.
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monthly, returns be prepared. These musters were difficult to 
obtain, as has already been indicated, and when accumulated 
rarely did they reflect the true status of the army. A return of 
every regiment is not absolutely necessary for this study since 
only a comparative percentage is sought. Data from the returns 
available indicate what percentage of the men were listed as 
deserters, regardless of the completeness of the units reporting.
Of course, if some unit that experienced unusually large numbers 
of desertions failed to report, the percentage of desertion for 
that month would be affected to some extent. Even so, the exclusion 
of a few units will not be regarded as detrimental to the problem of 
determining approximate percentages from the army returns.
From the Revolutionary War Records in the National Archives, 
data was gathered from returns for the following years: 1775,
fourteen returns; 1776, twenty-one returns; 1777, six returns; 1778, 
forty-one returns; 1779, forty-three returns; 1780, fifty returns; 
1781, thirty-seven returns; 1782, forty-one returns; and 1783, 
thirty-two returns. Some returns were not fully usable because of 
omissions of vital statistics. As might be expected, most of these 
"official" reports register relatively few men in the column marked 
desertion. Actually, if these returns alone were used, the 
impression would be gained that desertion seldom occurred in the 
American army, or at least it was so infrequent that little mention 
need be made of it. Since the opposite of this is most likely
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the case, some account must be made for the gross discrepancies 
in the records. As indicated earlier, the most likely place to hide 
the deserters was with the soldiers listed as sick-absent, furloughed, 
or on command, since reports on these troops could not easily be 
checked out. This reasoning seemed logical to the typical commander. 
As far as usefulness was concerned, it mattered little in which 
column the soldier was listed on the muster, since he was lost to 
the unit whether sick, on command, or deserted. Moreover, the 
morale of other troops would have been damaged by seeing large 
numbers of men listed as having successfully deserted. It is 
therefore, quite understandable that a relatively small number of 
men were officially listed as deserters.
Another factor to be considered was just which soldiers were 
to be placed in the desertion column. If all the men who left with­
out authorization for any length of time had been listed as deserters, 
the number would have been very large. This was not the case; 
usually only those men who were known to have deserted to the enemy 
were listed. This meant definite proof was available concerning 
their illegal departure. Another way runaways were counted was 
by recording the actual number who had been court-martialed for 
that offense and found guilty. Again, since most deserters avoided 
capture, they were never tried as deserters. The numbers listed in 
the official returns correspond rather closely to the actual number 
of men who were court-martialed for desertion. While such information
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might at first be considered very accurate, it is also misleading.
The army apparently did not wish to make known how many men were 
leaving the service, but could not help recording those definitely 
accused or convicted of desertion. Another more serious obstacle 
arose over whether to count each occurrence of desertion, or to 
count only once individuals who deserted, regardless of the number 
of times they fled.
The data employed in preparing the following figures was 
based on general returns of the army directly commanded by 
Washington, which included soldiers of the rank and file only, 
with commissioned officers, staff officers, and chaplains being 
excluded. A percentage of desertions was obtained by averaging 
the total strength of the army from a specified number of musters 
and comparing this figure with the total number listed in the desertion 
columns.
There were fourteen general returns from July 19 to December 
30, 1775. The returns for July 19, 22 and 29 did not include a 
section for entries regarding enlistments, dead, discharges, or 
desertions. The first return to show this information was the one 
for August 5, which listed the highest number of desertions to be 
recorded that year, 199. The next highest number of desertions 
appeared the following week when 164 were counted. Without exception, 
the number of desertions declined each succeeding week according to 
the general returns throughout the year 1775; only eight deserters
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were listed in the returns of December 30, 1775. The 1775 reports 
show an average strength during the last six months of 18,873
troops, with an average of 13,732 listed fit for duty. The number
of desertions for this same period totaled 960, which gives an 
average desertion rate of 5.1 per cent of the total strength and 
7.0 per cent of those declared fit for duty. At the same time, 
those counted as sick-absent, sick-present, on command, and 
furloughed averaged 5,141 or 27.2 per cent of the total strength 
and 37.5 of those fit for duty. The desertion rate of 5.1 for 
1775 was not high when compared with that of European armies, but 
if part of the 5,141 troops listed in other places were actually 
deserters, then the true rate of desertion would be much higher.
From January through July, 1776, the average total strength 
of the army was 11,240, and the average fit for duty strength was 
8,300. During this period at least 843 men deserted, causing an 
increase in the percentage of departures over the previous year's
figures to 7.5 per cent of the total and 10.1 per cent of the fit
for duty strength. In only two weeks' returns were more than 100 
desertions reported —  that of February 18th, which showed 140, 
and that of June 28th which indicated 107. The next highest figure 
for this period was May 12, when 72 men were reported absent without 
leave. The return for January 8 listed 10,209 men fit for duty, 705 
sick-present, 233 sick-absent, 1,318 on command, and 1,044 on 
furlough from a total strength of 13,509 rank and file. No figures 
were given for those enlisted, killed, discharged, or deserted.
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The strength of the army was increased during the last half
of 1776. The Continental Congress first called for 26 battalions
for 1776, with each state to furnish a given quota. On September 16,
the figure was raised to 88 battalions of infantry, to be raised by
the country at large, bringing the year's tally with three other
22irregular battalions, to 107 battalions. Three returns submitted 
in 1776 show the increased size of the army. The one dated 
September 21 was the first to reveal substantial desertions, 556. 
Desertion statistics fell markedly in the tallies of September 28 
and October 5, to 80 and 142, respectively. With the total force 
being increased, the percentage of desertions took a large drop 
from the 7.5 for the first seven months returns to a low of 2.9 
for the last five months. A corresponding drop in desertion 
percentages was seen in the fit for duty strength from 10.1 to 
5.0. During the last five months those registered as sick-absent 
rose to 3,361, or 12.2 per cent of the total enlisted personnel.
It is very likely that the lists for the last half of 1776 were 
incorrect since the army was engaged in heavy fighting in New York 
and New Jersey from August through December. On the other hand, it 
is also reasonable to assume that fewer soldiers deserted during 
this period of heavy combat. The inconsistency of official returns
22Journals of the Continental Congress, V, 762; VI, 1045.
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precludes verification of the generally held belief that there 
was always a decrease in desertions during periods of heavy fighting.
The general returns for the year 1777 are the least usable 
since they were usually devoid of information concerning desertion.
Only three give complete data regarding such losses, those of 
November 3, 10, and December 31. They show that the percentage 
of desertions dropped again to a low of 1.6 of the aggregate 
strength and 3.2 for those fit for duty. By December, 1777,
Washington had moved his army to Valley Forge, where its size 
increased about 7,000 over the number counted at White Marsh in 
1776. During the last two months in 1777, an average of 4,099 
men or 23.5 per cent of the total, were reported sick-absent. It 
is likely that some of these men should have been listed as 
deserters. The May 2 return indicated 1,020 men sick-absent, 
mostly because of unfavorable reaction to smallpox vaccination on 
the western side of the Delaware River. The same report showed 369 
men on command, with 33 specifically listed as serving as wagoners; 
there was no mention of the other 336. A comment on the November 
10 return explained that the eleven men reported as deserters 
from the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment belonged to an independent company
23General Return, May 21, 1777, Revolutionary War Rolls,
National Archives, Roll 137.
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recently annexed to the Pennsylvania unit and that they had
24deserted on the inarch from Lancaster to camp.
A general weekly return was made in 1778 for all but about 
a dozen weeks, and all but four give complete data on desertions 
and other losses. The strength of the army rose from about 17,000 
in January to a high of 30,134 in October, for an average of 
20,241 for the year. The actual available manpower averaged only 
9,874, with eight showing fewer than 5,000 men fit for duty, and 
six recording fewer than 4,000 men. After May, Congress increased 
the size of the army considerably, giving Washington an effective 
force of over 12,000 on each return for the remainder of the year. 
Desertions recorded during this period, excluding militia not used 
as Continental troops, totaled 3,612, with the greatest numbers 
occurring after the troop increase in May. Prior to May 9, five 
returns show over 100 desertions: January 2, 101; February 29,
242; March 30, 207; May 2, 295; and May 9, 152. Seven returns 
made after May 9, show over 100 desertions with the highest —  321 —  
coming on May 30. Since there were more returns available for that 
year, it is not surprising that defectors reported was larger than 
for any previous year, causing the percentage of desertions also to 
appear greater. When desertions are compared to total strength,
24General Return, November 10, 1777, ibid.
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the desertion rate for 1778 was 17.8 per cent and when compared 
with those fit for duty the rate was an astounding 36.4 per cent. 
This rate of desertion seems vastly out of line with that of earlier 
years, but it might be more nearly correct than the figures for 
those years since the data for 1778 are more complete. The data for 
the first three years could justifiably be disregarded and reliance 
placed entirely on the returns for the years from 1778 through 1783 
since the percentages for these latter years stabilized, indicating 
a level of accuracy had been reached that is more in line with 
actual desertions. During this same period the sick-absent 
figures continued to be very high, averaging over 4,000 per 
return for an average of 20 per cent of the total. Beginning with 
1779, two percentages are given for each year, one based on weekly 
returns and the other on monthly returns. The weekly and monthly 
returns should be the same, but in fact they are not.
Eleven monthly returns for 1779 show an average strength 
of 19,809 and an average duty aggregate of 13,619, with a desertion 
percentage of 8.9 of total strength and 12.9 of duty strength. The 
monthly lists recorded a total of 1,762 desertions, of which the 
highest number, 364, occurred in July. When the weekly returns for 
1779 were used, the percentages of desertion dropped noticeably, 
primarily because a total of only 634 desertions appeared on all 
the thirty returns. The weekly tallies show an average total 
strength of 10,751 and an average duty strength of 7,258, with
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desertion percentages of 5.9 and 8.7. Obviously there were 
discrepancies in these reports.
The 1780 returns reversed the pattern, showing the desertion 
percentages for the weekly returns to be larger than those for 
the monthly reports. Nine monthly returns for 1780 revealed an 
average strength of 13,808 and a duty strength of 9,259, for 
desertion percentages of 9.8 and 14.6. The number of runaways 
on these nine returns was 1,354, with the 275 desertions in January 
the largest number for a single month. Thirty-eight weekly 
returns record a total of 1,217 quitters, only 137 less than the 
number recorded on the monthly returns. Since the total average 
strength in the weekly returns was much less —  9,159— the desertion 
percentage increased to 13.3, or 3.5 greater than the percentage 
registered for the monthly rolls. The percentage for the duty 
strength on the weekly return of 6,307 also showed an increase in 
the desertion rate to 19.3 per cent, or 4.7 per cent greater than 
for the monthly checks. Only one weekly return of the thirty- 
eight showed more than 100 deserters, that of February 14, which 
listed 135.
The monthly and weekly returns for 1781 are very close for 
strength but vary widely as to desertions reported. The percentage 
of illegal absences on the monthly returns was much larger; only 
437 desertions are listed on the weekly inventories, while 609 
appear on the monthly reports. The aggregate of the army fell to
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about half the strength of the previous year, with only 6,290 
recorded on the monthly and 5,562 on the weekly returns. The 
average duty strength was 2,427 on the monthly and 2,586 on the 
weekly manifests. These figures provide desertion percentages of 
the total strength of the army of 9.1 on the monthly and 7.9 on the 
weekly returns. Duty strength percentages were 23.6 on the monthly 
and 17.9 on the weekly returns.
The monthly returns for the year 1782 show an increase in the 
average strength of the army over the previous year to 8,699, 
and in duty strength to 5,080; the desertions total also increased 
to 692, yielding percentages of 8.0 and 13.6. The weekly returns 
for 1782 were lower in total strength — 6,351—  duty strength —
4,145—  and in total deserters — 440—  for percentages of 6.9 
(of total strength) and 10.9 (of duty strength).
While the total and duty statistics remained about the same 
for the first six months of 1783 in both monthly and weekly checks, 
the total number of desertions decreased measurably (463 monthly 
and 280 weekly), providing desertion percentages of 5.3 and 7.3 —  
the lowest since the year 1777.
What conclusions can be drawn from these returns? The 
erratic changes in the desertion percentages compared with total 
strength for the first four years would indicate that these figures 
are less reliable than the figures for the last five years. Beginning 
with the figures for 1779 and continuing through 1783, the rates
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of desertion seemed to stabilize according to both the monthly and 
weekly returns. More accurate reporting by the commanders probably 
accounted for some of the change, along with the increased number 
of returns submitted. When the monthly returns are compared for the 
years 1779, 1780, 1781, and 1782, the percentages of desertions of 
the total strength are very close: 8.9, 9.8, 9.8 and 8.0. The
desertion rates computed from the average duty strength are much 
more erratic, but are interesting as an additional comparison.
The weekly returns for these same years show a stability 
that corresponds with that of the monthly returns, enhancing the 
reliability of both sets. When the return for 1779 is omitted, 
the rate of desertion from 1780 to 1783 in the weekly returns 
dropped each year in a fairly reasonable pattern, falling from
13.3 per cent in 1780 to 7.9, then 6.9, and finally 3.4. The 
similarity in the monthly returns would Indicate that possibly the 
rate for the last four years of the war should be estimated at no 
less than 10 per cent of the total strength of the army. This 
approximation might seem reasonably sound since it comes close to 
the figures armlet usually expect today and compares favorably 
with desertion rates of European armies of the eighteenth century.
When other factors regarding inaccuracies in reporting are considered, 
it seems reasonable at best to double the fitures and estimate the 
desertion rate to have been from 20 to 25 per cent. The larger 
figure would account for the men listed as sick-absent who should
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have been carried as deserters. Since the percentage of men in this 
category often ranged above the 25 mark, it seems not out of line to 
give preference to an overall desertion rate that closely approximates 
this figure. Additionally, the higher percentage is substantiated 
when the 1778 desertion rate of 36.4 per cent of duty strength is 
considered.
Individual Units
The records of many units when examined separately show 
desertion rates much higher than the rates indicated by the army 
muster returns. Of course, some units experienced more desertions 
than others, but since all units cannot be analyzed in detail, a 
close look at a few will provide desertion percentages that can be 
used in comparison with data from other sources.
Colonel Moses Hazen’s Second Canadian Regiment, also
called "Congress* Own" because it belonged to no single state, is
a suitable unit of the Continental army to study in detail for 
25several reasons. First, the officer personnel remained about 
the same throughout the war; Hazen himself commanded the regiment 
from January 22, 1776, to June 1, 1783. Second, this period corresponds 
closely with the years of the war. Finally, a list is available that 
provides the name of every man serving in this unit during the war,
25Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental
Army, 16.












































1775 18,873 13,7322 960 5.1 7.0 Aug. 5, 1775 (199) 11
1776 (January to July) Q
11,240 8,300 843 7.5 10.1 Feb. 18, 1776 (140) 16
1776 (Sept. to Dec.)
26,896* 15,854 778 2.9 5.0 Sept. 21, 1776 (556) 3
1777 17,362 8,758 278 1.6 3.2 Dec. 31, 1777 (147) 3
1778 20,241 9,874 3,612 17.8 36.4 May 30, 1778 (321) 39
1779 10,751 7,258 634 5.9 8.7 Aug. 14, 1779 (57) 305
1779 19,809 13,619 1,762 8.9 12.9 July 19, (364)
1780 9,159 6,307 1,217 13.3 19.3 Feb. 14, 1780 (135) 38
1780 13,808 9,259 1,354 9.8 14.6 Jan., (275) 9S
1781 5,562 2,427 437 7.9 17.9 Oct. 6, 1781 (38) 295
1781 6,290 2,586 609 9.7 23.6 June, 1781 (127) 8,
1782 6,351 4,145 440 6.9 10.6 April 22, 17&L (37) 31
1782 8,699 5,080 692 8.0 13.6 April, 1782 (140) 1051783 8,026 5,847 280 3.4 4.8 Feb. 22, 1783 (39) 17
1783 8,8196 6,360 463 5.3 7.3 Feb., 1783 (139) 5
^Data collected from Revolutionary War Record, National Archives, Rolls 137, 138.
Only nine returns used for computing average strength fit for duty in 1775.
•̂ No deserters listed on return dated January 8, 1776.
Eighty-eight battalions authorized accounts for large increase in army strength.
^Weekly returns. ^Return covers period from January to May, 1783.
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along with the dates of enlistments, discharges, desertions, promotions,
26and other data. On the other hand, Hazen's regiment was not typical 
of the army as a whole, because it often suffered more from want of 
supplies, food, and pay than units supported by both the central 
government and a specific state. In another way, this unit seemed to 
be a poor example, because it often received as recruits many of the 
undesirables rejected by other regiments. These factors could help 
account for the unusually high desertion rate suffered by Hazen's 
command.
Hazen's muster roll contains the names of 1,435 men who 
joined this unit, in most cases for the duration of the war. From 
this aggregate, 399 men are listed as deserters from the regiment, 
which provides a desertion rate of 27.8 per cent for the eight-year 
period. While this is a much higher rate than the general muster 
returns indicated, it corresponds closely with estimates often given 
by other writers and is only slightly higher than the adjusted 
estimate already determined from the official muster returns. At 
the same time that over one-fourth of Hazen's men were deserting, 
only 4.8 per cent were listed as killed in action or deceased from 
other causes. Only one of Hazen's soldiers, Richard Bussard, was
26Revolutionary Muster Roll, 1776-1783: Names of Persons
taken from Inlistments and Muster Rolls in the service of the United 
States in a Regiment Commanded by Brigadier General Moses Hazen in 
the Revolutionary War by Benji Moore, 2 ledgers, U. S. Revolution, 
Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Library of Congress. Hereinafter cited 
as Hazen, Revolutionary Muster Roll.
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listed as having been executed for desertion— on June 6, 1777, at
Princeton. Host of the men listed on this roll were from Connecticut,
New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland.
Colonel Henry JaCkoOu 's regiment, one of the sixteen additional
Continental regiments authorized by Congress on December 27, 1776,
and redesignated the Sixteenth Massachusetts Regiment on July 23,
1780, suffered considerably fewer desertions than Hazen's unit.
Fourteen returns during 1778 listed 48 deserters from an average
total strength of 405 men, which yields a desertion rate of 11.9
per cent. Fifteen returns for 1779 show 52 shirkers from an average
27total strength of 402 men, for a desertion rate of 12.9 per cent. 
Jackson's unit was probably more typical of the army as a whole and 
the rate from his unit closely corresponds with the unadjusted figure 
from the general muster returns.
Company-size unit muster rolls reveal varying desertion 
rates. Captain John Nelson's company of Pennsylvania riflemen in 
Colonel John Philip DeHass's regiment experienced 18 desertions from 
March to May 1776, from a full complement of 93 officers and men.
For this period Nelson’s unit experienced defections at the rate of
19.4 per cent. All of these slackers were short-time men having 
served only a few months before departing; seven of the eighteen
^Henry Jackson, Return of Regiment, 1777-1780, U. S. 
Revolution, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Library of Congress.
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28left together on May 2, 1776. This figure supports the adjusted
rate of about 20 per cent.
Captain Samuel Watson's company in Colonel Arthur St. Clair's
and Colonel Joseph Wood's battalion contained 103 officers and men.
From January 5, to November 25, 1776, six soldiers were killed, four
discharged, two reported missing in action, and eighteen ran off.
All the deserters were privates except one, Sergeant Morris McMahon,
and all served about two months before abandoning the army. Eight
scampered off in a four-day period —  April 6-10 —  while the unit
was not engaged in combat. The rate of desertion for this unit was 
2913.5 per cent, which is still higher than the rate obtained from 
general returns; when adjusted, this company would exceed the 20 
per cent mark.
During the same period of time, Captain Rudolph Bunner's
company, of the same battalion, experienced eight desertions for a
rate of only 8.5 per cent. However, eight others are listed as
missing, most having disappeared while the unit fought at Three
30Rivers, Canada, and nine others were killed. Captain Thomas Craig's
28Willla® Thomas Roberts Saffell, Record of the Revolutionary 
War: Containing the Military and Financial Correspondence of Distin­
guished Officers, Names of Officers and Privates of Regiments . . . 
General Orders . . . (New York: Pudney & Russell, 1858), 181.
29Ibld., 183.
30Ibid., 185-87.
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company of 100, also at Three Rivers, reported three missing and
Olfive privates and two corporals deserting for a rate of 7 per cent.
Several companies of St. Clair's and Wood's Pennsylvania
battalion recorded no desertions, and very few missing, killed, or
discharged. However, the total strength of these units averaged
only about 60 men rather than the normal 100. It is likely that
desertion took a heavy toll from these companies, because no
explanation is given concerning the disappearance of nearly half the
men. The desertion rate in these units, while officially low, was
32probably in excess of 20 per cent.
Colonel Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania battalion, during 1776,
felt substantial desertions. Captain Persifor Frazer's Company of
108 officers and men experienced thirteen desertions, for a rate
of 12 per cent. Seven of the thirteen decampted in July. Twelve men
deserted from Captain James Taylor's rather large company of 120
officers and men during 1776, for a rate of 12 per cent. All of
these deserters were short-timers; most of them left in February
33after only a month's service.
31Ibid., 187-89.
32Ibid., 189-98. Captain William Butler's Company contained 
72 men; Stephen Bayard's, 57; John Brisban's, 60; John Rees, 47;
John Huling's, 47; Thomas Robinson's, 73; Thomas Church's, 83; and 
John Lacey's, 69. None of these companies show any deserters.
33Ibid., 198-201.
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The desertion rates, of course, were not the same in all
military companies all the time —  they varied with circumstances.
Hence, individual unit records might not always support the average
rate of about 20 to 25 per cent determined from other data. For
example, the number of men who deserted from the companies of Colonel
William Irvine's regiment while fighting at Three Rivers was remarkably
low. Captain Samuel Hay's company of 97 troops had six to desert;
Captain Robert Adam had only three to leave from 111 men. Four of
Captain Abraham Smith's company of 93 ran off; William Rippey's
company lost only one man by defection while losing ten captured and
four killed; Captains David Greer, James A. Willson, Moses McLean,
and Jeremiah Tolbott reported no truants from their companies.34
Although it is reasonable to assume that almost all soldiers in a
few units remained faithful to the service, this was not the case army-
wide. Captain Bernard Roman's Pennsylvania artillery company
made up of 102 officers and men suffered twenty-one desertions during
1776 while stationed at Fort Ticonderoga, for a desertion rate of 
3520.4 per cent, and is more representative of the typical army unit —  
and of the army as a whole.
34Ibid., 202-15.
33Muster Roll of Captain Bernard Roman's Pennsylvania 
Artillery Company, U. S. Revolution, Miscellaneous Manuscripts,
Library of Congress, File Box II.
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The desertion rates of these companies, selected at random, 
vary considerably —  from practically none to over 27 per cent.
When considered collectively, they tend to agree rather loosely 
with the adjusted desertion rate given in the general returns. This 
gives credence to the thesis that the overall desertion rate of the 
army should be placed somewhere between 20 and 25 per cent of the 
total strength. Certainly Hazen's regiment strongly supports the 
higher figure.
State Records
Another view of desertion can be had by looking at the troops
furnished by each state without regard to their regiments, the
enlistment periods, or the length of service. The total number of
men listed on state rosters can easily be compared with the number
designated as deserters, yielding a desertion rate for each state.
These state statistics furnish another figure useful in determining
a reasonable rate of desertion from the army during the war.
The data for this comparative analysis comes from the Rosters
of State and Continental Troops 1775-1783, located in the National 
36Archives. Nine state rosters are included in this twelve-volume
■^Rosters of State and Continental Troops, 1775-1783 (12 
vols., Record Group 93, Entry 5-i, National Archives).
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set: Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
These rosters give the name and military assignment of each soldier, 
along with such information as rank, date of appointment or enlist­
ment, promotion, duration of enlistment, and date of discharge, 
desertion, or death. Within each volume the soldiers are listed 
alphabetically by surname according to regiments. A few additional 
regiments are attached to some of the state rosters. For example, 
those of Colonel John Crane, Colonel David Henley, Colonel Henry 
Jackson, and Colonel William R. Lee are attached to the Massachusetts 
lists. The regiments of Colonel Oliver Spencer and Colonel David 
Forman are attached to the New Jersey roster.
Some of the state rosters are not complete. The North 
Carolina roster includes only soldiers whose surnames begin with 
the letters "R" to "Z". The entries for "A" are missing in the Rhode 
Island list, and only the soldiers whose surnames begin with "A" 
through part of "R" appear in the South Carolina record.
A count was made of the total number of soldiers listed in 
each state roster and of those who deserted. These two figures were 
compared to give a percentage of desertions for each state. The 
total of all the troops listed in these nine rosters was compiled 
and compared with the aggregate number listed as deserters from all 
the states. This provided a rate of desertion that could be compared 
with rates obtained from other data.
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Before presenting the data gleaned from the state rosters, 
one should mention the total number of troops officially belonging 
to each state according to the Continental Congress. Although the 
exact number of men furnished by each state in the war is not 
known, an estimate was made by Colonel John Pierce, paymaster- 
general of the Continental army, and the treasury accountants in 
1787. It is listed below.37
TABLE II





New Hampshire 12,497 4.000 16,497
Massachusetts 67,907 20,000 87,907
Rhode Island 5,908 4,000 9,908
Connecticut 31,939 9,000 40,939
New York 17,781 10,000 27,781
New Jersey 10,726 7,000 17,726
Pennsylvania 25,678 10,000 35,678
Delaware 2,386 1,000 3,386
Maryland 13,912 9,000 22,912
Virginia 26,678 30,000 56,678
North Carolina 7,263 13,000 20,363
South Carolina 6,417 20,000 26,417
Georgia 2,679 8,000 10,679
Totals 231,771 145,000 376,771
^Haitnan, Historical Regia tar of Officers of the Continental 
Army, 691. For the complete list consult American State Papers,
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The total given in this table is excessive. Many of the men 
listed served two, three, or even four terms, which caused them to 
be counted more than once. While the total enlistments might well 
have numbered 231,771 for the Continental army, it is likely that 
no more than 154,000 different men served in the Continental army 
from all the states. The troops from the nine states included in this 
comparison, according to Pierce's estimate, totaled 176,005. When 
the factor for multiple enlistments is subtracted (about 20 per cent), 
the corrected total for individuals should be about 118,000. The 
state rosters for these nine states list only 48,589 individual troops 
by name who served in the Continental army. This leaves approximately 
70,000 men unaccounted for. Even though the Bhode Island, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina rosters are incomplete, the total number 
of troops omitted would be small compared to the 70,000 missing names, 
probably reducing the number at the most by only nine or ten thousand. 
This discrepancy can be accounted for in two ways: either Pierce's
records are grossly inaccurate, or the state records are very incomplete, 
or both are partly faulty. For the purpose of this study, the state 
rosters, even though they might not contain all the troops, seem at 
times to be more reliable and therefore more usable, since they list 
individuals that can be accounted for. They will, therefore, be used to 
compile a desertion rate for the Continental army.
Military Affairs, edited by W. Lowrie and M. S. Clarke (7 vols., 
Washington: Cales and Seaton, 1832-1861), I, 14-19.
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The following table lists the nine state roster totals:
TABLE III
ROSTERS OF STATES’ CONTINENTAL TROOPS
State Total on Rolls Deserters Percentage
Connecticut 8,477 1,045 12.33
Massachusetts 16,148 1,682 10.42
Rhode Island (B-Z) 2,424 494 20.38
New Jersey 4,448 1,190 26.76
New York 5,063 1,308 25.83
Pennsylvania 4,928 377 7.66
North Carolina (R-Z) 1,765 239 13.54
South Carolina (A-R) 4,146 151 3.64
Delaware 1,190 305 25.63
Totals 48,589 6,781 13.98
The rate of 13.98 per cent desertions shown by the state 
rosters is only slightly higher than the rate found by using the 
unadjusted general returns of the army. This still does not signify 
conclusively that the rate was this low. More likely it was closer 
to 20 per cent for the whole army during the entire war, since the 
state rosters are not without errors and omissions. As indicated 
earlier, the state rosters list fewer troops from each state than is 
believed to have been furnished by the states. It can also be 
assumed that not all the men who deserted were so indicated in all 
cases in the state rosters.
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At least two state rosters, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, 
appear to be significantly erroneous. The Pennsylvania roster, 
like the others, recorded fewer men serving in the Continental army 
than the Pierce account, but more importantly, it did not indicate 
very many desertions among the individuals included. The Pennsylvania 
roster was at times little more than a list of names with the 
"remarks" column left blank. There was little consistency in the 
recording of information in this roster. Troops who served in 1776, 
1782 and 1783 were not included. Many of the entries could not be 
interpreted —  some of which could have referred to desertion.
None of the entries in the Pennsylvania roster show multiple enlist­
ments, which means that if a soldier ran off, and then returned, he 
was not listed as a deserter. Another problem with the Pennsylvania 
roster is that only those men who had served long enough to build 
up a sizeable amount of pay were included. This would eliminate all 
those who fled in the first thirty days or so, when much of the 
desertion occurred. Possibly the Pennsylvania percentage of deser­
tions should have been in excess of 25 rather than the 7.6 given in
qo
the table.
38Pennsylvania 1776-1781, Roster of State and Continental 
Troops, National Archives, VII.
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The South Carolina roster is odd in that the total number of 
individuals included in half the roster equals two-thirds of the 
total number recorded by Pierce. If all other data had been complete 
this roster would become a very accurate source, but the reverse is 
true. There were very few deserters indicated, and most of those 
listed occurred very early or very late in the war, either in 1775- 
1776, or in 1782-1783.39 The desertion rate of only 3.64 per cent 
seems out of line with the rate for troops in other states.
If the Pennsylvania and South Carolina rosters are not used, 
the overall desertion rate for the seven states remaining would 
be 15.85 per cent. Since this figure represents known deserters, the 
true rate for the army, based on this known factor, should have 
exceeded 20 per cent, possibly as high as 25 per cent.
The rosters for the states of Connecticut, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey were the most 
complete in detail and are probably the most accurate. All of these 
states recorded desertion rates above 10 per cent, with New Jersey 
listing 26.76 per cent of the troops as deserters. Both Delaware 
and New York recorded defections of over 25 per cent with Rhode 
Island close behind with over 20 per cent. It is conceivable that 
New Jersey did experience a very high desertion rate. Much of the 
war (actual combat) took place in or near New Jersey. These troops,
39South Carolina, 1775-1783, ibid., XIX.
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if engaged, would than have been stationed relatively near their bosses 
making it much easier for them to desert. The temptation to leave 
the army would have been intensified if news reached the soldiers that 
British units were active in or near their places of residence. In 
an attempt to protect their families soldiers were often impelled 
to desert. The same reasoning could account for the high desertion 
rate of the Delaware troops. Another possible explanation for the 
higher rate of the New Jersey troops is that the record is more 
accurate for them. While the recorders for the other states did 
not always give complete and accurate tallies, the New Jersey compiler 
perhaps listed every person, without fail, who was absent from a 
muster or who was reported at any time as having deserted. This 
possibility would then support the higher percentage rate of New 
Jersey as being more accurate for the army rather than the lower rate 
obtained by averaging all the states together. The 25 per cent 
desertion rate for the army is certainly within reason according to 
most authorities.
The New York roster was more detailed than any of the others;
it shows signs of much work in an attempt to produce a complete
account of the soldiers' military record. The rate of desertion for
40New York was above 25 per cent. The Delaware roster, likewise,
*®New York, 1776-1783, ibid., V, one unnumbered volume. This 
roster also Included Colonel James Livingston's First Canadian Regiment 
and Colonel William Hacolm's regiment.
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seems to be quite accurate, listing half the total number of troops 
given by Pierce. The conscientious recorder of this check list 
noted over 25 per cent of the troops as deserters.^
The Rhode Island roster, showing signs of being as accurate 
as any of the other state rosters, lists a few less than half of 
the troops ascribed by Pierce to that state, and records a desertion 
rate of over 20 per cent.^ The Rhode Island rate fits about midway 
between the three states with the highest percentages and the remainder 
of the states with rates of from 12 to 15 per cent, and might have 
been typical for the entire army.
If the lower rate of desertion of about 20 per cent is to be 
preferred to the higher one of 25 per cent, then the Connecticut 
roster would best represent the entire Continental army. This register 
appears to be fairly accurate and probably as complete as any other 
in this set. It, however, listed approximately 8,477 men as compared 
to Pierce's 31,939, or about one-fourth the total assigned to that
/ *3state. The roster includes some individuals who might have been 
militiamen . The "Arrangement" troops of 1778, 1781, and 1783 are
^Delaware, 1776-1783, ibid., II.
^Rhode Island, 1776-1783, ibid., VII. Roster included Colonel 
Nicholas Haussengger's German Regiment and Colonel Henry Sherburne's 
Regiment. Haussengger's Regiment was organized under a resolution of 
Congress of May 25, 1776. It was raised in Pennsylvania and Maryland, 
but, not belonging to any state, it was regarded as one of the sixteen 
additional regiments.
^Connecticut, 1776-1783, ibid., I.
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also Included.^ The number of deserters Indicated on the Connecticut 
roll is less than the number recorded in several other state rosters. 
The inclusion of so many short-term troops, or arrangement soldiers, 
partially accounts for the difference, since these part-time men 
did not seem to be as likely to desert as did the troops who were in 
for the duration of the war. Many entries in the Connecticut roster 
indicate that soldiers were mustered on certain dates and were 
supposed to have joined other units, especially units in Georgia.
Some of these men possibly should have been carried as deserters. For 
example, John Carrell of Colonel Philip B. Bardley's regiment enlisted 
on April 1, 1777, for the duration of the war. In the August, 1777, 
muster he was reported present, but he supposedly had joined the 
Georgia battalion and could have been a deserter. The desertion 
rate for Connecticut was slightly over 12 per cent, and possibly 
should have been a little higher.
The North Carolina roster, only partly intact, lists over 13
per cent of the troops as deserters, which corresponds closely with
the Connecticut rate, and the rate for all the states combined. It
appears to be moderately accurate in regard to runaways, but skimpy
45in recording other information.
^Troops provided by states for short periods of three, six 
or nine months.
45North Carolina, 1776-1783, Roster of the State and Continental 
Troops, National Archives, VI.
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The Massachusetts roster contains the largest number of soldiers
and the largest number of deserters, but still only about one-fourth
46the total number registered by Pierce. This tally begins with
1776 and ends with 1780, which would account for a sizeable number
of men being left off the roll. The information seems to be accurate
and complete in most cases. The desertion rate of over 10 per cent
for Massachusetts troops is a little misleading if soldiers who
deserted more than once are counted as only one desertion. A
considerable percentage of the deserters in this roster actually
deserted two, three, or more times according to the information
written in the record. For example, Timothy Alvord enlisted April 1,
1777, deserted December 12, 1777, then joined again on February, 1778,
deserted the second time on January 5, 1779, joined again March 2,
1779, deserted for the third time in 1779, and joined for the fourth
47time on July 3, 1779, only to desert again on October 13, 1780.
Just how this information is to be dealt with makes a difference in 
the desertion rate. Should Alvord be counted as one deserter, or as 
four desertions? The desertion rate gathered from these state 
rosters records each soldier who deserted only once, regardless of 
how many times he deserted.
^Massachusetts, 1776-1780, ibid., III.
47Ibid., Ill, 2.
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This same problem exists for all the rosters; they all record 
many men as having deserted more than once. Samuel G. Dyer, listed 
in the Rhode Island roster, enlisted five times and deserted four 
times, receiving his discharge by order of General Washington in
October, 1782.48 John Hendrick of Colonel Bradley's Connecticut
49 • ,regiment deserted three times. Some men who went home sick were
just dropped from the rolls rather than being listed as deserters.
George Patton enlisted December 31, 1776, went home sick in 1778,
never returned and was dropped from the rolls and finally discharged
January 1, 1780.^ Some men were transferred from unit to unit.
Elisha Reynolds, enlisted as a private in January, 1777, reenlisted
in 1780 for the duration of the war, then deserted on January 31,
1781, rejoined in June, 1781, and deserted again on July 27, 1782.
During this time he was transferred from Holmes' regiment to Starr's,
then to Stanford's, then to Douglass's unit.^* Promotions did not
always act as a safeguard against desertion. Daniel Browing of
Connecticut enlisted January 10, 1777, as a private, was promoted to
corporal on July 11, 1780, to sergeant in September, 1780, and deserted
on January 31, 1 7 8 1 . Henry Brown of Samuel Wyllis' regiment enlisted
48Rhode Island, 1776-1783, ibid., VII, 18.
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on January 1, 1777, deserted on September 6, 1778, rejoined on
October 10, 1778, was promoted to corporal on August, 1779, promoted
53to Sergeant August 1, 1780, and deserted September 26, 1782.
On the other hand, many men who deserted returned to serve 
out their time or until they were properly discharged. John Barnes, 
Ladock Morris, and Elijah Murphy all deserted more than cnce, only 
to return to the army and serve faithfully until the end of the war. 
Countless men could be included in this category. These men were not 
registered as deserters since they returned.
In summary, what can be deduced from the state rosters?
Excluding those of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, the desertion 
rate varied from a low of 10 per cent for Massachusetts to a high of 
nearly 27 per cent for New Jersey. It is possible that each roster 
was correct for that state. A combined average for the seven states 
gives a rate of nearly 15 per cent, half again as large as the rate 
obtained from the general returns. It is difficult, however, to set 
an average rate for the army lower than the highest state rate since 
possibly none of these records included all the men that deserted.
It can be assumed that the actual rate of desertion was considerably 
higher than the totals positively identified. Three states ~  Delaware, 
New Jersey end New York —  did show over 25 per cent of their troops 
as having deserted. If this evidence is used as a guide, the desertion
S3Ibld.. I, 25.
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rate for the entire army should be considered to correspond rather 
closely with the highest rates, or at least not lower than 20 per 
cent for the entire army during the war. When data from the three 
groups are considered collectively, a desertion rate of from 20 to 
25 per cent can be fairly well established.
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CHAPTER IX
THE APPREHENSION OF DESERTERS
To prevent further defections it was absolutely essential 
that the army exert every possible effort to capture deserters. Any 
hesitancy on the part of officers and non-commissioned officers to 
recover their losses only encouraged more men to depart. In fact, 
the negligence of some officers not only interfered with the 
apprehension of deserters, but encouraged others to leave under the 
assumption that they would not be pursued or punished if returned. 
General Anthony Wayne made a deep impression on one lieutenant who 
apparently neglected his duty to post sentries properly. Ebenezer 
Elmer recorded in his diary that Wayne came on board his vessel, 
and finding no sentry, which was normal during the day, became enraged 
and "damned all our souls to hell, and immediately ordered two by 
night and one by day." This order was immediately put into execution. 
Elmer added that the lieutenant "shall not forget his damns, which 
he is very apt to bestow upon people."'*'
^"Ebenezer Elmer, "Journal kept during an Expedition to Canada 
1776 . . .," New Jersey Historical Society, Proceedings, III, No. 1 
(1848), 55. Elmer "blessed God" that no more power was in the hands 
of Wayne. A week later Elmer wrote: "I hear that Col. Wayne is
promoted to Brigadier General but believe it is a joke," January 20, 
1777, ibid., Ill, 56. Elmer was in the Third New Jersey Regiment.
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Major General Horatio Gates was just as direct in rebuking 
two officers who had apparently deserted:
To the disgrace of yourself, and the Dishonor of 
your Rank, and profession, you have been Guilty of 
the Atrocious Crime of Desertion; to which you have 
added that of being accessory to Inveighling the 
Soldiers under your Command, to commit the like 
scandalous Offense. If you do not return without 
delay to Camp, and bring with you, the soldiers 
you carried off, be assured, that I will leave 
you no resting place upon this Continent, until 
I get you into my Hands, When, a Solemn Trial, 
and an Ignaminous Death, is what you must expect, 
as the just reward of your Complicated Crimes.
Gates then signed the letter, "I am Sirs, Your humble Servant,
2Horatio Gates."
The negligence of some non-commissioned officers gave 
opportunity for desertions to occur. A Sergeant Major Hammer was 
court-martialed August 28, 1779, for neglect of duty in not appre­
hending a deserter when it was in his power to do so, and also for 
using abusive language against other sergeants who were trying to 
capture deserters. The court found Hammer guilty and reduced him 
to the rank of private, but the commanding officer granted him a
full pardon with the warning that he would be punished severely if
3he ever committed that crime again.
2Major General Horatio Gates to Captain James Libbey and 
Lieutenant Joshua Roberts of Colonel Evans' New Hampshire regiment, 
and to all other officers of this command who have deserted, October 24, 
1777, U. S. Revolution, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Library of Congress, 
File Box V.
^Orderly Book No. 32, National Archives, 231-33.
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On the other hand, most officers and soldiers gave serious 
attention to this problem from the first. Eventually Washington had 
to call on Congress and the states to assist in the capture of 
soldiers by offering rewards, promising punishment for those who 
harbored deserters, and encouraging the citizenry to aid the army in 
returning such men. While most runaways were not captured, some were 
recovered and stood trial for their misdeed.
Recruiting officers played a major role in rounding up 
deserters as well as enlisting new men. Civilians gave only minimum 
assistance, and the burden of taking shirkers fell mainly upon army 
officers; recruiters actually handled considerable numbers of 
deserters. Whatever methods were used, Washington’s subordinates 
were severely handicapped by the widespread tendency of civilians to 
shelter fugitives. Officers constantly appealed for vigorous measures 
against loyalists and other civilians who prevented the return of 
army truants.
Colonel John Stark asked the New Hampshire Committee of Safety
in 1775 to recommend that town officials arrest and return men found
4away from the army without furloughs. In the same year Washington 
called upon the Massachusetts legislature to cooperate in securing 
large numbers of men who were at their homes, some engaged in
^Bowman, The Moral of the American Revolutionary Army, 81.
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regular civilian employment, but the response was disappointing."* 
Virginia gave little help to Charles Lee who found large numbers of 
recruits deserting.^ Connecticut at one point actually cooperated 
with deserters, providing them a wage settlement since they claimed 
that their time had expired.^
By 1777 the situation had worsened. Washington implored 
Congress to exert pressure on the states for vigorous action. He 
warned that if the states did not force the people to give informa­
tion about deserters in their communities he would be obliged to
g
deplete his force to bring back deserters. The widespread aiding 
of deserters was causing his army to evaporate as fast as it was 
recruited. Washington favored strong action by the central government 
over reliance on state authorities to remedy the situation. In a 
letter to Joseph Reed, Washington stressed the importance of Congress 
developing some effective means of preventing desertion and apprehending
^Washington to the Massachusetts Legislature, August 7,
1775, Writings of Washington, III, 406; ibid.. V, 293; VII, 86-87, 
467-69.
^Major General Charles Lee, The Lee Papers (4 vols., New York 
Historical Society Collections, 1872-1874), II, 35.
^J. H. Trumbull and C. J. Hoadley (eds.), Public Records of the 
Colony of Connecticut (15 vols., New York: Abraham's Magazine Service
Press, 1890), XV, 370.
ftWashington to President of Congress, January 31,1777,
Writings of Washington. VII, 81.
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deserters or else, he warned, the states would Implement "some new-
9fangled, or inadequate schemes of their own."
As early as November 4, 1775, Congress recommended to the states 
that fines of from thirty to fifty dollars be imposed on persons 
sheltering fugitives, but the effect was incidental.1® In 1776 
Congress brought special pressure on Pennsylvania to use the German 
battalion to return culprits to camp.1'1' The state authorities did 
little to implement this proposal.
In February, 1777, Congress passed a resolution recommending 
that the state legislatures provide laws authorizing any "constable, 
freeholder, or Keeper of any public ferry" to apprehend any deserter 
and return him immediately to the army. At the same time Congress 
also recommended that the states provide laws to punish any person 
who concealed or aided any deserter by imposing a fine of ten dollars. 
If he could not pay the fine the guilty person was to be publicly 
whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine lashes. It was also ordered that 
pertinent sections of the Articles of War along with the harboring
9Washington to Joseph Reed, February 23, 1777, ibid., VII,
191-92.
10Journals of Continental Congress. Ill, 325.
“ September 27, 1776, ibid., V, 831-32.
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resolutions be published in the newspapers for six months and three
12hundred copies be distributed among the officers of the army. The
reward for apprehending deserters was increased from five to ten
dollars in March, 1777, and the offer extended to non-commissioned
13officers and privates as well as to civilians.
Besides the reward, on July 31, 1777, Congress authorized the
payment of mileage between the place where the deserter was captured
14and the nearest jail or army camp. The premium and all expenses 
were to be taken from the pay of the soldier being returned.
Washington consented to releasing a sizeable number of officers 
to apprehend tum-tails. State executives were requested to provide 
additional officer assistance as well as money.^ Many officers 
were able to draw expense money for having properly secured deserters 
in jails. Captain James Smith incurred expenses of <^49.5 in the 
pursuit of eight deserters. Smith encountered trouble collecting his 
expense money and appealed to Washington to help him settle the
12Ibid., VII, 115-18. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the 
harboring laws.
13Ibid., IX, 813; Writings of Washington, IX, 442, 492,
Washington sent a circular letter to general officers commanding 
corps and divisions on October 26, 1777, requesting their opinions 
concerning a number of questions. One question was: "Will it be
consistent with propriety and good policy to allow Soldiers the 
reward offered to others for apprehending deserters?" Most of the 
generals answered that a reward should be allowed to soldiers.
"Proceedings of the Council of War," Washington Papers, Library of Congress, 
Roll 45.
14Papers of the Continental Congress, October 7, 1777,
National Archives, Roll 30.
15Ibid. *. Washington to Colonel James Innis, January 2, 1778,
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account. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Kidder Meade, aide-de-camp 
to General Washington, informed Captain Thomas Converse of the 
Seventh Connecticut Regiment in September, 1779, that he could not 
pay the full amount owed him for apprehending four deserters because 
of the shortage of money, but he was given a reduced amount.^ These 
examples indicate that the good intentions of Congress and the states 
in providing money for apprehension were not always realized because 
of the inability to pay what they had promised. Even so, in 1779 the 
state governors were authorized to offer a reward of X 30 and 3s. per 
mile for transportation of captured deserters, with Congress paying 
the bill.
While these measures had some good effect, they offered no 
satisfactory solution, mainly because local cooperation was too 
often lacking. Most states did pass laws offering rewards for 
seizing deserters and imposing punishments on those who harbored 
them, but even the legislators admitted that the laws were ineffective.
Washington informed Vice President George Read of Delaware 
that not less than three hundred deserters were hiding out in Delaware, 
receiving assistance from many disaffected persons who made a practice 
of aiding these renegades. He urged the speedy passage of a law to
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 46.
■^Lieutenant Colonel R. K. Meade to Captain Thomas Converse, 
September 29, 1779, ibid., Roll 61; Washington to Thomas Converse, 
September 29, 1779, Writings of Washington, XVI, 360-61. Twenty- 
five receipts of money paid for bringing in deserters were found 
in Record Group 93, Entry 6, Documents 1111-1134, National Archives.
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remedy this situation.^ Washington ordered Captain Henry Lee to
proceed with the apprehension of these deserters after the passage
18of the required law. But Lee, who received scant help from state 
authorities, found a considerable number of influential men who 
continued to shelter the guilty.
In addition to the three Delaware counties, several areas of 
the country became recognized hideouts for deserters. The lower 
counties of New Jersey, because of their inaccessibility and loyalist 
influence, were excellent places for quitters to find refuge. Many 
people in various towns of Pennsylvania concealed deserters and 
refused to give them up to recruiting officers. Hundreds of law­
less deserters lurked in Virginia, especially in the counties of 
Hampshire, Montgomery, and Washington, where they spread disaffection 
and occasionally engaged in armed riots. Many truants were found in
North Carolina as early as 1776, where the army had had little
19success in apprehending them. The good reception given runaways 
by civilians throughout the South had a demoralizing effect on the 
army and caused others to flee on the assumption that they too would be 
forgiven and well received.
"^Washington to Vice President George Read, February 26, 1778, 
Writings of Washington, X, 517-18.
18Washington to Captain Henry Lee, February 25, 1778, ibid., X,
514.
19Washington to Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh, January 5, 
1778, ibid., X, 268-69. Washington sent an appeal to the Governor of 
North Carolina to give assistance in picking up stragglers and 
deserters.
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The western parts of Pennsylvania and New York, as well as
the frontier settlements in Tennessee and Kentucky, were swarming
with fugitives who sometimes combined with the Indians and Tories to
20raid army supply trains and prey on civilians. Throughout the war 
Vermont was a favorite sanctuary for hundreds of deserters from 
Washington's army. In 1781, Washington told Joseph Jones that he 
had had many uneasy moments because of the conduct of the people of 
Vermont in harboring quitters. Vermont, said the General, had become 
"an asylem to all deserters; [and] to every person who wishes to avoid
taxation," adding that the population growth in Vermont corresponded
21with the army's loss by desertion. In 1783, Washington all but 
gave up trying to retrieve fugitives from Vermont. In describing 
the land and the people he said that they were a "hardy race, composed 
of that kind of People who are best calculated for Soldiers; in 
truth who are Soldiers; for many, many hundreds of them are Deserters 
from this Army; who having acquired property there, would be desperate 
in the defense of it, well knowing they are fighting with Halters about 
their NECKS." The General decided against sending after the Vermont 
refugees. He felt his soldiers would be unwilling "to embrue their 
hands in the blood of their B r e t h r e n , H e  was no doubt correct in 
this decision.
20Nelson, The American Tory, 87-88.
2*Washington to Joseph Jones, July 10, 1781, Writings of 
Washington. XXII, 354.
22February 11, 1783, ibid.. XXVI, 123.
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Most of the responsibility for capturing deserters and bringing
them to trial for their crimes rested directly with the army. The
Commander in Chief and commanders of regiments took positive steps
to safeguard soldiers from abandoning the service while in camp and
23while marching to new locations. While at Morristown in 1777, 
Washington instructed regimental and corps commanders to take special 
care to prevent men from straggling, to disapprove all requests for
A /
officer leaves, and to have the rolls called twice daily. From
Valley Forge in December he issued orders providing confinement and
severe punishment for any non-commissioned officer or soldier caught
outside the limits of the camp without a pass, with or without his
arms. Brigade commanders selected officers to visit soldier's
quarters unannounced between the hours of eight and ten each evening
with authority to administer "exemplary punishment" on all absentees
25that could be located. Orders issued at White Marsh in December on 
the day prior to the scheduled march of Knox's troops called for "a 
Subalthera from each regiment and a Captain from each brigade, under the 
command of a Field Officer," to assemble and remain back until the 
force moved out, and then to collect all the stragglers who attempted
23Washington to Colonel James Innis, January 2, 1778, ibid., X,
254-55.
2AGeneral Orders, April 11, 1777, ibid., VII, 391.
^General Orders, December 26, 1777, ibid., X, 207.
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to hide out in the camp grounds. The backsliders were inarched off
26with the main body. As desertions continued during December, 
Washington increased the roll calls to once every two hours, and 
ordered the officers to keep up with their men —  to know where 
every one was at all times. No soldier was to be out of quarters 
after dark.^
Washington set a strict policy for granting furloughs to
officers and soldiers at Valley Forge. No regiment was to be
without at least two field grade officers, no company without two
commissioned officers, and no regiment to have more than twenty
28men on furlough at a time. Those on furlough were to have 
written orders specifying their leave time.
While providing security from within, efforts were also 
made to provide security from without the camp. Guards were detailed 
tc patrol every camp area. Captain Bartholomew Von Heer's entire 
command was detailed in 1778 to patrol the camp while the army was 
bivouaced with orders to apprehend deserters, marauders, drunkards, 
rioters, stragglers, and all other soldiers found violating general
^General Orders, December 10, 1777, ibid., X, 148-49.
^General Orders, December 6, 1777, ibid., X, 139; General 
Orders, January 1, 1779, ibid., XIII, 473.
28Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, November 27,
1778, ibid., XIII, 342.
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29orders. All civilians and strangers who were found near the pickets
or in camp without passes from some general officer and were unable
to give a good account of themselves, or whose actions seemed
suspicious, were ordered to be arrested as spies. Attempting to
clarify just who were to be considered as stragglers from camp,
Washington stated that "all Soldiers found beyond the nearest Pickets
in front and on the Flanks; and beyond the extent of one mile estimated
from the center of the Encampment in the Rear, without furloughs in
30the usual form, or proper passes, are to be taken as such."
From his headquarters at Short Hills,New Jersey, in 1780
the Commander in Chief again issued s tem orders against going out of
camp. Observing with great pain "that a number of men were straggling
to a considerable distance from Camp on a variety of frivolous
pretences and without passes," a practice that was "subversive of
all discipline and pernicious in every point of view," Washington
authorized officers to whip (with fifty lashes on the spot) soldiers
31found outside the limits without permission. To avoid this punishment 
soldiers desiring for some reason to violate the regulations managed to 
obtain fraudulently signed passes.
29Washington to Captain Bartholomew Von Heer, October 11,
1778, ibid., XIII, 68; General Orders, October 11, 1778, ibid.,
XIII, 61.
•̂ Ibid., XIII, 68; General Orders, August 20, 1778, ibid.,
XII, 338.
^General Orders, June 11, 1780, ibid., XVIII, 503-504.
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Washington was exceedingly enraged by this practice. Noting that
soldiers were passing pickets at Orangetown, New Jersey, with signed
passes given by sergeants, the General ordered all such to be
immediately stopped and returned to their regiments with their
false passes so that the regimental commanders could locate and
32punish the culprits responsible for issuing them.
A civilian at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, expressed astonish­
ment on hearing that General Thomas Mifflin had to station a 
special guard of several men to protect Continental stores and to
qqapprehend deserters. This was very soon the rule rather than the
exception for the army.
Supposedly alert guards should have detected most potential
deserters trying to slip out of the camp area. Washington often
complained about the lack of attention officers gave to the checking
of guards. This neglect, coupled with the natural tendency of
sentries to shirk their duty, at times actually sleeping on post,
allowed men to stroll defiantly out of camp without so much as a
challenge. Washington ordered phat guards found sleeping on post be
immediately punished; he further promised not .o pardon any man found
34guilty of this offense. A few soldiers were given the death
35penalty for this neglect.
^General Orders, August 19, 1780, ibid., XIX, 396.
33June 25, 1776, Jordan, "Bethlehem During the Revolution," 401.
■^Benjamin Craft, "Craft's Journals of the Siege of Boston," 
edited by S. P. Fowler, Essex Institute, History Collections, III (April, 
1861), 51-57.
35Robert Barber of the 3rd Artillery Regiment was sentenced
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At the same time the army was tightening the controls around
encampment areas and pressing states to prevent civilians from giving
refuge to deserters, plans were put into operation to pursue violators
more aggressively. Important road junctions and river crossings were
placed under strict surveilance by local militia units or special
detachments of Continental troops. Civilians were prevented from
using transportation facilities for the purpose of aiding deserters;
those detected engaged in these unlawful actions were punished. In
1777 Washington ordered the operators of ferries in Pennsylvania and
New Jersey not to convey soldiers across the Delaware and North
rivers until duly authorized discharges or passes were presented.
The ferrymen were further urged to apprehend soldiers who sought
transportation without properly signed papers, and immediately send
36them back to their corps.
Continental forces were ordered to widen their coverage of
areas where deserters might pass. Washington ordered Captain Eliakim
Littell of the First New Jersey Regiment to extend his pickets across
a bridge and put a patrol on the Morristown road, with instructions
to apprehend not only runaways, but also strangers and suspicious 
37persons. Garrison orders issued at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on
to death on August 31, 1781, for sleeping on guard.
^General Orders, February 22, 1777, Writings of Washington. 
VII, 184.
^Washington to Eliakim Littell, March 10, 1778, Mt. Vernon 
Library.
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December 29, 1777, called for a subaltern with guards to be immediately 
sent to Webbs Ferry "to attend strictly to the apprehending of all 
Deserters and particularly to the Examination of all Persons in a 
Soldiers' Dress and others that appear to be suspicious Characters. 
According to this order, if the account given by those questioned was 
not satisfactory to the officer in charge, the suspects were to be 
marched to camp for further interrogation. All wagons were to be 
checked not only for hidden deserters but also for property belong­
ing to the Continental army. All women passing the ferry accompanied 
by soldiers were to be closely investigated concerning their move­
ments .
So flagrant was the abuse of extra privileges granted to
soldiers while convalescing at hospitals that particular attention
had to be given to this problem. Surgeons were restricted in their
use of the furlough. The sick were to be closely accounted for at
all times; even so, desertions from hospitals were profuse. In 1777
Washington complained to the president of Congress that vast
numbers had been sent to hospitals but few ever returned to duty
39after they recovered! Sometimes the well were grouped together 
and marched back to camp. Others were given certificates stating
38Orderly Book, No. 18, National Archives.
39Washington to the president of Congress, January 19, 1777, 
Writings of Washington. VII, 30.
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their condition and allowed to go back on their own. Many of these
failed to return and had to be pursued.
Washington eventually had to send his officers out to collect
deserters, who, he said, were scattered over almost the entire 
40continent. Some regimental commanders and line officers occasionally 
had to be ordered to take more vigorous actions to retrieve deserters. 
Colonel William Russell, whose Thirteenth Virginia Regiment had 
suffered heavy desertions, was ordere'd by the Commander in Chief 
in 1777 to hurry to Fort Pitt, there to exert himself fully in the 
collection of as many deserters as possible.^
While numerous officers were sent out specifically to look 
for military fugitives, other officers voluntarily offered their 
time while traveling or on furlough. Captain David Scott of the 
Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, granted permission to accompany an 
expedition to the Indian country in 1777, informed Washington that
while waiting to join the detachment he had busied himself by
,, 42collecting deserters, including one officer, an Ensign Forshee.
Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, from Mount Joy in 1778, advised
Governor Thomas Wharton of Pennsylvania that a Captain Williams had
been sent on recruiting service with "orders to take up as many Deserters
^Washington to Colonel William Russell, March 30, 1777, ibid., 
XI, 175-76.
42Captain David Scott to Washington, August 25, 1777, U. S. 
Revolution, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Library of Congress, File Box IV.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
278
in this State as he possibly can."^ Captain McLane, in 1778, 
was sent to Delaware to take up and receive deserters belonging to 
the Continental army.^
Some officers were sent out to apprehend certain known 
deserters. Colonel Francis Johnson, Second Pennsylvania Battalion, 
ordered Captain Charles McHenry to proceed to Pennsylvania to arrest
all deserters from that regiment whose names appeared on a list furnished
45him. Captain Moore (possibly Henry Moore of the Fourth South
Carolina Artillery Company) requested that a John Dillard apprehend 
a few deserters from his company, namely, Joshus Westbrook, Richard 
Harden, William James, William Fowler, and William Kirby. Dillard
was promised from seventy to one hundred dollars reward each for these
46men. Captain Galbraith Falls, North Carolina Partisan Rangers,
detailed Captain Leroy Taylor to seize "the Bodys of William &
Robert Johnsons and any other suspected Persons such as Vagerant 
Deserters or Disorderly Persons.
/ A
Brigadier General Anthony Wayne to Governor Thomas Wharton,
April 12, 1778, Pennsylvania Archives, VI, 411.
^John Fitzgerald to Captain Allen McLane, January 8, 1778, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 46.
^Colonel Francis Johnston to Captain Charles McHenry, September 
1, 1778, Pennsylvania Archives, VI, 732.
46Captain Moore to John Dillard, March 20, 1778, Original 
Letter, Miscellaneous Numbered Records (Manuscript File), 1775- 
1784, Record Group 93, Entry 6, Document No. 31894, National Archives.
^Galbraith Falls to Captain Leroy Taylor, July 31, 1779.
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Occasionally extra benefits were derived from being assigned
the duty of apprehending deserters. Washington suggested to Major
General Robert Howe in 1780 that those officers who had not been
given furloughs be selected since they would have an opportunity to
visit their families and friends, and even to look after some
48private affairs while on this duty. Lieutenant James McMichael
of the Pennsylvania Line recorded in his diary that he was ordered
to return to Pennsylvania to search for deserters. He immediately
set out for his home at Stoney Brook where he "passed some days 
49with his wife."
Washington seemed to be always conscious of the expense 
attached to every mission, even the business of retrieving deserters.
He wanted to make sure that benefits reaped in apprehension missions 
were worth the expense and effort. Officers were not usually sent 
out without written authorization. The General personally approved 
most such expeditions requested by regimental commanders. A letter
Original Letter, ibid., Document No. 034161, National Archives. Second 
Lieutenant John Campbell, Second North Carolina Continental Regiment, 
was stationed at Guilford Court House to apprehend deserters and 
delinquent troops. Ibid.
A O Washington to Major General Robert Howe, April 13, 1780, 
Writings of Washington, XVIII, 256.
49July 11, 1777, McMichael, "Diary," 145.
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to Colonel Francis Johnston in 1780 well illustrates Washington's 
concern for the money being spent:
His Excellency is consenting to your sending Lt. John 
Armstrong after the deserters to Fish Kill should you 
think the object worth the expense; but wishes at the 
same time in order to avoid further expense on his 
head [quarters] that you would take proper measures 
before his setting out to inform yourself whether 
there may not be deserters from the rest of the line 
at or near the same place . . . that may be taken up.
A detachment sent out on a patrolling mission in 1780 to
detect night-time enemy activities was given a secondary mission of
inquiring about deserters as they made their way through an area
considered to be infected with loyalists.Captain William Reily,
stationed at Pluckemine Hospital, reported to Robert H. Harrison in
1780 the capture of several deserters. He ended his letter with a
request for a horse, which he said was absolutely necessary if he
was to discharge his duty properly. "If a man deserts," pleaded
Reily, "we are sure to loose him for want of a horse to follow." He
said that two had already made good their escape who might have been
52recovered with the assistance of a horse.
James McHenry to Colonel Francis Johnston, March 24, 1780, 
Writings of Washington, XVIII, 147; Washington Papers, Library of 
Congress, Roll 65; similar letter sent from Brigadier General Richard 
K. Meade to Colonel Walter Stewart, February 16, 1780, ibid.. Roll 64.
"^Washington to Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, July 20, 1780, 
Writings of Washington, XIX, 216-17.
52Captain William Reily to Robert H. Harrison, June 17, 1780, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 67.
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A letter from Adjutant General Richard K. Meade to Colonel 
Moses Hazen in 1780 well illustrated the concern both to capture desert­
ers and to do it in the most economical manner. Meade expressed 
Washington's anxiety to prevent further desertions from the Canadian 
regiment. The General had consented to a few officers being sent to 
recover those who had deserted, but they were to use "the strictest 
economy in the execution of this business and procure accounts and 
vouchers agreeable to the Genl order of that head [quarters]
Not all the effort expended by the army was wasted; sometimes 
officers and soldiers detailed to pursue military shirkers were 
successful in apprehending culprits. Colonel James Wood of the 
Eighth Virginia Regiment reported to Washington in 1778 that he had 
collected twenty deserters whom he was forwarding to camp.^ An 
article in the New Jersey Gazette reported that eight enemy cavalry 
troops had been captured on July 30, 1779, near Tarrytown by Continental 
soldiers. Three were former members of the Continental army who 
had defected to the enemy. After surrendering themselves the three 
attempted to escape but were prevented from leaving again by their 
guards. The newspaper account said that the deserters were "Pretty
53Major General R. K. Meade to Colonel Moses Hazen, October 5, 
1780, ibid.. Roll 71.
^Colonel Janes Wood to Washington, March 14, 1778, Ibid..
Roll 47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
282
55roughly handled when subdued." James Moore from Rantas Mills 
reported to Washington in April, 1780, that the militia had captured 
two deserters who belonged to the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment.^ 
Brigadier General Edward Hand informed David McKnight of the Fifth 
Pennsylvania Regiment in 1781 about the capture and wounding of a 
Negro soldier named Robert, who belonged to Colonel John Durkee's 
regiment of the Connecticut Line. According to Hand, Robert was 
escorting British prisoners of war to Pennsylvania and apparently 
had been bribed by the British soldiers to let them escape and 
then to go off with them but was prevented from escaping because of 
his wound. While recuperating Hand overheard Robert trying to 
persuade a Negro woman to go off with him to the enemy. He was 
confined for attempted desertion but was later sent to the hospital 
at Fishkill to recover from his injury.^
A report giving full details of the pursuit of thirty-one
deserters from Fort Schuyler was sent to Colonel Goose Van Schaick
58by Lieutenant Abraham Hardenberg in May, 1780. The lengthy report 
^ New Jersey Gazette, August 11, 1779.
"^James Moore to Washington, April 28, 1780, Washington Papers, 
Library of Congress, Roll 66.
^Brigadier General Edward Hand to David McKnight, May 7, 1781, 
Hand, Copies of Letters, Miscellaneous Record Book, No. 162, National 
Archives, 20-21.
58Lieutenant Abraham Hardenberg to Colonel Goose Van Schaick, 
May 31, 1780, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 66.
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stated that on May 22 the officer of the guard observed that two of 
his sentries had not called out the hour of the night. Upon investi­
gation the officer found that the sentries had fled their post; he 
immediately alerted the commanding officer who ordered the entire 
garrison to parade; when the rolls were called, it was learned that 
thirty-one men were missing. Since the garrison was weakened by 
this desertion, the commander sent a dispatch to neighboring friendly 
Indians requesting that they collect warriors to pursue the deserters. 
The next day about forty Indians appeared at the post. Lieutenant 
Hardenberg accompanied the party in pursuit of the deserters with 
orders to bring in as many prisoners as possible without endangering 
his detachment; but, if the deserters resisted, force was to be 
used to compel them to surrender.
The search party found the deserters' tracks about two miles 
from camp and followed them all that day. On Wednesday, May 24, 
about sunset, they came upon the deserters while they were attempting 
to cross the Grand River on a small raft. Fifteen had already crossed 
the river which left sixteen on the near side. Those across the 
river saw the Indians and hollered across warning the others of the 
danger. The search party rushed the deserters. A deserter named 
Conway fired at the search party, then the other fugitives began to 
fire as well as those on the opposite bank of the river. The Indians 
immediately returned the fire, killing thirteen of the deserters.
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Three were captured unharmed. Lieutenant Hardenberg then beckoned 
to those across the river watching the melee to give themselves up, 
promising that they would not be harmed. They answered with their 
muskets, then fled. The next morning six Indians caut?' sly crossed 
the river to investigate; they soon surmised that the deserters had 
run off in several different directions making it useless to continue 
the pursuit. Judging from the number of packs and food left behind 
Hardenberg estimated that the escapees had no more than three loaves 
of bread to carry fifteen of them about 150 miles to Oswagatchee 
their supposed destination. On Friday the Lieutenant returned to 
Fort Schuyler with the three prisoners and submitted his report.
Rapid pursuit prevented a mass desertion from occurring in
59Major General William Heath's command. On the evening of January 1, 
1780, about forty men of the West Point garrison gathered their belong­
ings including packs, arms, and accoutrements and left the army on 
the assumption that their time of enlistment had expired. Since most 
of them had enlisted for three years or the duration in January,
1777, they felt they should have been released. However, none of 
them had been granted discharges from the any; thus their depart­
ure was unauthorized, and they were all considered deserters.
As soon as it was known that the men were gone, Captain 
Luther Bailey with one hundred men was ordered to bring them back
•^Major General William Heath to Washington, January 10, 1780, 
ibid., Roll 63.
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dead or alive. The deserters marched up the west side of the Hudson 
River, looking for a place to cross. Heath sent an express rider to 
the regimental commander located at Fishkill, requesting that he 
prepare to stop the deserters if they got that far. Captain Bailey 
fortunately overtook them at New Winsdor, bringing them all under 
his control without opposition. He marched them back to West Point, 
where the leaders were confined, and the others allowed to return to 
their quarters.^
Heath indicated to Washington that he felt there had been
a plan for more troops to leave for the same reason. All of them
were to rendezvous at Fishkill, and from there to go to Danbury
to be joined by still more troops from Poors' brigade before they
all marched home together. Effective measures taken by Heath had
discouraged their plan. Heath said a sergeant in Colonel Timothy
Biglow's Fifteenth Massachusetts Regiment had tipped off the plan
by talking too freely. The sergeant was tried, reduced in rank,
and given one hundred lashes at the head of the brigade. The effect
of the punishment was noticeable, for none of the men of that unit
left their quarters while about sixty men of Brigadier General John
Glover's brigade, who had not heard of the actions already taken,
61went off from their lines, but they were speedily recovered.
6^Ibid.
61Ibid.
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Not all the men captured offered resistence. Captain
Jeremiah Fogg, whose company was located at a bridge near Bedford,
New York, reported that the militia forces had taken two deserters
62from his company who were making their way to the enemy. The 
deserters, John McCormick and William Boyd, were captured in a 
swamp early one morning by the militia guards who reported that the 
men seemed panic stricken at the approach of the guards and gave 
up without a struggle, even though only one of the militiamen was 
armed.
Ebenezer Wild recorded in his diary on August 23, 1777, that
five men from the First Massachusetts Regiment had been captured
63trying to desert. They were put in irons in the guardhouse.
Some of the methods used by individual officers and commanders 
to retrieve deserters might not have stood careful scrutiny by 
concerned citizens. Captain William Eggleston of Colonel Lee's 
Legion used rather highhanded tactics in the apprehension of Peter 
Bainbridge, a soldier in the Legion, who had deserted. Washington 
wrote to Greene in 1780 that reports had reached him indicating 
that Eggleston's "conduct had been highly unmilitary and unwarrant­
able."^ Apparently the captain had extorted from the father of the
62Captain Jeremiah Fogg to Major Amos Morrill, February 2, 
1781, ibid.. Roll 76.
63Wild, "Journal," VI, 93.
^Washington to Major General Nathaniel Greene, December 28, 
1780, Writings of Washington, XXI, 30.
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deserter a number of concessions including a promise to pay for a
pair of leather breeches, the procurement of ten recruits for the
army, and the capture of three additional deserters. In return
Eggleston promised to spare the life of the lad. The Commander in
Chief ordered that this matter be investigated, and that if the
captain was guilty, he be punished.
At the same time, Washington himself occasionally resorted
to questionable methods, such as using captured deserters to lead
search parties to hideouts of other deserters. Washington wrote to
Heath in 1779 that the capture of a deserter named Rissimbarack was
worth a little trouble and suggested that a deserter named Nifer
65be used as a pilot to Rissimbarack’s home.
Deserters were often found among the prisoners of war. A
careful check of the prisoners of war at Penburroug township in 1778
66revealed four men who were deserters from the American army. Two 
of the men had escaped by going aboard an English ship, a method 
used frequently when desertion occurred near the coast or in the lake 
areas. In October, 1781, Washington ordered that all prisoners taken 
at Yorktown and Gloucester be carefully scrutinized to determine if
^Washington to Heath, August 10, 1779, ibid., XVI, 71.
66Report of the Prisoners of War now under Main Guard . . . 
Penburroug, Township, June 2, 1778, U. S. Revolution, Miscellaneous 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress, File Box III.
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any were deserters from the American forces. Officers from every
corps and state line who knew their deserters personally were
detailed to make the inspection and point out their men, who
67were to be immediately confined.
Occasionally men who deserted were sent back to the American
lines under flags of truce on various missions for the British. Some
of these men were apprehended, but it posed a question concerning the
honoring of a flag of truce. In answer to a letter from Sir William
Howe questioning the propriety of taking action against men in this
situation, Washington gave assurance that persons of this kind
would be detained and punished. He said that, since the person in
question was a deserter from the army under his command, he and
all others in similar circumstances would be seized and punished
as deserters whenever they were found. This was simply the practice
of war among nations. The American Commander in Chief angrily
added that former deserters who appeared under these conditions only
68aggravated their offense.
Numerous advertisements for deserters appeared in practically 
every newspaper printed in America. They usually gave descrip­
tions of the deserters including how they looked, what they wore,
^General Orders, October 21, 1781, Writings of Washington, 
XXIII, 252.
68Washington to Sir William Howe, March 22, 1778, ibid., XI,
130-31.
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the regiment and company they belonged to, and the reward for their 
capture. They were normally inserted by officers who promised 
from eight to one thousand dollars reward. Captured offenders 
were ordinarily to be delivered to the officers placing the notices, 
although some requested the men be delivered to a jail.
The apprehension of deserters during the Revolutionary War 
was never effective enough to constitute a substantial deterrent to 
desertion. The laws on the subject were never adequate or well 
enforced. Popular sympathy for the fugitives, frontier lawlessness, 
and a weak government were effective obstacles that hindered capture. 
At times officers were actually prevented physically from taking 
culprits. Washington bitterly observed that there was "too much 
countenance given to Deserters," and many instances "where Deserters 
which have been appreh nded by Officers, have been rescued by the 
People, and but very few where the Officers have received their aid 
and s u p p o r t . I t  was evident that a greater threat than mere 
capture was needed to stem the practice of desertion among the 
soldiers —  they would have to be punished in an exemplary manner.
^Washington to President Joseph Reed, April 28, 1780, 
ibid., XVIII, 311.
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CHAPTER X
THE PREVENTION OF DESERTION - PART I
Since desertions began to occur at the very start of the 
fighting, authorities immediately began to deal with the problem.
At first commanders thought only of punishing offenders, believing 
this would have a positive effect on all the troops. Various punish­
ments were used, such as confinement, forfeiture of pay, reduction in 
rank, whipping, and death, along with other forms. When these measures 
failed to produce the desired results, the army interlaced punishment 
with periods of leniency by offering pardons to some while promising 
much harsher treatment if desertion recurred. This approach also 
failed.
At the same time, the army attempted to deal with the desertion 
problem by correcting some of the grievances that had caused men to 
flee the service, which was certainly a step in the right direction. 
Improvements in camp life and in the recruiting process along with a 
rigidly imposed discipline were measures attempted by the army. 
Washington maintained that ill-trained men and poor officers accounted 
for a large percentage of the army's deserters. Regular pay, better 
clothing and living conditions, and adequate food were remedies 
designed to dissuade men from running away. Of course, the army 
was powerless to correct all the abuses the men suffered; many were
290
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beyond the scope of the army. Family problems could not usually 
be solved by military regulations, nor could the service stop men 
determined to run away to gain additional bounty payments.
The first action, and the one most often used in an 
effort to prevent desertion, was simply to punish the person who 
deserted. But it was difficult to mete out adequate and meaningful 
punishment. Ever since the publication of Marchess Di Beccaria's 
Essay on Crimes and Punishment in 1764, the use of punishment had 
been undergoing a slow change in Western society. This book had a 
profound impact on the thinking of all prison reformers, including 
military disciplinarians. Beccaria maintained that the certainty, 
not the severity, of the punishment was the most powerful deterrent 
to an act of crime.^ This idea was the keynote of all who opposed 
capital punishment. However, during the Revolutionary War, most 
military men continued to regard the death penalty and flogging as the 
best deterrents against desertion. And the basic assumption of the 
reformers was lost, because the army did not always punish offenders. 
Too many pardons removed the certainty; thus punishment, for all 
practical purposes, lost its deterrent effect during the Revolutionary 
War.
Recruiting
A particularly troublesome grievance arose over the manner 
of cnliating men for the service. Various attempts were made during
*Albert Post, "Early Efforts to Abolish Capital Punishment in
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the course of the war to improve the recruiting process in order to 
decrease the illegal departures. As noted earlier, some commanders 
obtained recruits through the unlawful procedure of enticing men away 
from units where they were already serving tours of duty. Not only 
did this practice cause dissention among the officer class, but 
often resulted in the soldiers' being tried as deserters by their 
former commanders. Most of these men, no doubt, agreed willingly to 
the "transfer" because of the bounties offered them. As early as 
July, 1775, Washington sent a stem warning to commanders to abstain 
from this practice: "if any agent or soldier shall hereafter be
ofound so offending," they would be punished with the utmost severity.
If flagrant abuses of this sort subsided after the war's first year,
bounty-jumping continued for several years and even increased as the
bounties became more attractive.
In January, 1777, the Commander in Chief issued detailed
3instructions to all recruiting agents. Qualification for service in
Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXVIII 
(January, 1944), 38; Marchess Di Beccaria, On Crime and Punishment, 
trans. Henry Paolucci (Liberal Arts Press, Imprint of Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, 1963). Originally published in 1764.
^July 7, 1775, Henshaw, "Orderly Book," 119.
3Recruiting Instructions, January 13, 1777, Writings of 
Washington, VII, 7-8.
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the army was specified. Recruits were to be between seventeen and 
fifty years of age, sufficiently large and strong to perform the 
duties of soldiers, free from lameness and bodily infirmities. 
Recruiters were not to enlist any deserters from the British army,
"nor any person of disaffected and Suspicious Principles, with respect 
to the American C a u s e . B e s i d e s  monetary benefits, the soldiers 
were to receive one hundred acres of land at the end of the war or 
the termination of three years' service. This last provision caused 
considerable confusion during 1780, because some of those enlisted 
in 1777 felt that their tours ended in three years rather than at the 
end of the war. Desertion turned into mutiny on that occasion.
Complete fairness in recruiting could scarcely prevail. 
Individual inequities continued to cause resentment not only among 
the soldiers chosen to serve, but also among the civilian popula­
tion and among army commanders. Brigadier General John Glover, from 
Marblehead, complained to Washington in April, 1777, of doing every­
thing in his power to fill the quota for the state of Massachusetts 
without success. A great part of the problem, he said, was caused by 
"privateers fitting out" in the sea port towns and signing up most of 
the men normally available for the land service. Glover complained 
that "there is at least 5 or 100 as good able bodied men in this 
town as I should wish to see in the field, but nothing will induce
4Ibid., VII, 7.
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them to go into the army while there's the least prospect of going to 
s e a . F r o m  Providence, Major General Joseph Spencer reported in
April, 1777, that there were only 382 rank and file in the army from
£
Connecticut and not one from Massachusetts of New Hampshire. Colonel 
George Baylor, Third Continental Dragoons, located at Fredricksburg, 
Virginia, wrote in April that it was difficult to find men fit to 
serve as cavalrymen who were willing to enlist for the duration of the 
war. Baylor suggested that he be allowed to exchange large men for 
small men from other corps to fill up his dragoons.^ The Commander in 
Chief did not favor the idea of transferring men; he issued instructions 
later that year to encourage the enlisting of suitable men for the 
horse service, but included a warning against taking anyone not a 
native in this service, since, as he said, "the Equippment [Sic] of
O
Dragoons is very expensive and Desertions should be avoided."
Horse soldiers were indeed prime targets for British propaganda. 
Considerable numbers were tempted away from the American service by 
offers of money for their mounts and equipment.
^Brigadier General John Glover to Washington, April 1, 1777, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 40.
^Major General Joseph Spencer to Washington, April 14, 1777, ibid., 
Roll 41.
^Colonel George Baylor to Washington, April 14, ibid., Roll 41.
O
Instructions to Officers of Light Dragoons, December 30, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, X, 230.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
295
In 1779, in an attempt to eliminate inequities and stabilize
personnel procurement, Washington recommended that Congress adopt
a policy of drafting annually to fill up the regiments. He expressed
his disdain for short tours of duty and discouraged further dependence
9on voluntary enlistments. Washington wanted a sure supply of men 
and disliked having to rely on recruiters to persuade men to 
join. Earlier in the year a council of officers met at Peekskill,
New York, to discuss the problem of recruiting. At the meeting, held 
at Major General McDougall's headquarters, the officers agreed to 
enlist only able-bodied men and to recruit for the duration of the war. 
Another improvement came when the army selection policy became more 
selective. Before credit would be given for enlistments, a certificate 
had to be secured from the surgeon stating that the inductees "were 
free from ulcers, ruptures, and other infirmiti is," and were of a 
firm constitution."^ The generals also agreed to follow orders and 
not enlist British deserters.
Regardless of the efforts of Congress, the states, or military 
officers, the levies were never completely filled and the army struggled 
along with insufficient numbers. In 1780 the Commander in Chief wrote 
a circular letter to the states expressing extreme alarm over the
Q
Washington to the President of Congress, November 18, 1779, 
ibid., XVII, 127-28.
^Major General McDougall to Washington, April 15, 1779, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 56.
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lack of men.^ "Our allies,11 he said, "would be chagrined, were they
to arrive today, to find that we have but a handful of men in the
field, and would doubt, it is more probable, whether we had any serious
12intentions to prosecute the measure with vigor." He insisted that 
the states fill their levies as fast as possible. No doubt the 
shortage of men in the field was discouraging to those soldiers on 
active duty, causing some of them to desert. Fully conscious of this 
situation, Washington did everything possible to keep the army at 
full strength, partly at least, to improve the morale of the veterans. 
During the last two years of the war, the army was able to attract 
sufficient men to keep the Continental forces operative until victory 
came; and there appear to have been fewer desertions for this reason.
Discipline
Early in the war Washington decided that strict discipline 
must be maintained if the American army was to be effective. Realizing 
that desertions often occurred in conjunction with criminal acts, such 
as stealing, plundering, rioting, and even murder, the army endeavored 
to remedy both situations by improving the discipline of the troops. 
Soldiers poorly trained and lacking proper supervision were very 
likely to become engaged in unlawful activities warranting punishment.
^Washington to the States, June 30, 1780, Writings of 
Washington, XIX, 104-105.
12Ibid., XIX, 104.
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To avoid punishment the simplest alternative facing the offender was 
to run away. It was obvious that measures had to be taken to stop 
men from committing crimes, which would thereby prevent some desertions.
As early as June; '775, Washington ordered regimental colonels
to prepare detailed descriptions of all their troops so they could
be readily identified. These descriptive lists were to include the
soldier's name, place of residence, age, stature, and complexion.
The same order required that the rolls be called each morning and
evening; the soldiers were to be in their tents by 9 o'clock at
13night on penalty of confinement. Similar instructions were repeated 
numerous times during the war, indicating a lack of strict compliance.
Foremost in the mind of Congress in revising the Articles 
of War in 1776 was the hope of achieving better discipline among 
the troops. The president of Congress wrote to Philip Schuyler in 
September that Congress was insistent on strict discipline; all 
soldiers were to be trained daily in the art of war and taught to 
pay attention to orders.^ As might be expected, the desired results 
were not fully achieved. A letter from the president to Horatio Gates
13John Chester, "Extracts from an Orderly Book, 5 June-17 June, 
1775," Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, XIV (1875- 
1876), 90.
14President of Congress to Philip Schuyler, September 12, 1776, 
Burnett (ed.). Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, II, 
106-107.
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in 1777, deploring the poor discipline and lack of order in the army.^"*
attests to the disorderliness of the service. Congress on March 22,
1778, appointed a five-member committee to devise ways and means for
preserving the health of the troops, and for introducing better
16discipline into the army. Little good came from this study.
The Commander in Chief continued to press the issue. In 
1778 Washington wrote to Major General Charles Lee that he must be 
strict in discipline: He must allow no rambling, keep his men in their
ranks, and the officers on duty with their divisions, and "punish 
severely every Officer or Soldier who shall presume to press without 
proper authority." Lee was also to "prohibit the burning of Fences," 
and "to protect the persons and property of the Inhabitants from 
every kind of Insult and a b u s e . W r i t i n g  to Brigadier General 
William Woodford, Washington reasoned that a strict attention to 
discipline would enable the Virginia Line to vie with any corps in 
the service. The Commander in Chief listed all those things that
■^President of Congress to Horatio Gates, February 23, 1777, 
ibid., II, 273.
16Resolutions of Congress, March 22, 1778, Journals of the 
Continental Congress. VII, 193. Members of this committee were Oliver 
Walcott, David Roberdeau, John Witherspoon, Samuel Adams, and 
Abraham Clark. On April 17, two additional members were appointed, 
Elbridge Gerry and William Duer.
^Washington to Major General Charles Lee, May 30, 1778, 
Writings of Washington. XI, 489-90.
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were required to prepare a unit to compete successfully in the field 
with the enemy. He concluded by encouraging soldiers
. . .  to abide strictly by Military rules, regulations, 
and orders. These constitute the essence of a Soldier, 
and are characteristic of good Officers. Without these 
no service can be well conducted, and every service must 
be disagreable [Sic], sluggish, and expensive.
One reason for the ill-discipline of some troops came as a
result of officers' failure to properly inform them or pass on vital
information. There was gross negligence in reading general orders to 
19the men. Many soldiers were totally ignorant of important orders 
and instructions designed to improve military discipline. Major 
General Greene found officers with little more idea of military 
discipline than raw militia recruits.. Numerous general orders from 
Washington's headquarters dealt directly with the problem of 
desertion. Orders from Morristown in 1780 noted the continued 
irregularities and disorders that prevailed in the army. The General 
called upon all commanders to correct the abuses and to "introduce an
18Washington to Brigadier General William Woodford, December 13, 
1779, ibid. XVII, 255. Similar instructions were sent to Lord 
Stirling, June 2, 1779, ibid., XV, 211.
19General Orders, September 26, 1777, ibid., IX, 268.
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exact conformity to the regulations for the order and discipline of the
troops," ending with a reminder that ignorance of duties and regula-
20tions could not be excused. From Orangetown, New York, general
orders instructed commanders to prevent their troops from plunderings,
committing violence, destroying fruit in the fields, and injuring
private citizens.^
Civilians often contributed to the ill-conduct of the troops.
From Middlebrook, New Jersey, Washington wrote to Colonel Daniel
Brodhead concerning the problem of local inhabitants selling liquor
to the soldiers. The General advised exemplary punishment for the
soldiers and seizure of the liquor from the sellers, but he warned
22against trying to punish civilians under military law. In 1778, 
in a letter to William Duer, Hamilton returned to an old problem, 
stating that he considered much of the poor discipline to stem from 
having military units only half filled. Under strength regiments 
tend to be lax in all military affairs, and consequently, lax in 
discipline.^
20General Orders, February 12, 1780, ibid., XVIII, 5-6.
^General Orders, August 9, 1780, ibid., XIX, 348.
^Washington to Colonel Daniel Brodhead, May 21, 1779,
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 58.
^Hamilton to William Duer, June 18, 1778, Syrett (ed.), Papers 
of Hamilton, I, 499-500.
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Many commanders, however, did try to comply with Washington's
instructions. Brigadier General James Mitchell issued orders when at
Providence, Rhode Island, designed to keep closer watch over the
troops. Both soldiers and non-commissioned officers were forbidden to
go more than one mile from camp without a written pass from the officer
of the day. Soldiers found outside the limits were ordered to be
24immediately confined and court-martialed. The next day Mitchell
issued additional orders detesting the general confusion and noise
in camp at night and the high-handed practice of some soldiers who
were going into town at night disturbing the civilian inhabitants.
The threat of punishment, the only weapon available, was again 
25published. Mitchell was even more appalled to learn that many of 
the officers were not remaining in camp at night; by sleeping out 
of camp without authority, they afforded the troops ample opportunity
to slip away. This practice, though ordered stopped immediately,
26did not cease.
At West Point, Greene had the same trouble. In October, 1780, 
he declared that he was "exceedingly mortified at the complaints by 
the inhabitants . . . against the troops of this garrison for fights
24Orderly Book, No. 26 (Varnum, Providence), September 16,
1780, National Archives.
^September 17, 1780, ibid.
^September 20, 1780, ibid.
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and violence offered to their property." He further stated that
the villains had tried to justify their actions by the "license" of
their officers, the scarcity of provisions, and the apparent unconcern
of the inhabitants about the cause they were suffering to accomplish.
To prevent the ill-disciplined from stealing from the townspeople,
Greene ordered the rolls to be called three times a day, and directed
the local inhabitants to apprehend every soldier that went out of
27camp without an authorized pass. Strict discipline energetically
enforced did bring good results. Major General Robert Howe reported
to Washington in March, 1780, that he had arrested both officers and
soldiers who violated orders, and that he intended to continue the
28strict discipline because it had already produced a good effect.
Numerous attempts were made to maintain close supervision of 
troops in garrison areas. Captain Simeon Brown, of Colonel Nathaniel 
Wade'8 regiment, recorded in his orderly book in August, 1778, 
warnings against officers being absent from camp without permission; 
on September 6, 1778, additional orders announced that "no soldier 
[was] to absent [himself] more than one mile from his quarters without 
written permit from his officers on penalty of his being flogged ten
27Orderly Book No. 45 (Greene, West Point), October 13, 1780, 
National Archives.
28Major General Robert Hove, March 8, 1780, Washington Papers, 
Library of Congress, Roll 64.
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lashes on the spot."29 By September, 1779, in the Providence head­
quarters, the punishment had jumped to thirty-nine lashes on the spot 
for any soldier found one mile from camp after tattoo and a five-dollar
reward to anyone who exposed an offender. Houses were searched for
30delinquent soldiers, A more effective threat was to move the
troops far away from all inhabited areas if conduct did not improve.
At Peekskill, general orders issued in 1781 required "chains" of
sentries to be established around the camp grounds to keep the
0*1soldiers from leaving during the night. At York, Pennsylvania, 
orders called for the use of patrols with authority to detect and 
apprehend all soldiers found straggling out of camp with their fire­
arms. Those detected were to be given thirty lashes, on their bare 
back without the benefit of a trial.^2
General Orders issued in November, 1782, by Washington to the 
entire army attempted to suppress the practice of marauding out of 
camp that was so scandalously flagrant at that time. The orders 
required that the rolls be called four times every twenty-four hours 
at irregular times. The General advised commanding officers to call 
the roll during the night if they suspected that soldiers had slipped
29Simeon Brown, "Orderly Book of Captain Simeon Brown, Colonel 
[Nathaniel] Wade's Regiment, Rhode Island Campaign, 1778," Essex 
Institute, Historical Collections, LVIII (July, 1922), 251-52, 255.
2®0rderly Book No. 26 (Providence), September 1, 1779,
National Archives.
^General Orders, June 27, 1781, Writings of Washington, XXII,
269.
^General Orders, October 31, 1781, ibid., XXIII, 305.
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out to pillage the countryside. Patrols were ordered out to apprehend 
villains, with instructions to punish those apprehended on the spot 
with lashes not exceeding one hundred. If goods and property belong­
ing to inhabitants were found in the possession of the delinquents
they were to be confined until they could be "tried for their Lives"
33by a general court-martial. The army certainly tried to correct 
this gross violation of military discipline, but the effectiveness 
of these measures were all less than was desired.
The general qualities of the American troops were well 
known to the British. Captain Johann Heinricks of the Hessian Jager 
Corps reported in 1778 from Philadelphia that the Continental soldiers 
were brave and enthusiastic but lacked good leadership. The greatest 
problem Heinrick detected was the lack of subordination: "their
very spirit of independence is detrimental to them, as Hans cannot
Q /
concede that Peter, who is his neighbor should command him." A 
few months later, in a letter to his brother, this Hessian officer 
provided further insight into the American problem when he reported 
that all males were required to take up arms against the enemy, 
without benefit of hiring a substitute. He noted that there were 
many soldiers pressed into service in the army against their will,
^General Orders of Washington, November 19, 1782, ibid.,
XXV, 354-55.
^Johann Heinrick, "Extracts from the Letter-Book of Captain 
Johann Heinrick of the Hessian Jagers Corps, 1778-1780." Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography, XXII, No. 2 (1898), 139.
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35which accounted for many of the American desertions. Substitutes 
were permitted in some states although many could not afford them.
It is very doubtful whether the most stringent military 
code could have remedied the prevailing laxity in the army. These 
were problems that could be solved only if the greatest attention
possible were given the subject by every officer in the service, at the
same time that the attitude of the entire army was changed to one of 
willingness to undergo rigid regimentation for the good of the service. 
This idealistic condition could only have been achieved by vigorous 
attempts to change public opinion throughout the thirteen states.
The army, therefore, had to struggle along as best it could, meeting 
each crisis with the only weapons it had —  courts-martial for those 
apprehended and punishment for those convicted.
Punishment
While, the army tried to correct administrative and operational 
abuses that had doubtlessly been responsible for considerable unrest 
and some desertions, it also resorted to punishment of offenders
against army rules. An often-used procedure was to punish a few of the
guilty in a severe manner as an example to the others. From the start 
of the war until the very end examples were made daily.
35April 14, 1778, ibid., 143.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
306
Congress passed a resolution in April, 1776, directing the 
commanders in Canada to be very attentive to military discipline 
and to impose a precedent of harsh punishment on all who violated 
military regulations.3  ̂ In November, the Board of War read a report 
in Congress directing Washington to punish "in the most exemplary 
manner" all officers and men who desert the service.
Concurring in the opinion that examples were essential, 
Washington wrote to Major General Joseph Spencer approving the death 
sentence of one of three men convicted of desertion. "Examples must 
be made," wrote Washington, "to put a stop to that prevailing Crime, 
or we may as well disband the Army at once; I therefore desire that 
the most atrocious of the three may be executed and the others
qopardoned." In a letter to Major General William Heath in July, 
1777, the General condoned a heavy-handed method of dealing with 
deserters:
It is a disagreeable consideration, that our men are 
so apt, on any misfortune, to desert their engagements, and 
return home at a time their Services are most wanted. The 
evil is cf the most injurious and dangerous nature and 
calls for a vigorous remedy. I approve of what you have 
done . . . toward checking the practice by a few instances 
of examplary Severity.
3^April 23, 1776, Journals of the Continental Congress, IV, 302. 
■^November 7, 1776, ibid., VI, 933.
O Q
Washington to Major General Joseph Spencer, April 3, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, VII, 353.
39Washington to Major General William Heath, July 27, 1777, 
ibid., VIII, 482.
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Two months later, an extract of a letter from Washington to 
Congress appeared in the Virginia Gazette giving fair warning to all 
potential deserters. The letter specified that soldiers who quit 
their posts without orders, retreat, or desert, "are instantly to 
be shot down, as a just punishment to themselves, and for examples 
to others."^
Major Henry Lee, in 1779, was particularly perplexed by
desertion and proposed to Washington that all quitters be immediately 
41put to death. Washington agreed that immediate death would probably 
discourage some defectors, but he cautioned that this punishment 
should be decreed with great care and only when the facts were "very 
clear and unequivocal."^ Lee further proposed decapitating 
deserters and sending their heads on spikes to the troop areas. 
Washington disapproved of this proposal, explaining that "examples 
however severe ought not to be attended with an appearance of in­
humanity otherwise they give disgust, and may excite resentment
I ̂
rather than terror." During the same month, Brigadier General
^ Virginia Gazette (Alexander Purdle), September 26, 1777, p. 21. 
41Major Henry Lee to Washington, June 5, 1779, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 59.
^Washington to Major Henry Lee, July 9, 1779, Writings of 
Washington, XV, 388.
*3Ibid. A year later Washington advised Lee to have the 
culprits executed at the place whore the example would do the most 
good, April 17, 1780, ibid., XVIII, 258-59.
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Charles Scott wrote the General from Petersburg, Virginia, requesting 
permission to execute a few deserters to prevent the loss of the 
entire force.^ Washington informed the general that he had full 
power under a resolution of Congress of April 14, 1777, to order 
courts-martial and execute sentences. Washington further encouraged 
Scott by saying that "examples necessary to check the spirit of 
desertion ought to be made."^
Major James Moore, at Paramus, New Jersey, reversed the 
procedure —  he executed a "fit culprit" as an example and then 
sought Washington’s approval for what he had done. Moore explained 
in his letter, written April 26, 1780, that the night before a 
sergeant and fourteen men had attempted to desert to the enemy but 
all were captured within a mile from camp. To prevent the loss of 
even a larger part of his detachment, Moore pled that he found it 
absolutely necessary to make an example of one of those captured "to 
put a stop (if possible) to so great a spirit of Desertion."
The officers had voted and chosen Sergeant Williams as the one to be 
executed as an example. Moore was satisfied with this choice, because 
Williams had made a full confession at the gallows just before he 
was hanged ~  without a court-martial trial. After soliciting
44Brigadier General Charles Scott, July 20, 1779, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 60.
^Washington to Brigadier General Charles Scott, July 27, 1779, 
Writings of Washington, XV, 492.
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Washington's approval, Moore boasted that he expected no more
46desertions in his command.
Major General William Heath, in 1780, added a slightly
different slant to the practice of making examples of a few renegades.
Colonel Christopher Greene, of the First Rhode Island Regiment,
having approved courts-martial sentences for three deserters, informed
Heath that he felt an example was absolutely necessary to restrain
desertion in his regiment. It was Heath's intention, therefore, to
execute one of the three as an example and to pardon the other two.
Heath reasoned that he had ample power to order an execution, but
he doubted his authority to pardon the other two. He asked Washington 
47for advice, and the latter agreed to the pardons.
Major General Nathanael Greene, after assuming command of the 
southern department, found the troops essentially ineffective 
primarily because of their utter disregard of discipline. It had been 
the custom of these troops to come and go almost at will. Some went 
home without leave and stayed as long as they pleased. Under Greene's 
leadership strict and sudden discipline was imposed. The first 
offender after Greene assumed command, having been properly tried 
and sentenced, was made an example for all to see, being shot at the
^^James Moore to Washington, April 26, 1780, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 66.
^Major General William Heath to Washington, August 22, 1780, 
ibid., Roll 69.
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head of the army. The terrible lesson was deemed necessary to impress 
the southern forces that discipline must be maintained and desertion 
stopped. Still they deserted.
The use of examples having produced little visible results, 
Washington seemed to have reverted to a much harsher attitude just 
before Yorktown that carried over into the last years of the war.
In September, 1781, the Commander in Chief advised Heath to deal
AQwith deserters with the "greatest severity." A month later, in 
general orders, Washington warned that every deserter from the American 
forces found within the enemy lines if the place fell into his hands, 
would be "instantly Hanged.
No amount of exemplary executions were able to stop men from 
running away from military service. Even during the last two years 
of the war, the problem remained just as acute as ever; captured 
deserters continued to be executed as examples for others to see.
A court-martial, held February 28, 1782, in the Second Pennsylvania 
Regiment, sentenced five men to death for desertion to the enemy 
and for plundering inhabitants. The five were executed, and on 
November 2 published orders for the day explained:
^Washington to Heath, September 7, 1781, Writings of Washington, 
XXIII, 96.
^General Orders, October 4, 1781, ibid., XXIII, 171.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
311
The General hopes that the dreadful example that was 
given the army yesterday, for the crimes of plundering and 
desertion, will prove a seasonable warning for others to 
avoid a conduct which brought these men to such a shame­
ful and disgraceful end. Let no false hopes of avoiding 
punishment enduce others into such villanous [Sic] conduct. 
It is painful to the General to be under the disagreeable 
necessity but he will be as inflexible in that to those 
who behave ill, as he will be just and generous to those 
who behave well.-’®
After March, 1782, the General took a more lenient stance in regard 
to examples. Writing to Brigadier General Elias Dayton in regard 
to James Fury, a soldier convicted of desertion and sentenced to 
death, Washington suggested that Fury be executed only if deemed 
absolutely necessary.
Courts-Martial
The convening and conducting of courts-martial caused considerable 
unrest. Punishment for violating provisions of the Articles of War 
had to be preceded by a properly convened court-martial and a fair 
trial. Numerous letters arrived at Washington's headquarters and the 
various state headquarters complaining of the inability to call a
52court-martial or to inflict punishment adequate to the crimes committed.
^ John B. Tilden, "Extracts from the Journal of Lieutenant 
John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782," Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography, XIX, No. 2 (1895), 222.
"^Washington to Brigadier General Elias Dayton, March 1, 1782, 
Writings of Washington. XXIV, 33.
C O
Washington to Lieutenant Colonel David Mason, July 25, 1779, 
ibid., XV, 483.
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Nathaniel Smith wrote from Baltimore to the Council of 
Safety in Annapolis in 1777 complaining that he did not have the 
power to call a general court-martial, and even if one were convened 
he could only punish with fifteen lashes, "Let their crimes be 
what they will." He added, "I would not by this have you think me 
cruel, or that I wish to punish my fellow creatures with more than 
they can bear or deserve, but the punishment I am now allowed to 
inflict is by no means equal to some of their crimes.
From New London, Brigadier General Samuel H. Parsons wrote 
Washington in March, 1777, requesting the General's endorsement 
before a court-martial sentence was executed.^ Letters of this sort 
constantly plagued the Commander in Chief. Often, as in this case, 
prisoners were sent along with the sentence of the court to Washington's 
headquarters, where the punishment was expected to be executed. This 
procedure compounded the General's problems, for he not only had 
to agree to a sentence that he had had no part in ajudicating, but 
he also had to impose punishment on the criminal.
Congress eventually decided to relieve Washington of his 
troublesome chore by allowing general courts-martial to be convened
'’̂ Nathaniel Smith (Captain Independent Company, Baltimore 
Artillery), to Council of Safety, February IS, 1777, Archives of 
Maryland. XVI, 139.
^Brigadier General Samuel H. Parsons to Washington, March 8, 
1777, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 41.
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by specified officers and to have the sentences executed by the 
convening authority. On April 14, 1777, Congress debated and 
finally passed a resolution which amended several sections of the 
Articles of War, one of which gave commanding generals the full 
power to appoint general courts-martial in any of the American states. 
The generals were also given power to pardon or mitigate any punish­
ment ordered to be inflicted for any of the offenses specifically 
mentioned.^ However, to provide a safeguard for the accused,
Congress declared that no sentence of a general court-martial shall 
be put into execution until after a report of the court proceedings 
has been prepared and approved by Congress, or the Commander in 
Chief, or the general commanding in the state where the court was 
held.^ To some extent this change in the Articles relieved Washington 
of the unhappy chore of having to approve all death penalties. The 
General, nevertheless, insisted that he be properly informed concern­
ing all death sentences. In a letter to Brigadier General Alexander 
McDougall, dated the very day he received a copy of the change by 
Congress, Washington made it known that he viewed with favor and relief 
the new amendment, adding that he "shall esteem it as a favour, if
"^Journals of the Continental Congress, April 14, 1777, VII,
264-65.
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every General Officer will exercise his own Judgment as to the
propriety of executing" the sentences of courts-martial."^
The sentence of a court-martial was actually no more than an
opinion, for the proceedings and the sentence were subject to review
by the officer who had ordered the trial. If Washington found
irregularity in the constitution of a court or in its proceedings,
he ordered a new trial. In most cases he approved the sentence, but
he often exercised his authority to pardon the accused or mitigate
punishment. He did not, however, have the power to increase the
punishment set by a court, even when he felt the court had been too
easy on the offender. Appeals from regimental courts to general
courts were permitted but seldom taken. All through the war the
courts were busy, causing the judge advocate to complain with
58justification that his duties were "arduous and difficult."
Often commanders punished soldiers without bothering to use the
court system. A few times even Washington dispensed with regular
legal proceedings and resorted to summary action to restore order.
At Valley Forge he ordered soldiers to be punished immediately on the
59spot with from twenty to fifty lashes for violating rules of camp.
"^Washington to Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, April 18, 
1777, Writings of Washington, VII, 431.
58Lieutenant Colonel William Tudor to Washington, August 23, 
1775, Force (ed.), American Archives, 4th ser., III, 245-46.
■^General Orders, December 22, 1777, June 11, 1780 (Short 
Hills, New Jersey), November 19, 1782 (Newburgh), Writings of
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Washington also felt that a coward was not entitled to his day in 
court; he ordered that any officer or soldier who turned his back 
and fled from the enemy during an attack was to be immediately shot 
down. All officers were authorized to see that this was done.^^ The 
Commander in Chief went as far as to order his generals to station 
selected officers in the rear of battalions with orders "to shoot 
any Officer, or Soldier, who shall presume to quit his Ranks, or 
retreat, unless the Retreat is ordered by proper Authority.
Not all offenses warranted harsh punishment. The General 
distinguished between premeditated crimes and slight offenses 
committed through levity or inconsideration. The Commander in Chief 
was always more interested in reclaiming soldiers than in punishing 
offenders. More often, strict adherence to military law was demanded 
by the General. The extreme care taken by Washington to insure 
complete legality in all judicial affairs is evident from the many 
letters he wrote on this subject and the numerous courts-martial 
sentences he disapproved on technical grounds. As an example, respond­
ing to the proceedings of a general court-martial held by order of 
Major General Marquis de Lafayette, Washington regretfully wrote:
Washington, X, 191; XXV, 354-55; XXXVIII, 503. "Orderly Book:
18 May 1778-June 11, 1778," Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Proceedings, VII (1863-1864), 135, shows several cases of punishment 
inflicted prior to courts-martial.
60General Orders, September 20, 1776, Writings of Washington,
VI, 79.
^General Orders, October 1, 1776, ibid., VI, 146.
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I am sorry, there happens to be an obstacle, which 
must necessarily delay the punishment due to such 
atrocious offenders, as those who have been the 
subject of these proceedings; but as the constitution 
of the Court was irregular, I cannot with propriety 
confirm the sentences.
Washington then restated the authority provided in the Articles of 
War for convening a general court-martial. He sent Lafayette an 
order showing exactly how a court-martial should be formed. At 
the same time, the General specifically pointed out several errors 
in the court proceedings that had been sent to him. A week later, 
another letter went out from Washington's headquarters explaining 
to Captain Thomas Cartwright that only the Commander in Chief, or 
the commanding general in a particular state, could call together 
a general court-martial. In this case, and in several others 
Washington ordered new trials under properly convened courts- 
martial.^^
A case involving two soldiers in Captain Edmund Reeds'
Virginia State Dragoons is a good illustration of Washington's insistence 
that courts-martial be technically correct. Colonel James Wood,
Eighth Virginia Regiment, sent to Washington's headquarters a
Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Adam Hubley, February 14,
1778, ibid., X, 458-59.
^Washington to Captain Thomas Cartwright, February 21,
1778, ibid., X, 493. Lieutenants McMichael and Dickerson were 
ordered to be retried.
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transcript of a general court-martial held at Albemarle Barracks,
March 24, 1780, in which Christopher Fossil and John LaBrun were 
tried and convicted of desertion and carrying off horses, arms, and 
other equipment. Both men pled guilty to the charge. Fossill was 
sentenced to run the gauntlet through the troops of the garrison 
twice a day for three days. LaBrun was sentenced to death by the 
firing squad. The sentence against Fossill was locally approved and 
carried out.*^ Washington responded to Wood’s letter in April, 
stating that he could not confirm the sentence against LeBrun "on 
account of the irregular constitution of the Court." Washington 
therefore ordered that the prisoner be released and returned to duty.^
Similarly, courts-martial were disapproved in the New Jersey 
line. In 1782 Washington informed Brigadier General Elias Dayton 
that he had returned several courts-martial "on account of their 
wanting that formality which is requisite in Capital Cases."
Additional proceedings were returned to Dayton disapproved because 
they lacked proper signatures. Washington stated that these 
procedures "carry too great an appearance of negligence and 
inattention."*’*’ In September, 1782, Washington disapproved
64Colonel James Wood to Washington, March 24, 1780, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 65.
^Washington to James Wood, April 20, 1780, Writings of 
Washington. XVIII, 290.
^Washington to Brigadier General Ellas Dayton, May 7, 1782, 
ibid., XXIV, 229-30.
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court-martial sentences of two soldiers in Colonel John Lamb's 
Second Continental Artillery on the grounds that the court was 
constituted in an illegal manner. The Commander in Chief again 
ordered new trials before a properly convened court.^
Apparently Washington was never satisfied in regard to the 
administration of justice in the army. Nor were his generals 
satisfied. General Moses Hazen complained to Washington about the 
lack of established rules in the proceedings of courts-martial; he
discussed several cases where the innocent had suffered while those
68guilty of grave offenses had been set free on mere technicalities. 
Washington could only agree that uniform rules were badly needed, 
but they would not be furnished until years later.
Washington's reputation for being just was widespread.
Douglas Southall Freeman, in his biography of Washington, suggests 
that desertion was reduced at Valley Forge "by Washington's reputation 
for justice."^ He had often refused to allow punishment beyond 
one hundred lashes for multiple offenses,^ and was reluctant to take
^Washington to Colonel John Lamb, September 18, 1782, ibid., 
XXV, 175.
^Washington to the Board of General Officers, February 12, 
1783, ibid., XXVI, 124.
CQ Freeman, George Washington. V, 3.
^Washington to Colonel Thomas Hartley, May 29, 1779, Writings 
of Washington, XI, 480. The sentence against William Jones, tried 
for theft and desertion was mitigated to one hundred lashes.
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away the personal liberty of a subject on the mere presumption of 
71guilt. A Hessian officer reported to his commander the great 
justice of Washington in the release of certain Quaker prisoners,
72and the good treatment received by most people held in captivity.
On the other hand, a few unfortunate deserters from the
American forces, as noted earlier, were denied even the pretense
of a court-martial, regardless of how improperly it might have
been formed. An example occurred during the battle at Quaker Hill,
Rhode Island, August 29, 1778. The Continentals, hard pressed
by the British throughout the day, managed to repulse a charge and
retain their ground. Ebenezer Wild, a sergeant in Colonel Joseph
Vose's regiment, recorded in his diary that a prisoner taken in
action that night turned out to be a former American soldier who
had fled from Fort Montgomery in 1776. Wild wrote: "We shot
73him in about an hour after we took him prisoner." While no name 
was given, there is no reason to believe that the account by Wild 
was not correct. No doubt this type of military justice occurred 
only infrequently, but it could have happened more often.
71In regard to the court-martial of John King, Jr., tried for 
desertion, Washington wrote: "I presume that the court took care to
ascertain the fact of his [King] being a soldier and liable to be 
tried as a Deserter." Ibid., XI, 479-80.
72Major Baurmeister to General Von Jungkenn, May 10, 1778, 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LX, 171-72.
^Wild, "The Journal of Ebenezer Wild," 116.
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Ebenezer Wild, who served both as an enlisted man and an 
officer, was on active duty during the entire war; he left a most 
interesting diary of his experiences that reveals the attitude 
soldiers took in regard to punishment. Wild recorded many episodes 
reflecting his feelings on hunger, hardships, cold, battles, punish­
ments, and even executions. He felt that most of the punishments 
administered to soldiers were fully justified. Nowhere does he 
give evidence that he disapproved of stripes or hangings. On several 
occasions whippings and executions were postponed for some reason or 
another, and Wild was somewhat annoyed when announced punishments 
were not carried out. It is even possible that he wanted to see 
hangings! Often the person receiving punishment was from another 
unit, which would partially explain his attitude toward the whole 
affair; but on other occasions men from his unit were whipped or 
hanged. From the record he left in his diary, it appeared that 
Wild was a fully and totally committed soldier; therefore, he 
probably had little sympathy for anyone who was less committed.
It was assumed by most commanders that punishment would be most 
effective if administered immediately upon the discovery of a viola­
tion of any regulation. (The same reasoning held true in regard to 
desertion,) The chief purpose of punishment was to dissuade the 
culprit from committing further illegal actions, and at the same time 
to let the punishment of one person act as a visible and terrible
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example before the entire regiment, brigade, or garrison. During
critical periods, when the absolute loyalty of the troops was most
urgently needed, offenders were sometimes punished on the spot with
or without the convening of a trial court to render a decision and
pronounce a sentence. Washington ordered commanders to "inflict
discretionary punishment . . . upon the Spot," on all stragglers
74during field exercises and marches. Numerous men were punished in 
this manner.
The inflicting of punishment for disobeying orders had a 
direct bearing on desertion. Laxity in enforcement of one rule 
led naturally to the assumption that the same attitude might be 
taken in regard to illegal departures. In an effort to prevent 
desertion the General endeavored to remove annoying inequities 
in recruiting, to instill good discipline in the army, to insure 
offenders of a fair trial, and to assure the convicted that they 
would be punished —  all of which were intended to help keep soldiers 
from prematurely leaving the service.
^General Orders, August 6, 1780, Writings of Washington.
XIX, 337; VII, 439; XII, 93-94.
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CHAPTER X I
PREVENTION OF DESERTION - PART II
Although the threat of whippings and the death penalty were
held over the heads of enlisted men during most of the war, there
were limitations imposed by Congress on the use of punishment. In
June, 1775, the Continental Congress limited stripes in all cases
to thirty-nine.^" In Washington's opinion this was not sufficiently
severe to act as a curb to desertion. William Tudor, judge advocate,
in October, 1775, suggested that the limit be raised to one hundred.
He said that most of the officers thought this addition "absolutely 
2necessary." Washington stated that even the thirty-nine lashes 
were often administered in "such a manner as to become rather a sport 
than punishment," adding that many "hardend [Sic] fellows who have 
been the Subjects, have declared that for a bottle of Rum they would 
undergo a Second operation."-3 It was evident to the General that 
thirty-nine lashes was inadequate for the crimes assigned and gave 
as evidence examples of thirty or forty soldiers deserting at a
Rules and Regulations for the Army, Journals of the Conti­
nental Congress, II, 111-12.
2Memorial of Judge Advocate (William Tudor), October, 1775, 
in Force (ed.), American Archives, 4th ser., III» 1164.
^Washington to the President of Congress, September 24, 1776, 
Writings of Washington, VI, 114.
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4time. Hence, Washington argued for a graduated scale of punish­
ment that would allow more stripes to be administered for the crime 
of desertion.
The Lash
Realizing that light floggings had not discouraged desertions, 
Congress acquiesced, and on September 20, 1776, raised the limit to 
"not exceeding 100 lashes,"'* which undoubtedly had the General's 
approval. Still, this increase was not considered to be adequate 
by most of the senior officers. To circumvent the maximum limit, 
courts often awarded a hundred lashes for each of two or more charges 
against a deserter. Burgal Capernaum, a private in Captain James 
Kieth's company, Colonel Michael Jackson's regiment, was found guilty 
of desertion and failure to join his company when ordered; his 
sentence was two hundred lashes on his naked back and forfeiture 
of half the pay due him; but one hundred lashes were remitted 
because it exceeded the maximum limit.^ Denis Lyons, a soldier 
in the Eighth Virginia Regiment and the Invalid Regiment, deserted 
and soon afterward was captured. He was tried, found guilty, and
Sfashington to Governor Jonathan Trumbull, September 26, 1776, 
ibid.. VI, 122.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, VI, 933.
^January 20, 1778, Crofts, "Orderly Book," XIV, 73.
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awarded three hundred lashes.^ Robert Kennedy of the Eighth 
Pennsylvania Regiment received four hundred lashes: three hundred
Q
for repeated desertion and one hundred for theft. A deserter
belonging to the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment was captured on July 21,
1779, along with two others. He was immediately tied up and given
five hundred lashes, which was justified as being "back
allowance" for a previous desertion for which he had received a
9reprieve from his colonel. Washington regarded such sentences as 
illegal and whenever possible would not allow excessive stripes to 
be administered."^ In a letter to Colonel William Irvine, the
Court Martial Proceedings, Colonel James Proctor, president 
of the Court, July ?, 1778, Papers of the Continental Congress, 
National Archives, Roll 179.
g
Proceedings of a General Court Martial, June 6, 1779, 
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 59.
9Lieutenant William McKendry, "Journal of William McRendry, 
October 23, 1777-January 3, 1780," Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Proceedings. 2nd ser., II (1885-1886), 460.
"^On June 11, 1778, Washington disapproved a sentence of three 
hundred lashes decreed by a court-martial against William Powell 
for desertion, joining another unit, and purjury. General Orders,
June 11, 1778, Writings of Washington, XII, 49. James Gorden, 
sentenced to three hundred lashes for three desertions, was given only 
one hundred. General Orders, ibid., XI, 266. Edward Conally, 
sentenced to two hundred lashes for desertion had his sentence 
reduced to one hundred lashes. General Orders, June 11, 1778, 
ibid., XII, 49-50. However, on May 29, 1778, the Commander in 
Chief approved a two hundred lash sentence against John Clime, 
convicted of desertion and attempting to join the enemy, General 
Orders, May 29, 1778, ibid., XI, 487.
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Commander in Chief overturned a court decision that had awarded a 
Sergeant Denmark several hundred lashes, stating that it was "unwarrant­
able to elude this restriction [of one hundred lashes] by accumulating 
the punishment of several crimes in one Trial." Denmark's sentence 
was limited to one hundred lashes.'*"*’ Thomas Cashall and Samuel 
Burris of Colonel Lambs' regiment, tried for desertion in 1778, 
were to receive five hundred lashes each on their naked backs.
Washington disapproved the sentences as being illegal and ordered
12new trials by a general court-martial.
To increase the severity of the punishment, courts often
ordered that the lashes be administered in segments at different times
or on several successive days. In 1780 John McLean of the Fourth New
York Regiment, found guilty of desertion, was sentenced to one
hundred lashes on the naked back "to be inflicted at four different 
13times." Two soldiers, Thomas Coshel and Samuel Burris, were
sentenced to one hundred stripes each, fifty lashes to be administered
on each of two successive days, with the culprit's "Back to be well
14washed with Salt and water after he has received the last fifty."
■^Washington to Colonel William Irvine, June 2, 1778, Writings 
of Washington, XII, 12.
^General Orders, March 10, 1778, ibid., XI, 57.
■^General Orders, January 3, 1780, ibid., XVII, 345; William 
Potter, a soldier in Colonel Angell's regiment received the same 
punishment.
^General Orders, March 25, 1778, ibid., XI, 143.
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The orderly books of the Second and Fourth New York Regiments listed 
hundreds of courts-martial authorizing thousands of stripes.^
While Washington and most commanders felt the lashes were often very 
"lightly" laid on, which was no doubt true in some cases, the generally 
held view was that whipping on the naked back was an extremely severe 
punishment. The diary of an English soldier gives a vivid account of 
the pain:
At the first blow I felt an astonishing sensation 
between the shoulder under my neck, which went to me 
toenails in one direction, my finger-nails in another, 
and stung me to the heart as if a knife had gone 
through my body. The Sergeant-Major called in a 
loud voice, 'one1.
James Thacker, a surgeon in the American army, described 
the procedure used and the results of whippings. Most officers 
in command resorted to spacing the authorized number of lashes by 
"first beating the soldier's back to an exquisite tenderness, and 
then later administering the balance of the lashes to his lacerated 
and inflamed skin." In such cases, he reported, "the wounds are 
in a state of inflamation [Sic], and the skin rendered more sensibly
A. W. Lauber (ed.), Orderly Books of the Fourth New York 
Regiment, 1778-1780, the Second New York Regiment, 1780-1783 . . . 
(Albany, New York: University of the State of New York, 1932).
For a typical day see Samuel Tallmadge, "Military Journal, December 
.1780-July, 1782," ibid., 340.
•^Quoted in Hughes, George Washington, III, 82.
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tender, and the terror of the punishment is greatly aggravated.""^
As painful as one hundred lashes might have been, it offered
no solution to the desertion problem. Few soldiers, determined to
leave the service, were slowed down by the lash. Washington complained
to Congress in January, 1778, that a better gradation of punishments
was sorely needed to prevent desertion. He explained that the
difference in severity between a hundred lashes and death was too
great and needed to be filled by some intermediate stages of 
18punishment. The General reasoned that a gradual scale of punish­
ments would better facilitate the sentencing of those properly tried 
by allowing the court to assign a fair penalty for each crime 
committed. To compensate for the variety and complexity of offenses,
Washington felt that the court should be given discretionary power
19to extend the number of lashes to at least five hundred. Washington 
bolstered his argument by pointing out that the awarding of the death 
penalty, which was too frequently the decision reached by courts- 
martial for desertion, produced an unfortunate effect for everyone 
concerned. To inflict capital punishment upon every deserter would 
give the army a reputation for cruelty, and to use it too often would
^James Thacker, Military Journal of the American Revolution 
. . . (Second edition, Hartford, Connecticut: Hurlbut, Williams and
Company, 1862), 186-87.
^®Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army 
(Committee of Conference) January 29, 1778, Writings of Washington,
X, 402.
19Ibid., X, 403.
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also destroy its effect as an example. On the other hand, he said,
to give only one hundred lashes to such criminals was a burlesque on
their crimes rather than a serious correction, "and affords encourage-
20ment to obstinacy and imitation." It is true that the courts,
confronted by the enormity of the facts against shirkers, too often
felt compelled to sentence the offenders to death. Washington,
consequently, felt obliged to remit most of these sentences because
of the large numbers involved. The end result was that the criminals
in many cases got off wholly unpunished. The Commander in Chief
argued that this could be avoided if other punishments, short of the
destruction of life, that were adequate to the crimes were available.
In August, 1778, Washington presented the same argument to a
council of general officers at White Plains, explaining that to
"avoid the appearance of cruelty many atrocious criminals were
being pardoned which had the unhappy effect of encouraging repetition
of the same crimes." The General requested the opinion of the
council on a substitute plan of punishment. He suggested that
instead of capital sentences, the offenders be punished with "hard
and severe labor" sufficiently rigorous to provide an effective
21deterrent to desertion.
20Ibld.. X, 402.
2Washington to the Council of General Officers, August 20, 
1778, ibid., XII, 343-44.
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The decision of the officers, delivered on August 24, was
unanimous; they recommended that hard labor be used as an intermediate
punishment between one hundred lashes and death. The board also
advocated the establishment of prisons in each division for the
confinement of the guilty with a bread and water diet during 
22imprisonment. In a letter to the president of Congress, Washington 
presented the plans and suggestions of the Board of Officers, being 
careful to explain the advantages of the intermediate punishments 
as being more effective in preventing desertion and less shocking to 
the general public than capital executions. To add weight to his 
argument he noted that there were at that time eleven men awaiting 
execution and many more in the divisions awaiting trial for crimes
oothat warranted the sentence of death. Congress, however, took no 
action on the matter at that time. Despite the persuasive stand of 
Washington, Congress was in no mood during 1778 to increase the 
number of lashes to five hundred.
In February, 1781, the Commander in Chief again tried to 
persuade Congress to extend the number of lashes to a maximum of five 
hundred. Washington attributed most of the army's discipline problems
22Ibid., XII, 344n.. This report was signed by Horatio Gates,
Lord Stirling, Baron DeKalb, Alexander McDougall, Samuel Holden Parsons, 
William Smallwood, Henry Knox, Enoch Poor, John Paterson, and Jedidiah 
Huntington.
23Washington to the President of Congress, August 31, 1778, 
ibid.. XII, 377.
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to the fact that the Articles of War allowed no punishment between 
one hundred lashes and death. Offering the same argument in slightly 
different words, he said that courts felt obliged to pronounce the 
death penalty for serious crimes since anything less would be 
inadequate.
An equally distressing situation arose when some officers, 
determined to punish offenders, resorted to arbitrary and unusual 
sentences that were not authorized. Though the General had no 
intention of allowing this practice to continue, he felt helpless to 
offer any solution other than revision of the Articles of War to allow 
courts to fix punishments at their discretion with the maximum 
number of lashes set at five hundred.^
Washington's February 3 letter, was read in Congress on
February 9, and came before a committee composed of John Sullivan,
Alexander McDougall, and Joseph Jones. On June 15, Congress received
the committee's report, which contained almost verbatim the request
of Washington, and rejected it. Five states voted against the report,
three voted for it, and three were divided. Fourteen members of
25Congress voted against it and thirteen for it. Leading the fight
^Washington to the President of Congress, February 3, 1781, ibid., 
XXI, 178-79.
25Papers of the Continental Congress, June 16, 1781, National 
Archives, Roll 12. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
Delaware, and Virginia voted "no"; Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 
South Carolina voted "yes"; and New Hampshire, North Carolina, and 
Georgia were divided. Journals of the Continental Congress, XX, 658.
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against the amendment was Roger Sherman who urged adherence to the
26Levitical Law specifying that stripes be limited to less than forty.
John Sullivan, the only member from New England to vote for the
proposal, sent word to Washington in July concerning the amendment's
fate and hinted at the incompetence of some members in the 
27"American Senate." Although the increase asked for by the Commander 
in Chief had humanitarian roots, Congress felt that five hundred 
lashes was excessively harsh. Washington was left with the un­
pleasant task of deciding on the fate of hundreds of soldiers sentenced 
to death by courts-martial. Desertions had to be stopped and capital 
punishment seemed to be the only remedy other than the lash.
Odd Punishments
Whippings were often accompanied by other penalties, such as 
fines, imprisonment, or some odd punishment like running the gauntlet 
and standing on the picket. James Thatcher described the gauntlet 
as a company of soldiers standing in two lines, each one with a 
switch; a criminal was made to run between them and receive the
scourge as he passed through. Often, to impede his steps, another
26"p<orty stripes may be given him, but not more; lest, if 
one should go on to beat him with more stripes than these, your 
brother be degraded in your sight," Deuteronomy 25:3 (RSV)
^John Sullivan to Washington, July 2, 1781, Burnett (ed.),
Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, VI, 132-33.
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soldier was ordered to hold a bayonet at the criminal's breast.2®
Ebenezer Wild recorded in his journal on May 4, 1779, that William
Luckey was taken from the guardhouse to the gallows with a halter
around his neck where he was stripped naked and made to run the
gauntlet through the whole brigade.29 Major General John Sullivan's
orderly book recorded the sentence of Edward Taylor, a soldier in
the Second New York Regiment, who was tried for desertion and made
to run the gauntlet through four regiments with a "Sentinal at his
Breast to regulate his pace."39 A sergeant, convicted of forging
discharge papers for deserters, ran the gauntlet through his regiment
0*1before being drummed out of the service.
Other types of arbitrary punishment included riding the wooden 
horse, wearing a halter around the neck, having a log chained to the 
leg, standing the picket, service in the navy, confinement on bread 
and water, and whipping with a birch rod. The British army also used
28Thatcher, Military Journal of the American Revolution, 186- 
87. See also Scott Claver, Under the Lash: A History of Corporal
Punishment in the British Armed Forces (London: Torchstream Books,
1954), 7, 9, 17, 18, 19, 111-12.
29Wild, "Journal of Ebenezer Wild," 112.
30June 25, 1779, Orderly Book No. 27 (Sullivan), National 
Archives.
31Enos Hitchcock, "Diary Enos Hitchcock a Chaplain in the 
Revolutionary Army," edited by W. B. Weeden, Rhode Island Historical 
Society, Publications. New ser., VII (January, 1900), 211.
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the strappado, hanging an offender by the thumbs with only the
toes touching, tying neck and heels, the stocks and a few other odd 
32punishments. Possibly some of these punishments were also used
by American commanders for minor offenses.
Americans frequently employed the wooden horse, especially
during the first years of the war. This punishment was very painful,
often permanently mutilating the victims, even to the point of
emasculation. The wooden horse was formed of planks laid together
so as to form a sharp ridge or angle which represented the back of
the horse. It was supported by four posts or legs, about six or
seven feet long. Sometimes a head and tail were added. The offender
was straddled across the ridge of the horse with his hands tied behind
him and his legs tied together. The horse was often placed on rollers
so it could be moved about which increased the difficulty of 
33remaining upright. James Stevens, a private in Captain Poor's 
mlnutemen company, noted in his journals on June 30, 1775, that a
32Clever, Under the Lash, 8-28. The British also used cold 
burning or bottling (pouring water down sleeve of culprit while 
arms are tied as high above the head as possible), cobbing (striking 
an offender on the posterior with a cobbing stick or, cross belt), 
booting (flogging a man with a belt on the soles of the feet), 
blistering (blister back with boiling oil or water), and 
venereal fine (a mulct of five shinnings for contracting a venereal 
disease).
33lbld., 13.
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soldier was made to ride the horse for an hour!3^ Another soldier
was sentenced to ride the wooden horse for "ten minutes on a very
Snowey day," and two others received the same punishment a few 
35days later.
Another way men were punished was to require them to wear
objects around their necks or tied to their legs. John Hewit,
guilty of desertion, was sentenced to pay charges, "ware the clogg
and work in the Laboratory two Days." John Griffith had "to
wear a clog four Days with his Coat turn'd rong side outwards."^7
At Ticonderoga in 1776, James Conway, for desertion was sentenced
to receive thirty-nine lashes and made to wear a halter around his
neck for fourteen days as an example to others, and if he at any time
was found without the halter he was to be immediately whipped with
38one hundred lashes. A court ordered Levi Perce, guilty of desertion 
and striking an officer, to sit on the gallows with a rope around
34James Stevens, The Revolutionary Journals of James Stevens 
of Andover, Massachusetts," Essex Institute, Historical Collections, 
XLVIII (January, 1912), 49.
35Lieutenant John Goodwin, "Military Journal Kept in 1777, 
During the Rhode Island Expedition," ibid., XLV (July, 1909), 207. 
Occurred February 11 and 23, 1777.
36January 27, 1778, Crafts, "Orderly Book," XIV, 112-13.
37June 17, 1778, ibid., XIV, 195.
September 24, 1776, Orderly Book, No. 13 (February 22, 1776- 
September 11, 1777), National Archives.
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his neck for half an hour, after which he was to be whipped with one
hundred lashes on his naked back under the gallows, and then sent
to prison to be confined until he paid for his clothing and the cost
39incurred in his apprehension.
Sometimes weighty objects were attached to the legs of
culprits to increase the effect of the punishment. Samuel Brown
was to wear "the log" for one week and to attend the parades with it
40attached to his leg. Baptist Benrick, a deserter from Colonel
Henry Jackson’s regiment, received one hundred lashes, besides
having a "clogg of twenty Wt. chained to his legg for one Month
and [to] attend all Parades in that situation."4^ Richard Smith,
a matross (an artilleryman) in Colonel John Carne’s Third Continental
Artillery Regiment, was to receive one hundred lashes on his naked
back, well laid on, twenty-five each morning for four days, and to
42wear a "clogg chain'd to his legg for the Term of two Months."
qgSilvanus Reed, "Orderly Book of Adjutant Silvanus Reed, New 
Hampshire Historical Society Collections, IX (1889), 370. Similar 
punishment was given to James Mumford and Cornelius Gordon, October 
23, 1780, Orderly Book, No. 45, National Archives.
40November 5, 1779, Orderly Book. No. 32, National Archives. 
410ctober 2, 1779, ibid.
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The American army rarely used the punishment of "picketting."
The offender was suspended in mid air by a rope tied to his wrist
with a sharp stake driven into the ground just high enough for him
to rest his bare heel. The stake did not break the skin but caused
great pain. The only means of relieving the heel was to allow the
43wrist to bear the weight, which was also intolerably painful.
Fifteen minutes was considered the limit a person could endure
this torture. In 1780, at Orange Town, Jack Freeman, a deserter
from the Ninth Connecticut Regiment, received one hundred stripes
44and stood the pickett for fifteen minutes. Major General Greene 
ordered this sentence put into effect that day at retreat before the 
whole regiment as an example to others who might consider deserting 
the service.
Sometimes the instrument to be used in whippings was prescribed 
by the court-martial. For deserting his guard post Samuel Platt was 
sentenced to receive thirty-nine lashes on the naked back with a 
cat-o-nine-tails, and John Butler, for being absent without leave, 
was ordered "to be whipped severely 13 strips with a Berch rod over 
such Parts as the commanding Officer shall appoint." The commanding 
officer reduced Platt's sentence to twenty lashes, and Butler's to ten, 
to be applied to his "Back side. John Rowe received two sentences
/ QClaver, Under the Lash, 14.
^September 25, 1780, Orderly Book No. 45, National Archives. 
45Crofts, "Orderly Book," XIV, 206-207.
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of thirty-nine lashes with the cat-o-nine-tails —  one for desertion and 
46one for stealing.
Sea duty, while not legally authorized, was occasionally 
prescribed by courts to lessen the opportunities for desertion.
47In 1777 a deserter felt one hundred lashes and went to the navy.
In 1778 John Pooler, a private in the Second Regiment of Light
Dragoons, was guilty of desertion, selling his continental clothing,
and stealing a horse and saddle, for which he was sentenced to
receive one hundred lashes, and ordered to service on a frigate for
the remainder of his enlistment. Washington immediately remitted
the service on the frigate but allowed the whipping to be executed 
48the next day. Benjamin Barbersby, sentenced to thirty-nine
lashes for desertion, thirty-nine lashes for enlisting in another
regiment, and repayment of his enlistment bounty, was also to wear
a halter around his neck and be sent to a boat on Lake George.
49The colonel approved all his sentence except the last. (Commanders 
46Ibid., XIV, 195.
^General Orders, September 2, 1777, Writings of Washington,
IX, 168.
4®General Orders, September 13, 1778, ibid., XII, 447-48. 
^September 1, 1776, Orderly Book, No. 13, National Archives.
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seemed extremely reluctant to allow courts to send soldiers to serve 
in the naval forces.)
Occasionally soldiers had their hair cut as punishment. Peter
Linch, found guilty of desertion, was sentenced to have the hair on
the front part of his head shaved off without soap, "and a quantity of
tar and feathers fixed on the place as a substitute for hair." He
was then to run the gauntlet through his company and then to serve for
the duration of the war on board a Continental frigate.^® For being
drunk and asleep while on guard duty James Martin was to have one
hundred lashes and then to have his head shaved, tarred, and
feathered.^ Numerous soldiers and officers were publicly reprimanded
or drummed out of the service as punishment for crimes committed. A
decorated soldier who subsequently deserted had his honorary badge
taken off by the drum major at the head of his regiment and then was
52given fifty lashes on his naked back. A captain was drummed out of 
the service wearing women's clothing at a camp on Morris Heights on York 
Island in 1776, and several others were reduced in rank for crimes 
committed.^ James McMichael recorded in his diary the procedure
^General Orders, September 3, 1777, Writings of Washington.
IX, 170.
^General Orders, March IS, 1783, Washington Papers, Library 
of Congress, Roll 90.
^Richardson, "Letters of Lieutenant John Richardson, 1776," 
XVI, 206.
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followed in the drumming out of Lieutenant Frederick Gotthold 
Enslin:
He was first drum'd from right to left of the parade, 
thence to the left wing of the army; from that to the 
centre, and lastly transported over the Schuylkill with 
orders never to be seen in Camp in the future. This 
shocking scene was performed by all the drums and fifes 
in the army —  the coat of the delinquent was turned 
wrong side out.^
Offenders were often ordered to be confined by courts. This 
punishment was widely used but deemed less satisfactory than 
corporal punishment. Jails or prisons were not always available 
for the army's use;'*’* this left the commander with an added burden 
of furnishing soldiers to guard those ordered to be confined. When­
ever possible prisoners were retained in confinement for only short 
periods of time. Washington frequently ordered men who were in 
confinement back to service.
Samuel Platt, punished earlier for desertion, was sentenced
again in 1778 to pay charges for his capture and ordered "confined
56to Noodles Island During his Captain's pleasure." Often local
■’SlcMichael, "Diary . . .," XVI, 157-58. Enslin was cashiered 
March 14, 1778, and drummed out March 15.
^ I n  1776 the Convention of Pennsylvania donated a new jail to 
Congress for use of state prisoners, July 20, 1776, Journals of the 
Continental Congress, VI, 594.
56Thomas Crofts, "Orderly Book," XIV, 112-13.
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prisons were used when accessible. Non-commissioned officers found
guilty of desertion by courts-martial were usually reduced in rank
57to private. Sometimes they also received whippings.
Simulated whippings were used as a means of scaring the offender.
Benjamin Hole, soldier in Colonel Enoch Poor's regiment, convicted
of desertion, but under circumstances which appeared in his favor,
was sentenced to be "struck at," as if he were being whipped, and
58then to be severely reprimanded by his commanding officer.
A common occurrence was for officers to take it upon them­
selves to administer punishment to offenders without the benefit 
of a court-martial. Washington objected strenuously to this practice, 
as noted earlier, and ordered courts-martial for officers who 
inflicted such punishment. Two captains, tried by a court- 
martial for beating soldiers, were acquitted of the charge only to
have Washington disapprove of the court's findings and lecture
59them against such obvious abuse of their authority.
Occasionally officers went far beyond legal means to punish 
deserters, even ordering executions without benefit of a trial. A 
few officers urged the practice of having deserters' heads cut off 
and placed on poles as warnings for the whole camp. On one occasion
Examples are numerous. See Orderly Book No. 32, National
Archives.
"^August 26, 1776, Orderly Book No. 13, National Archives.
"^General Orders, May 8, 1779, Writings of Washington, XV,
27-28. Captain Jones beat a sentinel on his post and a corporal 
on his guard; Captain Mitchell beat a corporal on his guard.
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three deserters, sentenced to suffer death, were made to draw lots; 
the loser was decapitated, his head was placed on a spike and carried 
around camp by the other two and was then hung over the camp 
gallows. Although Washington had disagreed with Henry Lee's 
suggestion of cutting off an occasional head, the Commander in Chief 
found that before his letter reached Lee, the threat had been 
carried out; a soldier was hanged and decapitated for the crime of 
desertion.*’® Shocked, Washington ordered Lee to have the body buried 
immediately lest it fall into the hands of the British, who would use 
the publicity gained to justify their acts of c r u e l t y . P e t e r  Ten 
Broeck recorded the circumstances of these deaths in a letter to his 
parents, dated July 9, 1779:
We hear there is a great Number of Men Deserts Dayly 
both to and from the enemy; yesterday three men be­
longing to the Maryland line were found going into the 
enemy, they were brought to their camp. The one was 
shot and his head cut off and this morning was 
brought to the Virginia Camp and was put on the top of 
the gallows . .
^Washington to Henry Lee, July 9, 1779, ibid., XV, 388.
^Washington to Henry Lee, July 10, 1779, ibid., XV, 399. See 
also, Freeman, George Washington, V, 112.
62Peter Ten Broeck to Cornelius Ten Broeck, Sr., "News from 
Camp," II, 169.
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Ten Broeck said another soldier was hanged that day who had previously 
been sentenced to death on two occasions and reprieved and fully 
expected to be reprieved the third time. Ten Broeck had been in 
the army only six days when he witnessed these executions. It was 
to stop such exhibitions as these that Washington pled with Congress 
to increase the authorized limit of lashes to five hundred. Neither 
the whip nor any of these odd punishments acted as a deterrent to 
desertion. The death penalty seemed to be the only recourse, but 
it rendered no better results.
Death Penalty
Congress' adoption of the new Articles of War on September 20, 
1776, extending the death penalty to all types of desertion and for 
all crimes punishable by death under British law, was like opening 
the flood gates in the American army. Commanders, exasperated at the 
ineffectiveness of whipping as a deterrent to desertion, resorted 
more and more to the use of capital punishment. And yet the death 
sentence was so drastic that its use by a court usually invited a 
general to issue a pardon. General Henry Knox wrote to Washington 
concerning George Baker, a scoundrel who had been sentenced to die 
on May 5, 1779, for several desertions; he said that Baker would
^Ten Broeck's letter of July 8, indicated he joined on July 3,
ibid.
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probably desert twice a year for the next ten years if the war 
lasted that long. Still, Knox recommended a pardon for this 
soldier!^
Washington's attitude toward administering the death penalty 
varied. At times he approved large numbers of death sentences, but 
frequently would issue reprieves at the last minute. The Commander 
in Chief disliked the death penalty and used it only as a last 
resort when he thought the deterrent effect would be the greatest. 
Washington realized that little good was gained by merely having a 
culprit executed if it did not evoke the desired reactions among 
the troops. A deserter could be legally punished by death, but 
the army also lost a soldier! By 1777, the courts were sentencing 
so many deserters to death that Washington became alarmed. Writing 
to Brigadier General Samuel Parsons, he advised that death penalties 
be remitted if more advantage could be derived from a pardon, adding 
that capital executions had been too frequently used by the army.*’"* 
Brigadier General James Clinton voiced the same opinion in 1778:
"I always hear of capital executions with concern, and regret that 
there should occur so many Instances in which they are necessary." 
Nevertheless, on that occasion he approved of the execution of
^General Orders, Hay 12, 1779, Writings of Washington. XV, 
49N. Knox letter written Kay 9, 1779.
^Washington to Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons,
April 23, 1777, ibid., VII, 459.
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Aaron Williams, deeming it justified because of the large number of 
desertions in the New York line.*’® After several executions Major 
General Alexander McDougall expressed concern over the ineffectiveness 
of too frequent use of the death penalty, in which view Washington 
concurred.*^
The first instance in which Washington approved a sentence 
of death came nearly a year after he assumed command. Thomas 
Hickey, a member of the General's guard, was involved in a plot to 
enlist soldiers of the Continental army in the British service.
There were also rumors that he was involved in a plot to start an up­
rising in New York and to assassinate Washington. A court-martial 
sentenced Hickey to death; Washington submitted the matter to a 
council of generals, who advised the Commander in Chief to approve 
the sentence. Accordingly, the General ordered Hickey to be hanged 
the next day, June 28, 1776, at eleven o'clock, with all the officers 
and men belonging to the brigades of Heath, Spencer, Lord Stirling, 
and Scott in attendance at the execution.*’® Deeply concerned, the 
Commander in Chief explained the reason for the execution to the 
soldiers.
^Washington to Brigadier General James Clinton, December 
31, 1778, ibid., XIII, 471.
^Washington to Major General Alexander McDougall, June 25, 
1779, ibid.. XV, 317.
®®General Orders, June 27, 1776, ibid., V, 182; Washington 
to President of Congress, June 28, 1776, ibid., V, 193.
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The unhappy Fate of Thomas Hickey executed this day 
for mutiny Sedition and Treachery and General Hopes 
will be a warning to every Soldier in the Army to 
Avoid those Crimes and all others so disgraceful to 
a soldier and pernicious to the Country whose pay he 
received and whose bread he eats —  and in order 
to avoid these Crimes the most Certain Method is to 
keep out of the Temptations of them and particularly 
to avoid lew's women who by the dying Confession of 
this Poor Criminal first led him into Practices 
which ended in an untimely and Ignominous Death.
Although this was the first executed, it was to be followed by 
hundreds more. The exact number of men receiving the death sentence 
is difficult to ascertain. Allen Bowman, in his study of morale in 
the American Army, found 225 sentences of death, with only about 40 
actually being carried out.^ This could indicate that most of those 
sentenced to die were pardoned. Suspension of sentences for short 
periods were often granted by generals; many suspensions were left 
in that state with no later mention of whether or not the sentences 
were consummated. John Porterfield, a sergeant in Captain Stephen 
Bayard's company, Third Pennsylvania Regiment, was convicted of 
desertion on February 21, 1777, and sentenced to be shot. The 
General approved the court's judgment, but granted a reprieve of the 
sentence for one week. On the 27th the execution was suspended 
until March 14, when it was put off until the 21st, at which time it
Abraham Dodge, "Orderly Book kept by Captain Abraham Dodge 
of Ipswich . . .," Essex Institute, Historical Collections, LXXX 
(October, 1944), 379. June 28, 1776.
^Bowman, Morale of the American Army, 89.
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was postponed again until the 28th; on March 28th the execution was
delayed until April 4th, when there was another postponement until
the 11th. No further mention of Sergeant Porterfield has been found.
It is reasonable to assume that he was ultimately pardoned.^
Instances of this sort were common.
While many sentences were carried out, Washington tended to
employ the extreme penalty more as a threat, using stays of execution
and pardons to prevent actual executions. Rarely did the General
refuse to respond to a plea from a commander to pardon a convicted
deserter. He could, however, be adamant in rejecting petitions for
72the pardon of men he was determined to execute as examples. Elisha 
Smith, a soldier in Colonel Elisha Sheldon's Second Continental 
Dragoons, was tried on October 8, 1778, for several crimes —  de­
serting to the enemy, piloting the enemy in excursion raids against 
Continental troops, defrauding the public by selling his horse, arms, 
accoutrements, furniture, and clothing to the enemy, attempting to 
escape while a prisoner, and assaulting an officer. The court
sentenced him to death, which was approved by the local commander who
73ordered Smith to be executed on October 12th at eleven o'clock.
^General Orders, February 21, 27, March 14, 21, 28, April 3, 
Writings of Washington, VII, 183, 204, 285, 311, 324, 351.
19The petitions of pardon for Charles McClean, Thomas 
Herrindeen, William Potter, John Lewis, John McLane, William Hopper 
were all denied by Washington who ordered them "to suffer agreeable 
to the sentences decreed against them." General Orders, February 11, 
1780, ibid., XVIII, 3.
^General Orders, October 10, 1778, ibid., XIII, 60-61.
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Writing to Major General Horatio Gates on October 10th, Washington 
said the charges seemed sufficiently clear and well founded, and 
directed Gates to oversee the execution to ensure that "the example" 
was made "where the opportunity to desert is the greatest," and where 
it might "have a good tendency in checking so pernicious a practice. 
Gates probably changed the execution date, which accounts for Smith’s 
not having died on the 12th.
In the meantime, petitions for pardons reached Washington, 
one coming on the 15th from Captain Josiah Stoddard, Smith's command­
ing officer. Washington was determined that Smith should die. 
Answering Stoddard, the General expressed his sorrow at having to 
increase the number of unfortunate sufferers, but the General felt
that Smith was "an object worthy of punishment, and a proper example
75to prevent the commission of crimes of a like nature." Since no 
further mention of Smith has been found, Washington's denial of the 
reprieve no doubt sealed his fate. However, his death might have 
influenced the Commander in Chief to grant a pardon to John Yeomans 
on October 27, a soldier equally guilty and equally deserving the 
sentence. Explaining to Colonel Goose Van Schaick, who had intervened
^Washington to Brigadier General Charles Scott, October 10, 
1778, ibid., XIII, 55.
^Washington to Captain Josiah Stoddard, October 17, 1778, 
ibid., XIII, 95.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
348
on behalf of Yeomans, Washington said that the judgment of the court
seemed very proper for this offender; and he was suitable to be used
as an example, but since he had inflicted the punishment of death
on seven persons in the past few days, he felt obliged to remit the
punishment of Yeomans. The General ordered that he be taken to the
place of execution and there reprieved at the last moment. Washington
felt that this would have the same good influence as an actual execution,
and furthermore, would offset the bad effect that too many death
76penalties had produced.
A year later, writing to Brigadier General Anthony Wayne,
Washington related that "he did not see the multiplying of executions
produce the effects for which they were intended," and reasoned that
it was not desirable to lose men in examples of this kind, unless
77absolutely necessary. He suggested that pardons might be very 
advantageously used, as well as the practice of confining the condemned 
for some time under the fear of being executed as sentenced, and then 
liberated. The expected result was for a transformation in the heart 
and mind of the person sentenced to die once freed. As the record 
clearly shows, this idealistic reaction did not always occur, for 
often men scampered off on the very day some unfortunate soldier was
^Washington to Colonel Goose Van Schaick, October 27, 1778,
Ibid.. XIII, 166-67.
^Washington to Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, November 
27, 1779, ibid.. XVII, 198-99.
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78executed as an example to deserters. The pity of it is that these 
extreme examples failed in their purpose. Heavy desertions continued 
in the army at the very time the death penalty was most often used.
When the vast majority who attempted to run away succeeded, additional 
discontented men were ready to take the risk.
As might be expected, the erratic way in which pardons and 
stays were used tended to offset the effect of the examples ordered 
by the commanders. Soldiers were too familiar with capital sentences 
and last minute reprieves to expect that all of the men sentenced 
would be put to death, but no one knew for sure who would be pardoned.
7Q
Eleven deserters were ordered executed on May 25, 1780, at Morristown.
The regiments were muscered to watch the execution; the ceremonies
were designed to bring none to the army both the gravity of the
offense of desertion and the mercy shown the offenders. On this
occasion, with ropes around their necks, the coffins before their
eyes, and their graves In view, they waited the last words of the
chaplain, when at the last moment the reprieve came for ten of the
80eleven waiting to die. The eleventh man, James Coleman, guilty of
78Bowman, Morale of the American Revolutionary Army, 90.
79General Orders, May 25, 1780, Writings of Washington. XVIII,
422.
®®The criminals pardoned on May 26, 1780, by a proclamation 
ef the Commander in Chief were: Emanuel Evans, Cornelius Mix,
Thomas Brown, Joseph Infelt, John Earhart, Mathew Ball, James Hanly 
(tteaby), Lancaster Lighthall, Thomas Calvin, Washington Papers,
Library of Congress, Boll 66.
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numerous desertions, forging discharges, and causing more than one
hundred soldiers to leave the army, suffered the death penalty.®'*'
Appeals to Congress requesting pardons for condemned deserters
were sometimes fruitful. Acting on the recommendation of General
Putnam, Congress passed a resolution on September 2, 1777, approving
pardons for two soldiers, Amos Rose and Lemuel Ackerly, had been
82sentenced to death by a court. Congress sometimes dumped the 
decision back into the lap of the army. A petition on behalf of John 
Moore, a deserter from the Fourth Virginia Regiment who was sentenced 
to be shot, was read in Congress on October 20, 1777, and referred to 
the Board of War. Two days later the Board of War reported its
opinion that the case be referred to General Washington for his
83determination, and he remitted the punishment against Moore and
8 Lordered him to rejoin his regiment. Congress passed a resolution on
May 23, 1777, granting the Commander in Chief full power of pardoning
or remitting any punishment ordered by a court-martial for any offense
85mentioned in the Articles of War. A petition for a pardon for 
ftlVan Doren, Mutiny in January, 23-25.
82Resolution of Congress, September 2, 1777, Journals of the 
Continental Congress, VIII, 703.
83Ibid., IX, 822, 828.
Q  AWashington to Colonel David Mason, November 14, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, X, 63.
85John Laurance, judge advocate general, requested this 
resolution on May 17, 1777, which was passed May 23, 1777, Journals 
of the Continental Congress, VIII, 381.
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Thomas McCann, condemned to be shot for desertion from General Howe's
command in South Carolina, was the occasion for Congress' extending
the pardoning power to all generals commanding separate departments.
The resolution specified that commanders were empowered to grant
"free pardons" to criminals if they considered "such a step conducive
to the good of the service and the public welfare." They could also
order executions for all criminals condemned to death by courts-
martial without being obliged to report the matter to Congress or
86to the Commander in Chief.
Pardons
Along with individual pardons, the Commander in Chief
occasionally ordered pardons on a broader scale. The July 4, 1779
"anniversary of our glorious Independence" served as an occasion to
87pardon all prisoners then under the sentence of death. The
Commander in Chief more than once pardoned from ten to twenty or more
persons at a time; other commanders imitated this practice —  Heath
pardoned twenty-six, and Sullivan twenty-nine, at a single stroke of 
88the pen.
86Ibid., VIII, 476-77.
87General Orders, July 4, 1779, Writings of Washington, XV,
364. At least three soldiers, DePeu, King, and Bettis, were 
pardoned that day, and possibly several others benefited from this 
proclamation. Washington to Major General Alexander McDougall, July 3, 
1779, ibid., XV, 361-62; Washington to Philip Schuyler, July 9,
1779, ibid., XV, 405.
88General Orders, April 28, 1777, ibid., VII, 484-85; VIII,
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General proclamations of pardon were devices used by the
89 90Continental Congress, the various states, and the army to induce
men to return to the service. These proclamations offered pardons
to deserters who would return to camp within a given time, and
threatened drastic punishment for all who refused to do so. The
proclamations were published widely in the newspapers and occasionally
91printed as handbills for distribution near army camps.
Washington permitted some recruiters to extend pardons to 
92deserters. On four occasions Washington issued proclamations 
covering the entire army. The first appeared on April 6, 1777, 
promising pardon to all deserters who voluntarily surrendered themselves
213-14; XVIII, 3, 422; XXIII, 320; Orderly Book No. 32, February 15, 
1780, National Archives.
^June 9, 1777, Journals of the Continental Congress, VIII,
431.
^Rhode Island Proclamation, August 3, 1780, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 68; Massachusetts Proclamation, 
May 13, 1780, ibid., Roll 66; Virginia Proclamation, August 29,
1780, ibid., Roll 70; Hening, Statutes at Large, X, 265; New Jersey 
Archives, 2nd ser., I, 5.
^ New Jersey Gazette, No. 16, March 16, 1778; New Jersey 
Archives; Newspaper Extracts, II, 119-20: The articles promised
free pardon to all deserters from the Jersey brigade who returned 
to camp by April 5, 1778, and if they refused to return they were 
promised to be severely punished. Handbill, April 13, 1779, Wash­
ington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 57; Virginia Gazette 
(Dixon and Nicholson), April 2, 1779, p. 32.
92Washington to Colonel David Mason, September 2, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, IX, 165-66; Washington to Colonel Elisha 
Sheldon, April 18, 1780, ibid., XVIII, 281.
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93before the fifteenth of May. In October, 1777, Congress ordered
that another general proclamation be issued covering the period to
January 1, 1 7 7 8 . The third, issued March 10, 1779, stated that,
since some deserters had not rejoined their Corps because of fear
of punishment, their apprehension could be dismissed if they
95would return by May 1. This grace period proved too short since
few came in, and it was extended to July 1, thus covering altogether
over three and a half m o n t h s . T h e  last general proclamation was
issued in 1782 in the hope of dissolving the "New Corps" organized
by the British out of men who deserted from Continental forces; it
97applied only to deserters then in the British service.
These proclamations proved to be very disappointing; only 
an occasional fugitive came in to claim pardon tinder their provisions. 
Most deserters, perhaps, remained ignorant of the offers, and others 
preferred to run the risk of capture rather than to return voluntarily
^Proclamation, April 6, 1777, ibid., VII, 364.
^October 17, 1777, Journals of the Continental Congress,
IX, 816; Writings of Washington. IX, 426-27, 496.
95Proclamation, March 10, 1779, ibid., XIV, 222-23.
^Proclamation, April 22, 1779, ibid., XIV, 429-30.
97Washington to the Secretary at War, January 20, 1782, ibid., 
XXIII, 456; to Heath, January 29, 1782, ibid., XXIII, 469. Probably 
issued February 8, 1782.
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to the army. Washington, who lost confidence in obtaining any good
results from general proclamations of pardon, was very reluctant to
issue the second one. The Council of Safety of Maryland reported to
Washington in 1777 that it was disappointed that so few availed
98themselves of the benefit of the proclamations. Some good results
were reported in scattered areas after the 1779 proclamation.
Samuel Culper of New York wrote to Benjamin Tallmadge that he was
surprised to see a large number of deserters come in since the "General's
99Pardon" appeared in the newspapers. In the main, however,
Washington did not think proclamations were producing desirable 
results; he even tried to discourage Virginia from issuing a 
proclamation in 1780, stating that it would actually encourage 
future desertions.
The overall results of the proclamations of pardon proved to 
be harmful to the army. The few soldiers who returned without 
punishment only encouraged others to leave in the belief that they 
would also be able to return without punishment under provisions
98Council of Safety (Annapolis), 1777, Archives of Maryland,
XVI, 202-203.
^Samuel Culper to Banjamin Tallmadge, April 4, 1779,
Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 57.
^^Washington to Govornor Thomas Jefferson, August 29,
1780, Writings of Washington. XIX, 468-70.
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of some future proclamation of mercy. Washington despaired of this 
method: "I have tried the efficacy of proclamations of pardon to
deserters so often," he wrote Benjamin Lincoln in 1781, "and have 
found so little good result from them, that I am inclined to think 
desertion is rather encouraged than remedied by a frequent repetition 
of them. The Soldier goes off or remains at home after a furlough, 
and looks for a proclamation as a thing of course. Nevertheless, 
the General did not give up hope, but continued to issue proclamations.
It was evident from the beginning that neither punishment, 
the threat of death, nor proclamations of pardon would prevent men 
from deserting the service; yet the army had no alternative but to 
try to stop it by these methods. Just as Washington was aware that 
restraints were necessary to maintain good discipline in the army, 
so he also knew that too frequent use of the gallows demoralized the 
entire military force. He was not able to escape his dilemma. 
Desertions continued and the army continued to use very severe 
methods to punish the guilty until the end of the war.
The Commander in Chief took no pleasure in punitive measures.
He begged his men to save him the anguish of having to inflict 
harsh chastisements on them. He seemed unable to understand why 
men behaved as they did: "Why will Soldiers force down punishment
■^Washington to Benjamin Lincoln, February 27, 1781, ibid., 
XXI, 308.
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upon their heads? Why will they not be satisfied to do their
duty, and reap the benefits of it? Why will they abandon or betray
so great a trust? Why will they madly turn their backs upon glory,
102freedom and happiness?1 He expected too much, for no commander
has ever been able to have "the business of the Army conducted
103without punishment." The cure for desertion remained unanswered 
during the American Revolutionary War.
102General Orders, June 10, 1777, ibid., VIII, 214. 
^^General Orders, January 1, 1776, ibid., IV, 203.
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CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSION
This study has made no attempt to cover all the aspects of 
desertion in the American Revolutionary Army. Future studies might 
well show how many men deserted from each separate regiment, listed 
according to the states where they were inducted. An accurate record 
of executions should be made available. This information would be 
very useful if compiled according to states, dates of executions, 
family background, place of birth, age, race, occupation, and 
educational level.
It would also be of interest to know the relationship between 
the army and civilians who became entangled with military justice.
On several occasions private citizens were punished by courts- 
martial, and a few were executed.'*’ Since the British were also 
struggling with the problem of desertion, a comparison of the situation 
in the two armies would be enlightening. A study of how officer 
discontent affected desertion in the ranks would yield fruitful 
results.
What are the principal conclusions to be drawn from the study?
The Americans obviously found no satisfactory remedy for the problem
^The excellent study by Frederick Bernays Wiener, Civilians Under 
Military Justice: The British Practice since 1689 Especially in North
America (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1967) should
be duplicated to show the American civilian experience during the 
Revolutionary War.
357
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of desertion during the Revolutionary War. Regardless of the military's 
efforts to satisfy specific needs of the soldiers, or of the multitude 
of laws passed by governing bodies to prevent desertion, soldiers 
left the service in droves. Various punishments failed to restrain 
men from running off. The American army dealt with desertion not 
unlike other armies: (1) by encouraging faithful service with
reminders of love of country and manly obligation to perform legal 
duty; (2) by vigorously pursuing those who would not serve; and (3) by 
punishing captured runaways.
It was perhaps asking too much to expect to establish over­
night an effective fighting organization properly provisioned and 
composed of well trained officers and disciplined troops. Organiza­
tional and command functions of an army during wartime are staggering 
even for long-established countries, and to assume these burdens in 
revolutionary periods compounds the difficulties. It would have 
been most remarkable had there been no problem of desertion during the 
Revolution. The American forces had no long tradition of gallant 
service and meritorious action in combat to bolster morale to a point 
sufficient to overcome the desire of many men to go home illegally.
It was praiseworthy that the American army remained intact during 
eight years of war, and too much to expect that it should have found a 
workable solution to the age-old problem of desertion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
359
The "Typical" Deserter
The question might be asked, "Was there a ’typical' deserter
during the American Revolutionary War"? The answer is probably "no."
The typical deserter was actually the typical soldier. Some men
needed no special hardships or problems to encourage them to leave.
The fact that they were serving in the army, away from their homes
and families, was reason enough for leaving at the first opportunity.
lu*u iIiclc been uu offering or nuOiTuogeb of Toed, Supplies, clothing,
money, and housing, it would have mattered little to this sort of
soldier. A recent study suggests that every soldier who deserts
suffers from a personality disorder, lumped under the label of
"domestic neurosis," which caused him, when placed in the military
service, to give home and family problems first place, with the army
2second, if any place. A few left because they did not relish facing
death in combat, or, if captured, being hanged as rebels. They were
too human. Their love of life was stronger than their will to
fight for the ideal dream of political freedom, a cause that they
did not fully understand. On many occasions this proved to be
true with Washington's soldiers; at times whole units walked away
3without the least concern for the welfare of those left behind.
2Harold A. Rashkls, "Notes on Interviewing AWOL Soldiers," 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XL (January, 1945), 100-101.
3John Cadeuslader to Washington, December 3, 1777, Washington 
Papers. Library of Congress, Roll 46. Cadewalader wrote that the 
army was "every day reduced, by whole Brigades, leaving you, in
sight of the Roemy."
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Randolph Shaw, a cavalry officer, after studying desertion
in the American army during the late nineteenth century, compiled
a list of interesting conclusions that seem applicable to the
revolutionary period. He found that the rate of desertion was
considerably higher in the spring and summer than in the fall and
winter, and that it fell when punishment was severe, but gradually
increased to the same rate and even went higher at times. Shaw's
final conclusion was that most men deserted simply because they did
not like army life. He found that pay increases, changes in methods
of apprehension, and increased punishment had little lasting effect
in reducing the desertion rate. Every attempt by the army to reduce
desertions by any broad change in policy invariably proved unsuccessful.
The causes of defection were placed more largely oc the offender
and his outside interests than on the service itself. A study at
Fort Levenworth after World War I showed that 44 per cent of those
confined for illegal departures had criminal records in civilian 
4life. There is no reason to believe the causes in most cases were 
greatly different during the Revolutionary War when approximately 20 
to 25 per cent forsook the service.
Although specifying characteristics of a "typical" deserter 
from the American Revolutionary army is hazardous, Arthur J. Alexander
^Randolph C. Shaw, "Diagnosing Desertions," The Cavalry Journal, 
XXIX (July, 1920), 145-51.
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has drawn some suggestive conclusions regarding deserters listed in
the "wanted" advertisements appearing in the two Virginia Gazettes
published during the years 1776-1780. He found that runaways came
from all sections of Virginia, but with fewer from the mountain and up-
country counties. Alexander noted that "132 out of 214 deserters
were men in their late teens or early twenties," and that after a
soldier celebrated his twenty-sixth birthday he was less prone to 
£flee the service. At the same time, he observed that more thirty- 
year old men deserted than those of any other age. Alexander, 
however, partly discredited Washington's frequently stated warning 
against enlisting "Old Countrymen," for he found only nine per cent, 
or fifty-eight, of all advertised deserters to be of known foreign
"7origin, with Irishmen slightly in the lead.' Of the total twenty- 
three were Irishmen, twenty-two Britons, nine Frenchmen, eleven 
mulattoes, and one each were German, Portugese, Scotch, and Canadian. 
Not all were from the Old Dominion; some were from other states. 
Alexander explained that the low percentage of foreign born could be 
accounted for by the nature of the data used. Advertisements were 
not inserted for each and every quitter. Descriptions of the deserters
Arthur J. Alexander, "A Footnote on Deserters from the Virginia 
Forces During the American Revolution," Virginia Historical Magazine,
LV (April, 1947), 139-46; one of the two Virginia Gazettes was edited 
by Alexander Purdie and his nephew after his death, and the other was 
edited by John Dixon and John Hunter, and later in copartnership with 
Thomas Nicholson.
^Alexander, o£. cit., 145.
7Ibid., 138.
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were often vague partly due to poorly kept regimental records. 
Commanders with high percentages of German troops might have 
deliberately chosen not to advertise as much as other units. General 
Muhlenberg's "German Regiment" advertised for only three deserters 
from its ranks. Alexander found the average deserter or draftee who 
failed to muster to be a young man under twenty-six, who might have 
come from any part of the state, was probably b o m  in America, and 
had been employed before his service in a variety of trades and 
professions.^
Other lists of deserters are available in scattered sources.
In an attempt to apprehend runaways, for example, Washington required
descriptive lists prepared and distributed to the county recruiting
officers and others in a position to use them. On August 10, 1782,
the General ordered the commanding officers of various state lines
to accumulate data on all men who had deserted from their regiments
since January 1, 1777, and to send these lists to him and to the 
9state governors. Washington asked that the lists describe as 
accurately as possible the physical features of the men, as well as 
the dates of their enlistment and desertion, place of birth, and home
8Ibid., 144-46.
^General Orders, August 10, 1782, Writings of Washington, XXIV,
493.
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towns. Some of these lists are found in the Revolutionary War 
Records kept at the National Archives in Washington, D. C . ^
The list found in the George Clinton Papers differs considerably 
with the findings of Alexander's study in regard to age and place 
of birth, while the returns of Henry Jackson's regiment closely 
correspond with Alexander's in age but differ in birth place.
Clinton's rather short roster of only fifty-three deserters showed an 
average age of twenty-eight and a half; only three were less than 
twenty, and two were very old men —  one sixty-seven and the 
other fifty-five. Jackson showed even fewer deserters on his lists 
with the average age of those included a little over twenty-four. 
Clinton listed over twenty-eight per cent of his deserters as foreign 
bom, while Jackson recorded an even higher one of forty-eight.
No doubt, when other lists are compared equally divergent percentages 
would emerge. Until an accurate list of all the men who deserted 
the American army can be compiled approximate percentages will have 
to suffice. The same difficulty prevails when attempting to determine 
the physical features of deserters such as their average height, 
weight, and complexion.
Age seemed not to be the most Important factor in determining 
the probability of desertion, because most of the soldiers were young
■^Revolutionary War Rolls, Record Group 93, State Rolls,
National Archives, Roll 28 (Connecticut); Roll 37 (Massachusetts).
List are also found in returns of various commanders and in published 
papers: Hastings and Holden (eds.), Public Papers of George Clinton,
VIII, 286-87; Henry Jackson, "Returns of Regiment, 1777-1780,"
U. S. Revolution, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Library of Congress,
File Box I.
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men in their prime. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the 
average age of deserters would correspond with the average age of all 
the men in the army. Elderly patriots were enlisted, and some of 
them did depart illegally as indicated in Clinton's report, which 
included the sixty-seven year old Charles Dutcher of Connecticut.
A fifty-dollar reward was offered for the capture of Nathan Hall 
of the First Jersey Regiment, listed as an "elder man" in the adver­
tisement appearing in the New Jersey Journal. According to this 
description, he left on an authorized leave of ten days in January,
1779, and had not returned by November of that year.^ On the other 
hand, some very young men deserted. An advertisement appeared in the 
New Jersey Gazette in 1780 seeking the return of nineteen-year-old
James Lucay of North Carolina; and another in the Pennsylvania
12Journal in 1779 sought Nathaniel Avis who was only seventeen. The 
very young James Robilliard, only fifteen when he entered the Continental 
service, deserted to the enemy in January 1779, and was captured in 
May on board the British ship George while attempting to make his way 
to Scotland.^
Except for his physical appearance and his formal education, 
it is doubtful that the profile of an average deserter during the
**The New Jersey Journal, November 30, 1779.
12New Jersey Gazette, August 23, 1780; The Pennsylvania Journal. 
September 22, 1779.
l*Gates to Washington, May 25, 1779, Washington Papers,
Library of Congress, Roll 58.
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American Revolutionary War would differ greatly from the average 
slacker of today. Fred S. Hoffman, a military writer, has made a 
study of 116 soldiers listed as deserters to Sweden during the Viet 
Nam War and has constructed this description of the typical army 
deserter:
He is a regular Army soldier, nearly 23 years old and 
has had three years of high school. He is single, 
has no civilian occupation of skill, came from the 
more highly populated states, could not adjust to 
Army life, and was a disciplinary problem before 
he defected.
Methods Used to Desert
Soldiers used various methods to desert. As previously men­
tioned, one of the best opportunities to desert came when units 
were on the move from one location to another. Those disposed to 
leave slowed their pace, lingered until chey were far behind the 
main body, and when out of sight, they "got lost." Even though the 
commanders took careful precautions to prevent straggling, all the 
troops could not be watched every minute, which meant that any soldier 
who had determined to leave could best effect his escape during a march.
Equally effective was the practice of leaving during the 
confusion of battle. Soldiers often found themselves isolated from 
their comrades during skirmishes; once separated, they could easily
*^Fred S. Hoffman, "Army Draws Profile of Average Deserter," 
Jackaon Sun (Jackson, Tennessee), April 14, 1969.
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hide until the action ended and make their way home or to the enemy. 
Many continentals left from camp areas. Usually under cover of dark­
ness, they would make their way past the guards posted to prevent this 
very thing from happening. Others left from hospitals, or obtained 
authorized leaves and never returned. Small groups of soldiers sent 
out on special missions, or transfered to adjacent units, took
15this opportunity to run off while they were not closely supervised.
If the intention of the deserter was to join the enemy, assistance
was obtained from loyalists who helped him get to British lines.
16Boats were used frequently in making get-aways. British ships
17offered sanctuary to American army defectors. If soldiers did
not wish to join the enemy, they often went home to be hidden by
relatives and friends. Some chose to seek safety outside the
American continental limits by crossing over into Canada. Others fled
to the hills of Vermont for safety. Washington was especially
annoyed by the sanctuary soldiers found in Vermont, describing it
18as an asylum for all deserters.
^Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, February 5, 1777, 
Writings of Washington, VII, 110.
^James Lexington to Washington, April 11, 1780, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 69; Israel Putnam to Washington,
July 21, 1777, ibid., Roll 42. John Fairbanks, "Journal of John 
Fairbanks," Maine Historical Society, Collections and Proceedings,
2nd ser VI (1895), 140.
■^William Maxwell to Washington, November 13, 1779, Washington 
Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 62.
^^Washington to Joseph Jones, July 10, 1781, Writings of 
Washington, XXII, 354.
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A few soldiers managed to get out of the army by deserting, 
joining another unit, receiving additional pay, then revealing their 
true identity, taking their whipping, and being drummed out of the 
army. Of course this procedure was risky, since some were hanged 
for the crime. Daniel Carmicle, a soldier in Colonel Paterson's
1 Qregiment, was able to receive a discharge by following this procedure. 
Patrick English, in the Delaware regiment, was not so fortunate. He 
attempted to desert by changing his clothes and name and re-enlisting 
in one of the Jersey regiments. He was discovered, tried, and
onsentenced one hundred lashes.
Sometimes soldiers left in groups after making careful 
preparations. General William Maxwell informed Washington in 1779 
that twelve or thirteen left the Second Jersey Regiment after 
planning their escape for several nights in a house a short distance 
from town. One of the group informed an officer of the plan, but 
before they could be apprehended, the sentry at the colonel's door, 
who was in on the plot, sent word to those already assembled and 
they made good their escape. However, six were captured along with 
the guard.^
■^Hensham "Orderly Book", 124.
^General Orders, May 27, 1779, Writings of Washington, XV, 163.
21Major General William Maxwell to Washington, April 17,
1779, Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Roll 57.
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The Effect of Desertion During 
Combat Situations
Few if any battles, once underway, were lost as a direct 
result of desertion. Retreats occurred, some orderly and some dis­
orderly, as a result of confusion or superior enemy strength during which 
soldiers made good their escape from the army. The impact of desertion 
was felt more in planning attacks where commanders contended with half­
filled regiments. Similarly, desertion affected the enlisting of 
new recruits, the training of soldiers, and the maintaining of 
good military discipline. Desertion, consequently, discouraged 
some commanders from fighting. In only a few instances did desertion 
during the conflict cause the course of the battle to turn, and this 
usually in small engagements.
Probably the heaviest desertion in combat occurred during the 
New York campaign in 1776, where Washington's army of approximately 
20,000 was badly beaten in several engagements. Thousands of 
Americans deserted the colors at that time, and, no doubt, did 
affect the outcome of the battle to some extent. More importantly, 
however, were other factors such as poor communications and untrained 
soldiers. Desertion was, at best, only a secondary cause for this 
military disaster. The bulk of those who left illegally departed 
after the outcome of the contest was fairly well determined.
Considerable numbers fled during the New Jersey campaign in 
1778 when Washington pursued the British on their withdrawal from
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Philadelphia to New York; especially was this so following the bloody
22but indecisive battle at Monmouth Court House on June 28. After
burying the dead with full military honors, Washington ordered an
immediate return of the killed, wounded, and missing during the 
23battle. From Brunswick, the next day, Washington again ordered
the commanders to "avail themselves of this opportunity for
collecting all their Straglers." He also ordered officers "to exert
themselves in re&:raining their men from straggling, injuring Fences,
Fruit Trees and etc."2^
In reporting the casualties to Horatio Gates, Washington,
mentioned the men killed and wounded, but said nothing about the
25number of deserters in the campaign. To Augustine Washington
the Commander in Chief noted that he suffered "60 men killed, 132
wounded, and abt. 130 Missing, some of whom I suppose may yet come 
26in." On the same day, letters to Governors William Livingston 
and Patrick Henry mentioned only British losses and the 60 Americans
22For a full account of this battle see John R. Alden,
General Charles Lee (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1948), chapters 13-16, and Freeman, George Washington, V, 11-36.
23General Orders, June 30, 1778, Writings of Washington, XII, 132.
^General Orders, July 2, 1778, ibid., XII, 147.
23Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, July 3, 1778, 
ibid., XII, 148-50.
26Washington to Augustine Washington, July 4, 1778, ibid.,
XII, 157-58.
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killed and 132 wounded, with nothing said about the 130 miss­
ing.27
Proof that many desertions occurred during this time is to 
be found in the fact that in the weeks that followed numerous courts- 
martial of captured deserters were held in the various regiments.
Even one officer deserted. Lieutenant Garland Burnley of the Seventh
Virginia Regiment was tried for absenting himself from his command
28without leave, found guilty, and was discharged from the service.
On July 26, 1778, Washington wrote the president of Congress
that "the moving state of the Army has for some time past, in a
29great degree, suspended the exercises of the Inspectorate."
After the troops marched from Brunswick, Washington noted that there 
had been a scaitcity of general officers, because so many of them 
were being used in courts-martial proceedings. Several soldiers 
received death sentences for desertion during the June battles. 
Alexander Graham, alias Smith, in Colonel Meigs' Regiment, was tried 
for desertion. The court found him guilty by a unanimous vote and 
"sentenced him to be shot to death." John Craige of the Fourth 
Maryland Regiment, tried for desertion to the enemy and found guilty,
^Washington to William Livingston, July 4, 17/8, ibid., XII, 
158-59; to Governor Patrick Henry, ibid., XII, 159-60.
^General Orders, July 18, 1778, ibid., XII, 191.
^Washington to President of Congress, July 26, 1778, ibid., 
XII, 234.
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30was unanimously "sentenced to suffer death." A few days later,
John Jenkins, Zechariah Ward, Richard Burk, Michael Carmer, William
McConklin of the Sixth Maryland Regiment, Nicholas Fitzgerald of the
Seventh Maryland Regiment, and Solomon Lyons of the Second Virginia
Regiment were tried for desertion in several courts-martial trials,
found guilty by a unanimous vote in each case, and sentenced to
death. Another, John Daily of the Seventh Maryland Regiment, was also
found guilty of desertion but received only one hundred lashes. David
McClemens of the Delaware Regiment was tried for desertion and acquitted.
Washington approved these sentences and ordered the whipping of Daily
to take place the next morning at the head of his regiment, but did
31not specify a date for the execution of the others. Yet, if there 
were heavy desertions during the Monmouth campaign, the evidence 
indicates that these desertions did not materially affect the outcome 
of the campaign.
Deserters were more likely to alter the outcome of small 
engagements than large battles. Even here most expeditions succeeded 
or failed because of other factors and not because of the number of 
men who slipped away. The Sandusky expedition to the Ohio country 
during the summer of 1782 offers a good example of how men reacted
30General Orders, July 27, 1778, ibid., XII, 242.
31General Orders, July 31, 1778, ibid., XII, 254-55.
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in limited battlefield exercises. Baron Rosenthal, or Major John
Rose, a Russian serving as aide to Colonel William Crawford, leader
of the expedition, left an interesting account of the month's 
32campaign. On June 4, the day of the battle, while yet a few
miles short of Sandusky, Rosenthal wrote that about one hundred men
determined among themselves "not to proceed any farther." Thus, the
expedition was temporarily stopped. Shortly thereafter, scouts
brought in favorable information in regard to the Indian force that
for the moment eased tensions; the march continued for about five
miles when it halted again. "The Majority was for returning,"
wrote Rosenthal, "discouraged by the scarcity of their provisions,
and that there was not the least signs of any cultivation, or
33inhabitants nor cattle or horses."
After a reconnoitering party found the Indians, an almost
continuous fight ensued from June 4 to June 6, in which the American
force retreated while being pursued by the red men. During the hard
fighting the-first day and the retreat that followed Rosenthal reported
"that a good many deserted us; who mostly all lost themselves in the
34Woods and fell into our Rear at Mohickin John's Town." On June 12,
32Rosenthal (John Rose), "Journal of a Volunteer Expedition 
to Sandusky, from May 24 to June 13, 1782," XVIII, 129-57, 293-328.
33June 4, 1782, ibid., 149.
^June 6, 1782, ibid., 154.
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Rosenthal noted that some of those who deserted during the battle 
returned to camp on the Ohio River. Men in battle with Indians 
in wooded areas, no doubt, felt that they would be safer alone than 
staying with the main body. They believed that the Indians would not 
allow the military force to get away, and they left the expedition 
to save their lives. The number killed and missing during this 
encounter was estimated to be between forty and fifty out of a force 
of three hundred. Rosenthal understood the fear that possessed men 
facing the possibility of death: "Think[ing] this was the last,
qcthe dreadful moment, [they] deserted.1 Yet he wrote that the small
body that did not desert fought heroically, and even boasted of their
success: "We got rid of all our cowards, and the enemy got a
36sufficient check, not to molest us any more on our march." To 
Rosenthal the campaign had been a success in spite of the desertions. 
Actually the British and Indians had carried the field causing 
Crawford's force to flee helter-skelter. Most prisoners, which
37included Colonel Crawford, were promptly slaughtered by the Indians.
35June 13, 1783, ibid., 310.
36Ibid., 311.
^Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, ed. John 
Richard Alden (2 vols., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952),
II, 863-64.
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Was Desertion a Real Problem?
The question must be asked, "Was desertion a real problem during 
the Revolutionary War?" The answer is "yes," if we stop here and
say no more. But when asked in a more limited sense —  whether
desertion materially altered the course of the war? —  the answer 
must be "no"; it did not. There is no evidence to indicate that the
war was prolonged because of desertion and, obviously, no way to prove
that it would have been any shorter had there been no desertions. 
Therefore, it must be concluded that desertion had no significant 
impact on the course of the war, even though the effectiveness of 
the army was reduced. It is quite possible that the Commander in 
Chief greatly exaggerated the problem. If so, it is easily under­
stood; Washington had a war to fight, and any person who shirked his 
duty was naturally deemed a pernicious influence on the army and 
deserved to be punished. The General was well aware that a few 
deserters could affect adversely the overall determination of the 
nation to pursue the war.
The average person in the mid-1770's was basically non­
military in his attitudes. When called to serve as a soldier, he 
remained a civilian at heart, more likely to follow civilian views 
than to become enamored of military law. He could not easily be 
persuaded to serve during periods when he was not really needed, nor 
encouraged to endure hardships which he deemed unnecessary. A few 
inconveniences, added to the natural reluctance to serve in the army,
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produced the perfect ingredients for desertion to take place. It is 
true that there were many loyal, well-trained soldiers who endured all 
the hardships of army life, and who served without trying to better 
their plight by running away —  at the very time their fellow soldiers 
were illegally leaving the colors.
Washington realized early in the war that patriotism was not 
enough to hold men in the service. In a long letter written at
Valley Forge in 1778 to John Banister, just after over ninety officers
had applied for permission to resign their commissions, the General 
said:
Men may speculate as they will; they may talk of
patriotism; they may draw a few examples from ancient
story, of great achievements performed by its influence; 
but whoever builds upon it, as a sufficient Basis for 
conducting a long and [bloody] War, will find themselves 
deceived in the end.
Washington reasoned that the army must deal with "the passions of 
Men as Nature has given them," taking into consideration all the 
principles that will ultimately guide their actions. The Commander 
in Chief said that he did not mean "to exclude altogether the Idea of 
Patriotism," because he knew it did exist, and had accomplished much 
in the American army. The point that he wanted to stress was that "a 
great and lasting War can never be supported on this principle alone."
38Washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778, Writings of 
Washington. XI, 286.
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Rather, he asserted, "it must be assisted by a prospect of Interest 
or some reward. For a time, it may, of itself push Men to Action; to 
hear much, to encounter difficulties, but it will not endure unassisted 
by Interest.
Washington was saying that there must be something of material 
worth offered to men to persuade them to serve in the army. If this 
was true for officers, it was also true for every person who donned 
the uniform of any regiment. Since benefits offered to soldiers were 
far below those promised to officers, the task of keeping troops on 
active duty when they had pressing problems at home was one which 
very few commanders were able to accomplish with notable success.
Washington felt that Congress was not properly acquainted with 
the actual conditions that existed in the army. Writing to Robert 
Morris in 1777, the Commander in Chief said that it was "not in 
his power" to make Congress fully sensible of the real situation 
of our Affairs," and that it was with difficulty with all the means 
in his power that he was able to "keep the Life and Soul of this Army 
together." Washington believed that Congress was too far removed from 
the army to understand its needs; when the lawmakers heard of needs 
and grievances, "they think it is but to say Presto begone, and every­
thing is done. They seem not to have any conception of the difficulty 
and perplexity attending those who are to execute [the resolutions]."
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After stating his mind on this subject, which, no doubt, acted as a 
much needed catharsis for the General, he ended with a ray of hope.
"Our cause is good," he said, "and I hope Providence will support 
it."40
In any case, during the Revolutionary War a large number of 
American soldiers decided to await the final outcome a safe distance 
away from the army. Perhaps the nature of the war itself affected 
soldiers in a peculiar way. Final victory rested not so much on how 
many battles were won or lost, but on the continued existence of an 
American force that could offer resistance when pressed. As long as an 
American army was in the field, the British could not boast that the 
rebellion was squelched. American deserters hampered the effective­
ness of the Continental army, prevented it from being more aggressive 
by reducing its numbers, and caused commanders great anxiety by 
exhibiting a spirit of unwillingness to persevere to the end; but 
desertions did not cause the army to go out of existence. Those who 
remained faithful helped assure the political independence of all 
Americans.
Desertion in the Eighteenth-Century
Desertion rates from eighteenth-century armies were high 
everywhere. Most European armies of this period contained a substantial
40Washington to Robert Morris, March 2, 1777, ibid., VII, 225.
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element of ner'er-do-wells, social misfits, and even criminals,
41along with large numbers of peasant conscripts and mercenaries. 
During the American Revolution three British regiments were composed 
entirely of reprieved criminals, vagrants, and undesirables.
Armies drawn so largely from the lowest strata of society, and so 
non-national in composition, were prone to lose men by desertion. 
Frederick I, in 1711, ordered that future deserters from his army 
have their noses and one of their ears cut off and be sent to hard 
labor for life —  the threat was ineffective. From 1713 to 1740 the 
Prussian Army suffered 30,216 desertions from an army that averaged 
from 38,000 to 80,000 troops.^ In Russia, 20,000 deserters were 
counted in 1732.
During the Seven Years War the Austrian army lost 62,000 
men by desertion, France 70,000, and Prussia over 80,000. British 
regiments in Ireland, numbering about 12,000 in 1768, had above 500
41M. S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 137-38. Most
European armies contained large numbers of foreign mercenaries.
The French army included over 50,000 foreigners in the 1750rs, 
and still had over 40,000 in 1789. Twenty-eight of the one hundred- 
thirty-three battalions of infantry in the Spanish army were composed 
of foreigners, and twenty more battalions were proposed. The United 
Provinces had a Scottish brigade in their service, and 80,000 foreigners 
served in the Prussian army. The Swiss cantons, Ireland, Hesse- 
Cassel, Denmark, and Saxony hired out considerable forces as 
mercenaries. Ibid.
/  OJohn Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in
The Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1965), 175n.
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deserters per year. In the 1780's about one-sixth of the British
troops in Ireland deserted each year. The Prussian army, in the
War of the Barvarian Succession of 1778-1779, lost 3,400 men in battle
and over 16,000 by desertion. After the Seven Years War, France
set up military posts on her frontiers primarily to prevent soldiers
from fleeing their units. The average annual loss of the French
army through desertion and sickness prior to the revolutionary period
43was estimated at about 20,000 from a force of 80,000 men.
General Thomas Gage, British Commander in Chief in North 
America, was continually plagued during the years prior to the 
Revolution by desertions. He was especially disturbed because 
citizens so willingly gave assistance to deserters. Gage wantad 
the clause in the Mutiny Act against harboring deserters extended 
to America. As John Shy has pointed out, the British general had
learned very little in his ten years in North America if he seriously
44thought that such a stringent law would materially decrease desertions. 
Many British soldiers left the service in the 1760's and early 1770's 
Just as the American soldiers would do a few years later when their 
own armies were formed.
^Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth-Century, 138-39.
^Shy, Toward Lexington, 174-75.
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The British had their own share of defectors during the American 
Revolution, especially among the hired soldiers. The first attempt 
at influencing British troops to desert came on August 9, 1776, 
when Congress resolved that a committee of three be appointed to 
devise a plan to encourage the Hessians and other foreigners to quit 
the British forces.^ The resolve stated that
. . . these states will receive all such foreigners 
who shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty 
in America, and shall cause to become members of any 
of these states; that they shall be protected in the 
free exercise of their respective religions, and 
be invested with the rights, privileges and 
immunities of natives, as established by the laws 
of these states; and, moreover, that this Congress 
will provide for every such person 50 Acres of un­
appropriated lands in some of these states, to 
be held by him and his heirs in absolute 
property.
By August 26 Washington announced that the papers had been 
put into several channels so as to get them to the foreign troops.^ 
Shortly thereafter, another Congressional broadside appeared designed 
to influence the officers —  promising 1,000 acres of land to colonels, 
800 Co lieutenant colonels, 600 to majore, 400 to captains, 300 to 
lieutenants, 200 to ensigns, and 100 to non-commissioned officers, 
an added reward for officers who brought over a number of their
45Journals of the Continental Congress. V, 640.
46Ifcid., V, 654-55.
47Washington to the President of Congress, August 26, 1776, 
Writings of Washington. V, 491.
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soldiers. These measures had very little effect at first.
Captured prisoners said the Hessians had not received any bills and
knew nothing of the offers. When prisoner exchanges were offered,
Washington wanted the Hessians returned so they could spread favorable
reports about America among their comrades. The German commanders
sought to thwart the effort, but not until after it was already
49somewhat effective. From Canada there came reports of great numbers 
of Germans fleeing daily; and on one occasion seventy Brunswickers 
made off together.^® The New Jersey Gazette printed an article on 
September 16, 1778, stating that four Hessian runaways, who had 
deserted from Kingsbridge some ten days before, in company with a 
number of others, had passed through Trenton.
The morale of the German troops in America was not good.
Joseph Pell, an officer in the British Army, recorded in his diary 
(October 11, 1777) an account of a staff meeting during which Burgoyne
A O Journals of the Continental Congress, V, 707-708; Congress 
passed additional resolution on May 9, 1777, ibid., VII, 340; June 4, 
1777, ibid., VIII, 417. Franklin to Gates, 28 August 1776, Force 
(ed.), American Archives, 5th ser., I, 1193.
49Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Revolution in America: Confidential
Letters and Journals 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister 
of the Hessian Forces (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1957), 41.
"^Major General Horatio Gates interview of Captain L'Oiseau 
and Captain Allain, July, 1776, Force (ed.), American Archives, 5th 
ser., I, 799.
~*% e w  Jersey Gazette, September 16, 1778.
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tried to determine from his regimental commanders "what face their
regiments bore." The British commanders all answered that their
soldiers would fight to a man, but the German officers returned
to their regiments to determine the disposition of their troops, who
52responded with: "nix the money, nix the rum, nix the fighten!"
Pell attributed the defeat of Burgoyne, in part, to the sour disposition 
of the Germans, on whom no dependence could be placed.
The American efforts eventually paid off. During Clinton*s 
withdrawal to New York, the British and German forces suffered 
hundreds of desertions during the march. Baurmeister estimated that 
the Hessians alone had lost two hundred men, which he attributed not
to fatigue but rather to the long stay in Philadelphia and the many
53temptations put before the common soldiers. Probably over six
hundred Germans were lost to the British through desertion. Lyman H.
Butterfield estimates that over the eight years of the war between
54five and six thousand German soldiers deserted.
American Desertions after the Revolution
Desertion in the American army after the Revolutionary War 
was a continuing problem. Between February 1809 and January 1810,
"^Joshua Pell, Jr., "Diary of Joshua Pell, Junior, An Officer 
of the British Army in America 1776-1777," Magazine of American History, 
II (January, 1878), 111.
53Baurmeister, Revolution in America, 185.
"^Lyman H. Butterfield, "Psychological Warfare in 1776: The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
383
a force of 2,036 men under Brigadier General James Wilkinson,
operating at Terre aux Beoufs in the Mississippi River Valley,
55suffered 166 desertions. The American adjutant general reported
in 1823 that desertions totaled about one-fourth of the enlistments
for the year; in 1826 the number was more than half During
the Mexican War, the American army with an aggregate of only 47,150
57troops experienced 6,375 desertions or 14.28 per cent. In
1853 Secretary of War Jefferson Davis reported that the usual total
of desertions, added to discharges and deaths, compelled the re-
58placement of one-third of the army annually.
Ella Lonn, in her excellent study of desertion during the
Civil War, stated that statistics on desertion released after the
59war had been in progress for some time startled the country. 7 
The official records noted 278,644 desertions from the Union army
Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian desertion," American 
Philosophical Society Proceedings, XCIV (June, 1950), 240.
•’•’James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S. Army, 
1783-1812 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1947), 352.
Weigley, History of the United States Army, 168.
•’̂ Wilson, Digest of Laws, 8.
58Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 168.
■^Ella Lonn, Desertion During the Civil War (Glouster, Mass.: 
Peter Smith, 1966), 146.
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and 103,400 from the Confederate army during the four years of 
fighting.**® Lonn estimated that approximately 150,000 additional 
desertions should be added to the Union list. Fred Wilson said that 
draftees who failed to report for duty, and who were deemed deserters 
by the law, amounted to 161,286, and when added to the other figure 
gave a grand total of 508,494 desertions from an army of over two 
million men.*^ Thus possibly one-fourth of the Northern army deserted 
during the Civil War. At the end of the war there were still 117,247 
deserters at large, exclusive of non-reporting drafted men. Desertion 
continued after the Civil War, ranging in percentages from a low of 
7 in 1869 to over 21 in 1873.
In the early twentieth century the army corrected some of the 
more flagrant abuses that helped to account for the high rates of 
desertion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In World 
War I the desertion rate in the American army was reduced considerably, 
and the problem was not considered serious. During World War II, 40,000 
men deserted before the enemy in the European theater of operation
60House Executive Documents, 1847-1877, 39th Congress, 1st 
Sess., No. 1, IV, pt. I, 232-35.
^Wilson, Digest of Laws, 8.
62Ibid.; Weigley states that "in 1871 some 8,800 men, one- 
third of the army, deserted," Weigley, History of the United States 
Army, 290.
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alone. To American commanders in Europe the problem seemed serious
enough at the time to warrant the use of the death penalty as a
deterrent to further desertion. Of these 40,000 withdrawals, 2,864 were
tried by general courts-martial, and received sentences of from twenty
years to death. Forty-nine death sentences were approved by convening
authorities in Europe. (The death sentence had not actually been
carried out in the American army since the Civil War.) In punishing
offenders, the United States military usually followed the practice of
commuting death sentences, reducing confinement sentences systematically,
and releasing most deserters shortly after the end of the war. In
only one instance during World War II was this not the case: Private
Eddie D. Slovik was actually shot to death in 1945 after being convicted
63of the crime of desertion. The army executed ninety-six men during 
World War II, but Slovik was the only one shot for desertion.^
By the time of the Korean War, desertion had been greatly 
reduced, although much attention was given to a number of captured 
Americans who refused to be repatriated. The United States Army has 
made repeated announcements since the beginning of the Viet Mam War 
belittling the much publicized individuals who willingly deserted 
to avoid fighting in what many consider an unjust war. Apparently
William Bradford Huie, The Execution of Private Slovik: The
hitherto secret story of the only American soldier since 1864 to be 
shot for desertion (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), 6.
^ Ibld. Ninety-five of the ninety-six criminals were hanged 
by the united States for ordinary crimes of violence such as rape 
end murder.
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desertion has not been a major difficulty for the army during the 
Viet Nam conflict despite all the news coverage given to deserters.^ 
Even so, the problem continues to exist where men are unhappy with 
the idea of military service; just as it did in the American War 
of Independence.
In 1968 the Department of Defense reported that 155,536 
members of the military went absent without leave for periods of less 
than thirty days during that year. Military men absent more than 
thirty days are classified as deserters. There were 53,357 men 
listed as deserters in 1968. Very few of these men were tried and 
convicted for the crime of desertion. The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), 
March 6, 1969, p. 12.
The Pentagon reported February 13, 1968, that there had been 
86 convictions of desertion in the army during 1967; in 1966 there 
were 93; in 1965, 99; 1964, 111. Convictions for desertion from the 
Marine Corps were: 1967, 68; 1966, 25; 1965, 39; 1964, 21. The Air 
Force reported a total of 39 convictions since 1964, and the Navy 
reported a total of 48 convictions since 1964. "Desertion Convictions", 
Facts on File: World News Digest, XXVIII, No. 1444 (June 27-July 3,
1968), 264.
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APPENDIX I 
PRESIDENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
NAME DATE
Peyton Randolph, Virginia 5 September 1774
Henry Middleton, South Carolina 1774
Peyton Randolph, Virginia 10 March 1775
John Hancock, Massachusetts 24 May 1/75
Henry Laurens, South Carolina 1 November 1777
John Jay, New York 10 December 1778
Samuel Huntington, Connecticut 28 September 1779
Thomas McKean, Delaware 10 July 1781
John Hanson, Maryland 5 November 1781
Elias Boudinot, New Jersey 4 November 1782
Thomas Mifflin, Pennsylvania 4 November 1783
Richard Henry Lee, Virginia 30 November 1784
John Hancock, Massachusetts 23 November 1785
(did not serve)
Nathanael Gorham, Massachusetts 6 June 1786
Arthur St. Clair, Pennsylvania 2 February 1787
Cyrus Griffin, Virginia 22 June 1788
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Princeton, New Jersey 
Annapolis, Maryland 
Trenton, New Jersey 
New York 
New York
5 September - 26 October 1774
10 May 1775 - 12 December 1776
20 December 1776 - 4 March 1777 
5 March - 18 September 1777 
27 September 1777 
30 September 1777 - 27 June 1778 
2 July 1778 - 21 June 1783 
30 June - 4 November 1783 
20 November 1783 - 3 June 1784 
1 November - 24 December 1784
11 June 1785 - 2 March 1789 
4 March 1789 - 1800
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APPENDIX I I I
STATE GOVERNORS DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR1
STATE GOVERNOR TERM IN OFFICE
Connecticut Jonathan Trumbull 1769-1784





Nicholas Van Dyke 1783-1786














Maryland Thomas Johnson 1777-1779
Thomas Sim Lee 1779-1782
William Paca 1782-1785
Massachusetts 2John Hancock 1780-1785
*List of governors, assembled by Macmillan, The War Governors. 
285-86, presented here in different arrangement.
“The executive powers in Massachusetts were exercised by a 
twenty-eight member council from 1775 to 1780 as provided by their 
charter in the absence, death, or displacement of the governor. John 
Hancock, James Bovdcin, and Jeremiah Powell Served as president of the 
Council at various times, ibid., 40-41.
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New Hampshire Meschech Weare 1776-1784
New Jersey William Livingston 1776-1790
New York George Clinton 1777-1795
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